Bounded Rationality and Repeated Network Formation

We define a finite-horizon repeated network formation game with consent and study the differences induced by two levels of individual rationality. Perfectly rational players will remain unconnected at the equilibrium, while nonempty equilibrium networks may form when players are assumed to behave as finite automata of limited complexity. We provide structural properties of the sequences of networks which are likely to form in Nash and subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the repeated game. For instance, players can form totally different connected networks at each period or the sequence of networks can exhibit a total order relationship.

Social networks applied to training

In this article, we address the importance and relevance that social networks exhibit in their use as an educational resource.  This relevance relies in the possibility of implementing new learning resources or increasing the level of the participant's connectivity, as well as developing learning communities.  Also, the risk entailed from their use is discussed, especially for the students that have a low technological education or those having excessive confidence on the media.  It is important to highlight that the educational use of social networks is not a simple extension or translation of the student's habitual, recreational use, but that it implies an important change in the roles given to teachers as well as learners; from accommodative learning environments that only encourage memorization to other environments that demand an active, reflective, collaborative and proactive attitude, that require the development/acquisition of technological as well as social abilities, aptitudes and values.  It is also important to highlight that a correct implementation and adequate use will not only foment formal learning, but also informal and non-formal learning.

Influence of social status on the welfare of sows in static and dynamic groups

Forty-eight Large White x Landrace multiparous sows were mixed into twelve groups of four animals after their piglets were weaned. These groups were defined as static, with no animals being added to or removed from the groups after their formation. Aggressive and submissive behaviours were recorded continuously for 9 h after the sows were mixed, and the sows were assigned high or low social status on the basis of their relative aggressiveness and success in aggressive interactions. After five weeks, each static group was mixed into a dynamic group of 40+/-2 sows for an 11-week period. Three static groups (ie 12 animals) at a time were added to the dynamic group at three-week intervals; the same number of animals was removed at these time-points in order to maintain the group number at 40+/-2. Injury levels increased significantly with the transition from static groups to the dynamic group (P

Network formation under mutual consent and costly communication

We consider two different approaches to describe the formation of social networks under mutual consent and costly communication. First, we consider a network-based approach; in particular Jackson–Wolinsky’s concept of pairwise stability. Next, we discuss a non-cooperative game-theoretic approach, through a refinement of the Nash equilibria of Myerson’s consent game. This refinement, denoted as monadic stability, describes myopically forward looking behavior of the players. We show through an equivalence that the class of monadically stable networks is a strict subset of the class of pairwise stable networks that can be characterized fully by modifications of the properties defining pairwise stability.

Community Cohesion and Social Inclusion: Unravelling a Complex Relationship

In a global context of an emphasis on identity politics and a ‘cultural turn’ in social analysis, deep concern has been expressed about multiethnic Britain becoming a broken society with many ‘sleepwalking’ into segregation and separatism. Given the close correspondence between areas of acute ethnic segregation and those of multiple deprivation, intercommunal tensions have included disputes about the equitable allocation of scarce urban resources across ethnicity. This creates the possibility that urban programmes may inadvertently accentuate intercommunal tension and confound efforts to synchronise cohesion and inclusion agendas. Following recent debates about the implications of increased diversity, influenced by arguments that multiculturalism has encouraged ‘parallel lives’, an emergent policy framework emphasises more proactive integration to promote ‘common belonging’. Criticism of this agenda includes its confusion between community and social cohesion, and its disproportionate focus on cultural aspects such as identity formation and recognition, relative to structural issues of income and class. In exploring this contested terrain in Britain, the article suggests that the longer-term debate about segregation, deprivation and community differentials in Northern Ireland can offer useful insight for Britain’s policy discourse.

Ambiguity, social opinion and the use of common property resources

In this paper we argue that ambiguity, combined with social opinion formation, can be used as the foundation of a game-theoretic equilibrium concept that transcends the standard Nash equilibrium concept, applied to a model of the tragedy of the commons. Our approach sheds light on the international environmental crisis and the relevant ongoing international negotiations. We conclude that social opinion formation in most cases has a significant impact on equilibrium common property resource usage.

Labor unions and Nash bargaining using coalition formation games

In this paper we examine the properties of stable coalitions under sequential and simultaneous bargaining by competing labor unions. We do this using the Nash bargaining solution and various notions of stability, namely, Nash, coalitional, contractual and core stability. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved,

Single mating in orchid bees (Euglossa, Apinae): implications for mate choice and social evolution

Neotropical orchid bees (Euglossini) are conspicuously different from other corbiculate bees (Apinae) in their lack of advanced sociality and in male use of acquired odors (fragrances) as pheromone-analogues. In both contexts, orchid bee mating systems, in particular the number of males a female mates with, are of great interest but are currently unknown. To assess female mating frequency in the genus Euglossa, we obtained nests from three species in Mexico and Panama and genotyped mothers and their brood at microsatellite DNA loci. In 26 out of 29 nests, genotypes of female brood were fully consistent with being descended from a singly mated mother. In nests with more than one adult female present, those adult females were frequently related, with genotypes being consistent with full sister-sister (r = 0.75) or mother-daughter (r = 0.5) relationships. Thus, our genetic data support the notions of female philopatry and nest-reuse in the genus Euglossa. Theoretically, single mating should promote the evolution of eusociality by maximizing the relatedness among individuals in a nest. However, in Euglossini this genetic incentive has not led to the formation of eusocial colonies as in other corbiculate bees, presumably due to differing ecological or physiological selective regimes. Finally, monandry in orchid bees is in agreement with the theory that females select a single best mate based on the male fragrance phenotype, which may contain information on male age, cognitive ability, and competitive strength.

Nash equilibria of network formation games under consent

We investigate the Nash equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation based on explicit consent in link formation. These so-called “consent models” explicitly take account of link formation costs. We provide characterizations of Nash equilibria of such consent models under both one-sided and two-sided costs of link formation. We relate these equilibrium concepts to link-based stability concepts, in particular strong link deletion proofness.

The Role of Subjectivity and Knowledge Power Struggles in the Formation of Public Policy

There is a growing incentive for sociologists to demonstrate the use value of their research. Research ‘impact’ is a driver of research funding and a measure of academic standing. Academic debate on this issue has intensified since Burawoy’s (2004) call for a ‘public’ sociology. However the academy is no longer the sole or primary producer of knowledge and empirical sociologists need to contend with the ‘huge swathes’ of social data that now exist (Savage and Burrows, 2007). This article furthers these debates by considering power struggles between competing forms of knowledge. Using a case study, it specifically considers the power struggle between normative and empirical knowledge, and how providers of knowledge assert legitimacy for their truth claims. The article concludes that the idea of ‘impact’ and ‘use-value’ are extremely complex and depends in the policy context on knowledge power struggles, and on how policy makers want to view the world. © The Author(s) 2012

Empowering the Shamed Self: Recognition and Critical Social Work

Summary: This article provides a review of the contribution of Axel Honneth’s model of recognition for critical social work. While Honneth’s tripartite conceptualisation of optimal identity-formation is positively appraised, his analysis of the link between misrecognition, the experience of shame and eventual sense of moral outrage, is contested. Drawing on a range of sources, including the sociology of shame, Honneth’s ideas about the emotional antecedents of emancipatory action are revised to guide critical social work with misrecognised service users.

Findings: The intellectual background to Honneth’s recognition model, emanating from leading German philosophers, is described and its application to social work set out. Even so, Honneth’s model is found to be deficient in one primary regard: its assumption about the emotional antecedents to quests for withheld recognition is misapprehended. In particular, the argument in this article is that the ubiquitous emotion of shame, which Honneth argues flows from misrecognition, must be carefully addressed through the medium of relationship, otherwise it might lead to repressed shame and frustrated attempts at social struggle. To this end, a social work process is delineated for dealing with shame, following episodes of misrecognition.

Applications: Honneth’s model of recognition, along with revised ideas about how to recognise and manage shame, is incorporated into a conceptual framework for critical social work practice. With this renewed understanding of the impact of shame, following misrecognition, social workers should be better equipped conceptually to enable service users to take action for empowerment.

Beyond Individualism: Social Work and Social Identity

Individualism continues to have a notable impact on social work. The personalisation of services and the individualisation of care are just two examples of this societal trend. While helping service users to articulate their aspirations for a better future, individualism, if taken too far, undermines the social aspects of life. In response to this concern, this paper argues that social work must appreciate the interplay between the individual and the collective spheres, and its impact on identity formation, in order to enhance human well-being. To give substance to this argument, Jenkins's model of social identity is appropriated and augmented to take account of four interlinked, yet distinct, orders of experience, namely the individual, interactional, institutional and societal orders. This reworked conceptualisation is then considered in terms of its implications for social work practice.

Identity and Link Reliability in Social Networks

This paper considers a non-cooperative network formation game where identity is introduced as a single dimension to capture the characteristics of a player in the network. Players access to the benefits from the link through direct and indirect connections. We consider cases where cost of link formation paid by the initiator. Each player is allowed to choose their commitment level to their identities. The cost of link formation decreases as the players forming the link share the same identity and higher commitment levels. We then introduce link imperfections to the model. We characterize the Nash networks and we find that the set of Nash networks are either singletons with no links formed or separated blocks or components with mixed blocks or connected.