Expanded polytetrafluoroethylene graft for bypass surgery using the excimer laser-assisted nonocclusive anastomosis technique

OBJECT: Patients with complex craniocerebral pathophysiologies such as giant cerebral aneurysms, skull base tumors, and/or carotid artery occlusive disease are candidates for a revascularization procedure to augment or preserve cerebral blood flow. However, the brain is susceptible to ischemia, and therefore the excimer laser-assisted nonocclusive anastomosis (ELANA) technique has been developed to overcome temporary occlusion. Harvesting autologous vessels of reasonable quality, which is necessary for this technique, may at times be problematic or impossible due to the underlying systemic vascular disease. The use of artificial vessels is therefore an alternative graft for revascularization. Note, however, that it is unknown to what degree these grafts are subject to occlusion using the ELANA anastomosis technique. Therefore, the authors studied the ELANA technique in combination with an expanded polytetrafluoroethylene (ePTFE) graft. METHODS: The experimental surgeries involved bypassing the abdominal aorta in the rabbit. Ten rabbits were subjected to operations representing 20 ePTFE graft-ELANA end-to-side anastomoses. Intraoperative blood flow, followup angiograms, and long-term histological characteristics were assessed 75, 125, and 180 days postoperatively. Angiography results proved long-term patency of ePTFE grafts in all animals at all time points studied. Data from the histological analysis showed minimal intimal reaction at the anastomosis site up to 180 days postoperatively. Endothelialization of the ePTFE graft was progressive over time. CONCLUSIONS: The ELANA technique in combination with the ePTFE graft seems to have favorable attributes for end-to-side anastomoses and may be suitable for bypass procedures.

Game-theoretic view on intermediated exchange

Intermediaries permeate modern economic exchange. Most classical models on intermediated exchange are driven by information asymmetry and inventory management. These two factors are of reduced significance in modern economies. This makes it necessary to develop models that correspond more closely to modern financial marketplaces. The goal of this dissertation is to propose and examine such models in a game theoretical context. The proposed models are driven by asymmetries in the goals of different market participants. Hedging pressure as one of the most critical aspects in the behavior of commercial entities plays a crucial role. The first market model shows that no equilibrium solution can exist in a market consisting of a commercial buyer, a commercial seller and a non-commercial intermediary. This indicates a clear economic need for non-commercial trading intermediaries: a direct trade from seller to buyer does not result in an equilibrium solution. The second market model has two distinct intermediaries between buyer and seller: a spread trader/market maker and a risk-neutral intermediary. In this model a unique, natural equilibrium solution is identified in which the supply-demand surplus is traded by the risk-neutral intermediary, whilst the market maker trades the remainder from seller to buyer. Since the market maker’s payoff for trading at the identified equilibrium price is zero, this second model does not provide any motivation for the market maker to enter the market. The third market model introduces an explicit transaction fee that enables the market maker to secure a positive payoff. Under certain assumptions on this transaction fee the equilibrium solution of the previous model applies and now also provides a financial motivation for the market maker to enter the market. If the transaction fee violates an upper bound that depends on supply, demand and riskaversity of buyer and seller, the market will be in disequilibrium.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

The Impact of Property Condition Disclosure Laws on Housing Prices: Evidence from an Event Study using Propensity Scores

We examine the impact of seller's Property Condition Disclosure Law on the residential real estate values. A disclosure law may address the information asymmetry in housing transactions shifting of risk from buyers and brokers to the sellers and raising housing prices as a result. We combine propensity score techniques from the treatment effects literature with a traditional event study approach. We assemble a unique set of economic and institutional attributes for a quarterly panel of 291 US Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and 50 US States spanning 21 years from 1984 to 2004 is used to exploit the MSA level variation in house prices. The study finds that the average seller may be able to fetch a higher price (about three to four percent) for the house if she furnishes a state-mandated seller.s property condition disclosure statement to the buyer. When we compare the results from parametric and semi-parametric event analyses, we find that the semi-parametric or the propensity score analysis generals moderately larger estimated effects of the law on housing prices.

Microbe Hunters Revisited – Paul de Kruif and the Beginning of Popular Science Writing

Paul de Kruif is credited with being one of the first popular science writers for the general public. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan in 1916 and worked at the Rockefeller Institute under Simon Flexner. After being fired in 1922 for publishing a scathing article on medical research, de Kruif caught the attention of Sinclair Lewis, who used his scientific background to write his Pulitzer Prize winning novel, Arrowsmith. In 1926, de Kruif published Microbe Hunters which recounted the exploits and discoveries of 14 renowned microbiologists from von Leeuwenhoek to Pasteur, Ross, Paul Ehrlich and Walter Reed. Microbe Hunters became a best seller, was translated into 18 languages, and formed the basis of two Hollywood movies, "Yellow Jack" and "The Magic Bullet." Generations of young readers were captivated by the vivid protrayal of these men and their discoveries.

Oraculizando a los ciudadanos : Demagogia y profanación de las inscripciones oraculares en Caballeros de Aristófanes (vv. 818- 819)

Dentro de los ataques cómicos que el Morcillero emite a Paflagonio en Caballeros de Aristófanes, uno en particular describe las formas que le permitieron a este figurado Cleón construir su poder sobre Atenas. Luego de que el propio Paflagonio se comparara con el gran Temístocles, el Morcillero expone los modos perniciosos de hacer política: en vv. 818-819, dice que Paflagonio convirtió a Atenas en una ciudad pequeña "levantando muros a través de ella y oraculizando". La primera estrategia remite al dicho del "divide y triunfarás". La segunda, en cambio, hace referencia a una institución político-religiosa como la adivinación. El oráculo, que era un aparato ideológico de la polis ateniense, aparece en el drama como un mensaje legitimador de quien detenta o detentará el poder y Aristófanes echa un manto de sospecha sobre dicha institución sagrada que es manipulada con fines propagandísticos. Con base en estas reflexiones, esta ponencia se propone analizar en Caballeros la denuncia del Morcillero sobre el ocultamiento de los oráculos inscriptos, su vínculo con el contexto socio- histórico de su inscripción y los motivos cómicos que subyacen en la operatoria de profanación de los mensajes divinos

Oraculizando a los ciudadanos : Demagogia y profanación de las inscripciones oraculares en Caballeros de Aristófanes (vv. 818- 819)

Dentro de los ataques cómicos que el Morcillero emite a Paflagonio en Caballeros de Aristófanes, uno en particular describe las formas que le permitieron a este figurado Cleón construir su poder sobre Atenas. Luego de que el propio Paflagonio se comparara con el gran Temístocles, el Morcillero expone los modos perniciosos de hacer política: en vv. 818-819, dice que Paflagonio convirtió a Atenas en una ciudad pequeña "levantando muros a través de ella y oraculizando". La primera estrategia remite al dicho del "divide y triunfarás". La segunda, en cambio, hace referencia a una institución político-religiosa como la adivinación. El oráculo, que era un aparato ideológico de la polis ateniense, aparece en el drama como un mensaje legitimador de quien detenta o detentará el poder y Aristófanes echa un manto de sospecha sobre dicha institución sagrada que es manipulada con fines propagandísticos. Con base en estas reflexiones, esta ponencia se propone analizar en Caballeros la denuncia del Morcillero sobre el ocultamiento de los oráculos inscriptos, su vínculo con el contexto socio- histórico de su inscripción y los motivos cómicos que subyacen en la operatoria de profanación de los mensajes divinos

Oraculizando a los ciudadanos : Demagogia y profanación de las inscripciones oraculares en Caballeros de Aristófanes (vv. 818- 819)

Dentro de los ataques cómicos que el Morcillero emite a Paflagonio en Caballeros de Aristófanes, uno en particular describe las formas que le permitieron a este figurado Cleón construir su poder sobre Atenas. Luego de que el propio Paflagonio se comparara con el gran Temístocles, el Morcillero expone los modos perniciosos de hacer política: en vv. 818-819, dice que Paflagonio convirtió a Atenas en una ciudad pequeña "levantando muros a través de ella y oraculizando". La primera estrategia remite al dicho del "divide y triunfarás". La segunda, en cambio, hace referencia a una institución político-religiosa como la adivinación. El oráculo, que era un aparato ideológico de la polis ateniense, aparece en el drama como un mensaje legitimador de quien detenta o detentará el poder y Aristófanes echa un manto de sospecha sobre dicha institución sagrada que es manipulada con fines propagandísticos. Con base en estas reflexiones, esta ponencia se propone analizar en Caballeros la denuncia del Morcillero sobre el ocultamiento de los oráculos inscriptos, su vínculo con el contexto socio- histórico de su inscripción y los motivos cómicos que subyacen en la operatoria de profanación de los mensajes divinos

Trade Credits under Imperfect Enforcement: A Theory with a Test on Chinese Experience

It is widely recognized that trade credit is an important financial mechanism, particularly in developing economies and transition economies where institutions are weak. This paper documents theoretical analysis and empirical accounts on what facilitates an effective supply of trade credit based on original surveys conducted in P.R. of China. Our theory predicts that trade volume and trade credit are increasing function of cash held by the buyer and enforcement technology of the seller. Furthermore, if the state sector’s enforcement technology is high, it has positive external effect to expand the volumes of trade credit and trades in the whole economy. From the data, we found that government made active commitment in enforcement of trade credit contract and the government owned firms are main supplier and receivers of trade credit, which suggest that enforcement by government and state sector were effective against presumptions in the previous literatures.

Financial Aspects of Transactions with FDI: Trade Credit Provision by SMEs in China

This paper will document financial aspects of transactions, and trade credit supply behavior with FDI among small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs) based on two original surveys, conducted in four cities in China in 2003. The survey was designed to capture the nature of inter-firm transactions, trade credit and other financial conditions. Literature on FDI mainly refers to technology transfer, employment or investment. This paper focuses on the role and significance of FDI in the supply of trade credit due to its trade credit enforcement technology. Yanagawa, Ito and Watanabe [2006] developed a model which indicates that when a seller has higher enforcement technology or a buyer has richer liquidity, both trade credit and transaction volume will be increased. In this paper, we confirmed that FDI and G contributed to the provision of trade credit and had a positive external effect on trade credit enforcement towards China’s economy. (1) Sales towards FDI customers have the power to increase the trade credit ratio,even when controlling other factors such as choice of payment instrument, competitiveness, and expost default management. This implies that FDI does provide trade credit, not only because it has superior liquidity, but because it is also superior in terms of enforcement of trade credit repayment.(2) Cash constraints of the buyer influence the decisions concerning trade credit provided by the seller, as a model in Yanagawa, et al. [2006] predicted, and this implies that strategic default is a serious concern among SMEs in China. (3) Spillover effect exists in payment enforcement technology in transactions with FDI customers.

Ex ante bargaining and ex post enforcement in trade credit supply: theory and evidence from China

If payment of goods is easily default, economic transaction may deeply suffer from the risk. This risky environment formed a mechanism that governs how economic transaction is realized, subsequently how trade credit is given. This paper distinguished ex ante bargaining and ex post enforcement, then modeled that bargaining power reduces trade credit ex ante, and ex post enforcement power and cash in hand of buyer can enhances both trade amount and trade credit in a presence of default risk. We modeled this relationship in order to organize findings from previous literature and from our original micro data on detailed transaction in China to consistently understand the mechanism governing trade credit. Then empirically tested a structure from the theoretical prediction with data. Results show that ex post enforcement power of seller mainly determines size of trade credit and trade amount, cash in hand of buyer can substitute with enforcement power; Bargaining power of seller is exercised to reduces trade credit and trade amount for avoiding default risk, but it simultaneously improves enforcement power as well. We found that ex post enforcement power consists of (ex ante) bargaining power on between two parties and intervention from the third party. However, its magnitude is far smaller than the direct impact to reduce trade credit and trade amount.

Metodología para medir los efectos de la aplicación de estándares sobre la industria de los medios de pagos en el mercado chileno

Cada vez juegan un rol más relevante en nuestra vida las tecnologías de información, desde nuestros hogares hasta las empresas y gobiernos acceden a grandes volúmenes de datos e información, las comunicaciones ya no tienen impedimentos de distancias, un comprador y un vendedor puede estar en cualquier lugar, un producto que es adquirido en un comercio en Santiago a través de un medio de pago (tarjeta de crédito) en menos de un segundo la transacción va desde Chile a solicitar autorización en Singapur para ser aprobada. En la sociedad tanto oferentes como demandantes cuentan con información disponible en línea para la toma de decisiones. Existe una mayor apertura e integración económica iniciada con las redes comerciales, donde existen enfoques regionales y multilateral, que han impulsado la apertura del comercio y la integración económica. Son múltiples los tratados de libre comercio que apoyan al desarrollo económico, donde las crisis mundiales han afectado tanto las economías como el transporte, considerando que en el comercio internacional cerca del 90% se desarrolla a través de los puertos, es importante identificar relaciones entre el desarrollo de los medios de pago y el comercio electrónico a través de los puertos. Nuestra investigación busca integrar tanto aspectos de investigación científica como como investigación aplicada, de modo que sea un aporte al día a día de empresas en el sector de los medios de pago en Chile y quienes diseñan y definen la aplicación de normas y estándares. Esta tesis plantea una metodológica para analizar las relaciones entre la aplicación de estándares y sus efectos en la industria de los medios de pago en Chile. Este trabajo de investigación nos permitirá identificar entorno, variables que intervienen y evolución del mercado de los medios de pago, a través de un relevamiento del estado del arte de los medios de Pago en la industria Bancaria chilena. Buscaremos en el mercado de los medios de pago en la industria Chilena - sector Bancario, relaciones entre la aplicación de estándares y sus efectos en los volúmenes transaccionales, analizaremos las tendencias de los medios de pago y el desarrollo comercial del Puerto de Valparaíso. Se busca a través de esta metodológica poder mejorar la toma de decisiones en la industria de los medios de pago en Chile con una mejor gestión y uso de recursos. Every day information technology plays a greater role in our lives, from our homes to businesses, to how governments access large volumes of data and information. Communication is no longer hindered by distances, as a buyer and seller can be anywhere. A product that is purchased in a shop in Santiago through a payment option (credit card) in less than a second, a transaction will request authorization from Chile to Singapore to be approved. In this society both buyers and sellers have access to online information that is available for decision making. There is greater openness and economic integration that has begun within the commercial networks, in which there are regional and multilateral approaches that has helped expand trade and economic integration. Likewise, there are numerous free trade agreements that support economic development; however, the global crisis has affected economies like transportation. In regards to international commerce about 90% is developed through the ports, considering that the former is important to identify the relationships between the development of the payment options and e-commerce at the ports. Our research aims to integrate both the scientific research and applied research aspects, so that this will be a contribution to the day to day business for the payment options in Chile, and for those who design and define the application of norms and standards. This thesis offers a methodology to analyze the relationships between the application of standards and its affects in the industry of payment options in Chile. This research will allow us to identify the environmental variables that intervene and evolve the market of the payment options, through the analysis of the state of the art in the payment options in the Chilean Banking industry. In the market of the payment industry options we have looked specifically at the Chilean Banking industry and the relationship between the application of standards and their impact on transaction volumes. In addition, there has been an analysis of the activity of the payment options and wire transfers in the maritime industry in Valparaíso in order to define the feasibility of a model that allows us to relate these effects in these markets and the application of standards. We have searched the Chilean banking industry for the relationships between the application of standards and its effect on transaction volumes, in order to analyze the trends in the payment options and the commercial development at the Port of Valparaiso. Therefore, through the use of this methodology we look to be able to make better decisions in the payment options industry in Chile, with better management and use of the resources.

Simulating digital dividend auctions: Service neutrality versus dedicated licences

The award of the digital dividend can consolidate auctions as the preferred mechanism for spectrum allocation. Knowing in advance an estimate of what the results of an auction with these characteristics could be would be unquestionably useful for those in charge of designing the process, even if at the end another method such as a beauty contest is chosen. This article provides a simulation of a digital dividend auction in a major-type European country. In one of the scenarios, the spectrum is not pre-allocated to any service in particular (service neutrality) while in the remaining four, blocks of spectrum are pre-allocated to DTT, mobile multimedia and mobile broadband communications. The results of the simulations reveal that the service neutrality scenario maximizes revenues for the seller and that, in general, DTT operators would seem to have fewer opportunities as the spectrum packaging is less protective for them.

Water option contracts for reducing water supply risks: an application to the Tagus-Segura Transfer

El agua es un recurso cada vez más escaso y valioso. Por ello, los recursos hídricos disponibles deben asignarse de una forma eficiente entre los diferentes usos. El cambio climático aumentará la frecuencia y severidad de los eventos extremos, y podría incrementar la demanda de agua de los cultivos. El empleo de mecanismos flexibles de asignación de agua puede ser imprescindible para hacer frente a este aumento en la variabilidad del balance hídrico y para asegurar que los riesgos de suministro, y no solo los recursos, son compartidos de manera eficiente entre los usuarios. Los mercados de agua permiten la reasignación de los recursos hídricos, favoreciendo su transferencia desde los usos de menor a los de mayor valor. Diferentes tipos de mercados de agua se han establecido en diferentes partes del mundo, ayudando a los participantes a afrontar los problemas de escasez de agua en esas zonas. En España, los intercambios de agua están permitidos desde 1999, aunque la participación de los usuarios en el mercado ha sido limitada. Hay varios aspectos de los mercados de agua en España que deben mejorarse. Esta tesis, además de proponer una serie de cambios en el marco regulatorio, propone la introducción de contratos de opción de agua como una posible mejora. La principal ventaja de este tipo de contratos es la estabilidad legal e institucional que éstos proporcionan tanto a compradores como vendedores. Para apoyar esta propuesta, se han llevado a cabo diferentes análisis que muestran el potencial de los contratos de opción como herramienta de reducción del riesgo asociado a una oferta de agua inestable. La Cuenca del Segura (Sureste de España), la Cuenca del Tajo y el Acueducto Tajo- Segura han sido seleccionados como casos de estudio. Tres análisis distintos aplicados a dicha región se presentan en esta tesis: a) una evaluación de los contratos de opción como mecanismo para reducir los riesgos de disponibilidad de agua sufridos por los regantes en la Cuenca del Segura; b) un marco teórico para analizar las preferencias de los regantes por diferentes mecanismos de gestión del riesgo de disponibilidad de agua, su disposición a pagar por ellos y los precios aproximados de estos instrumentos (seguro de sequía y contratos de opción de agua); y c) una evaluación del papel de los contratos de opción en las decisiones de aprovisionamiento de agua de una comunidad de regantes ante una oferta de agua incierta. Los resultados muestran el potencial de reducción del riesgo de los contratos de opción para regantes en España, pero pueden ser extrapolados a otros sectores o regiones. Las principales conclusiones de esta tesis son: a) la agricultura será uno de los sectores más afectados por el cambio climático. Si los precios del agua aumentan, la rentabilidad de los cultivos puede caer hasta niveles negativos, lo que podría dar lugar al abandono de cultivos de regadío en algunas zonas de España. Las políticas de cambio climático y de agua deben estar estrechamente coordinadas para asegurar un uso de agua eficiente y la rentabilidad de la agricultura; b) aunque los mercados de agua han ayudado a algunos usuarios a afrontar problemas de disponibilidad del recurso en momentos de escasez, hay varios aspectos que deben mejorarse; c) es necesario desarrollar mercados de agua más flexibles y estables para garantizar una asignación eficiente de los recursos entre los usuarios de agua; d) los resultados muestran los beneficios derivados del establecimiento de un contrato de opción entre usuarios de agua del Tajo y del Segura para reducir el riesgo de disponibilidad de agua en la cuenca receptora; e) la disposición a pagar de los regantes por un contrato de opción de agua o un seguro de sequía hidrológica, que representa el valor que tienen estos mecanismos para aquellos usuarios de agua que se enfrentan a riesgos relacionados con la disponibilidad del recurso, es consistente con los resultados obtenidos en estudios previos y superior al precio de mercado de estos instrumentos, lo que favorece la viabilidad de estos mecanismos de gestión del riesgo ; y f) los contratos de opción podrían ayudar a optimizar las decisiones de aprovisionamiento de agua bajo incertidumbre, proporcionando más estabilidad y flexibilidad que los mercados temporales de agua. ABSTRACT Water is becoming increasingly scarce and valuable. Thus, existing water resources need to be efficiently allocated among users. Climate change is expected to increase the frequency and severity of extreme events, and it may also increase irrigated crops' water demand. The implementation of flexible allocation mechanisms could be essential to cope with this increased variability of the water balance and ensure that supply risks, and not only water resources, are also efficiently shared and managed. Water markets allow for the reallocation of water resources from low to high value uses. Different water trading mechanisms have been created in different parts of the world and have helped users to alleviate water scarcity problems in those areas. In Spain, water trading is allowed since 1999, although market activity has been limited. There are several issues in the Spanish water market that should be improved. This thesis, besides proposing several changes in the legislative framework, proposes the introduction of water option contracts as a potential improvement. The main advantage for both buyer and seller derived from an option contract is the institutional and legal stability it provides. To support this proposal, different analyses have been carried out that show the potential of option contracts as a risk reduction tool to manage water supply instability. The Segura Basin (Southeast Spain), the Tagus Basin and the Tagus-Segura inter-basin Transfer have been selected as the case study. Three different analyses applied to this region are presented in this thesis: a) an evaluation of option contracts as a mechanisms to reduce water supply availability risks in the Segura Basin; b) a theoretical framework for analyzing farmer’s preferences for different water supply risk management tools and farmers’ willingness to pay for them, together with the assessment of the prices of these mechanisms (drought insurance and water option contracts); and c) an evaluation of the role of option contracts in water procurement decisions under uncertainty. Results show the risk-reduction potential of option contracts for the agricultural sector in Spain, but these results can be extrapolated to other sectors or regions. The main conclusions of the thesis are: a) agriculture would be one of the most affected sectors by climate change. With higher water tariffs, crop’s profitability can drop to negative levels, which may result in the abandoning of the crop in many areas. Climate change and water policies must be closely coordinated to ensure efficient water use and crops’ profitability; b) although Spanish water markets have alleviated water availability problems for some users during water scarcity periods, there are several issues that should be improved; c) more flexible and stable water market mechanisms are needed to allocate water resources and water supply risks among competing users; d) results show the benefits derived from the establishment of an inter-basin option contract between water users in the Tagus and the Segura basins for reducing water supply availability risks in the recipient area; e) irrigators’ willingness to pay for option contracts or drought insurance, that represent the value that this kind of trading mechanisms has for water users facing water supply reliability problems, are consistent with results obtained in previous works and higher than the prices of this risk management tools, which shows the feasibility of these mechanisms; and f) option contracts would help to optimize water procurement decisions under uncertainty, providing more flexibility and stability than the spot market.

Active Learning and Dynamic Pricing Policies

In this paper, we address the problem of dynamic pricing to optimize the revenue coming from the sales of a limited inventory in a finite time-horizon. A priori, the demand is assumed to be unknown. The seller must learn on the fly. We first deal with the simplest case, involving only one class of product for sale. Furthermore the general situation is considered with a finite number of product classes for sale. In particular, a case in point is the sale of tickets for events related to culture and leisure; in this case, typically the tickets are sold months before the event, thus, uncertainty over actual demand levels is a very a common occurrence. We propose a heuristic strategy of adaptive dynamic pricing, based on experience gained from the past, taking into account, for each time period, the available inventory, the time remaining to reach the horizon, and the profit made in previous periods. In the computational simulations performed, the demand is updated dynamically based on the prices being offered, as well as on the remaining time and inventory. The simulations show a significant profit over the fixed-price strategy, confirming the practical usefulness of the proposed strategy. We develop a tool allowing us to test different dynamic pricing strategies designed to fit market conditions and seller s objectives, which will facilitate data analysis and decision-making in the face of the problem of dynamic pricing.