Modelling and Administration of Contract-Based Systems

Mirroring the paper versions exchanged between businesses today, electronic contracts offer the possibility of dynamic, automatic creation and enforcement of restrictions and compulsions on agent behaviour that are designed to ensure business objectives are met. However, where there are many contracts within a particular application, it can be difficult to determine whether the system can reliably fulfil them all; computer-parsable electronic contracts may allow such verification to be automated. In this paper, we describe a conceptual framework and architecture specification in which normative business contracts can be electronically represented, verified, established, renewed, etc. In particular, we aim to allow systems containing multiple contracts to be checked for conflicts and violations of business objectives. We illustrate the framework and architecture with an aerospace example.

Towards a Monitoring Framework for Agent-Based Contract Systems

The behaviours of autonomous agents may deviate from those deemed to be for the good of the societal systems of which they are a part. Norms have therefore been proposed as a means to regulate agent behaviours in open and dynamic systems, and may be encoded in electronic contracts in order to specify the obliged, permitted and prohibited behaviours of agents that are signatories to such contracts. Enactment and management of electronic contracts thus enables the use of regulatory mechanisms to ensure that agent behaviours comply with the encoded norms. To facilitate such mechanisms requires monitoring in order to detect and explain violation of norms. In this paper we propose a framework for monitoring that is to be implemented and integrated into a suite of contract enactment and management tools. The framework adopts a non-intrusive approach to monitoring, whereby the states of a contract with respect to its contained norms can be inferred on the basis of messages exchanged. Specifically, the framework deploys agents that observe messages sent between contract signatories, where these messages correspond to agent behaviours and therefore indicate whether norms are, or are in danger of, being violated.

A contract-based system for aerospace aftercare

The logistics of the aerospace aftermarket raises a number of very interesting challenges from the perspective of electronic contracting. This is a highly dynamic domain, where contracts are established between airlines and engine manufacturers, as well as between engine manufacturers all the way down the supply lines, providing a particularly illustrative showcase for the technologies developed in the CONTRACT project. In this paper, we describe such a domain, as well as our modelling of it as a multiagent simulator where the CONTRACT framework has been used to monitor for compliance with norms.

Monitoring and Explanation of Contract Execution: A Case Study in the Aerospace Domain

In the domain of aerospace aftermarkets, which often has long supply chains that feed into the maintenance of aircraft, contracts are used to establish agreements between aircraft operators and maintenance suppliers. However, violations at the bottom of the supply chain (part suppliers) can easily cascade to the top (aircraft operators), making it difficult to determine the source of the violation, and seek to address it. In this context, we have developed a global monitoring architecture that ensures the detection of norm violations and generates explanations for the origin of violations. In this paper, we describe the implementation and deployment of a global monitor in the aerospace domain of [8] and show how it generates explanations for violations within the maintenance supply chain. We show how these explanations can be used not only to detect violations at runtime, but also to uncover potential problems in contracts before their deployment, thus improving them.

Case studies for contract-based systems

Of the ways in which agent behaviour can be regulated in a multiagent system, electronic contracting – based on explicit representation of different parties' responsibilities, and the agreement of all parties to them – has significant potential for modern industrial applications. Based on this assumption, the CONTRACT project aims to develop and apply electronic contracting and contract-based monitoring and verification techniques in real world applications. This paper presents results from the initial phase of the project, which focused on requirements solicitation and analysis. Specifically, we survey four use cases from diverse industrial applications, examine how they can benefit from an agent-based electronic contracting infrastructure and outline the technical requirements that would be placed on such an infrastructure. We present the designed CONTRACT architecture and describe how it may fulfil these requirements. In addition to motivating our work on the contract-based infrastructure, the paper aims to provide a much needed community resource in terms of use case themselves and to provide a clear commercial context for the development of work on contract-based system.

Contract enforcement and incentive compatibility in large economies with differential information: the role of exact feasibility

We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irreducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis (2002)). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility. We first prove that the results in Einy et al. (2001) are still valid without free-disposal. Then we define an incentive compatibility property motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying that contracts of a competitive or core allocations are enforceable.

Adaptation of the international investment contract: the hardship clause

Este trabalho acadêmico explora, em linhas gerais, a questão da adaptação do contrato de investimento internacional, e o tema ‘cláusula de hardship’ em específico. Objetiva-se efetuar uma análise detalhada da cláusula de hardship, como meio de adaptação e flexibilização de contratos internacionais de investimento sob a ótica da prática jurídica e mercantil contemporânea. A discussão se centra no contraste entre a possibilidade de adaptação do contrato por circunstâncias imprevisíveis e o imperativo de previsibilidade no investimento. Nesse sentido, o estudo busca oferecer soluções práticas para o dilema existente entre a necessidade de segurança na relação econômica (cumprimento do contato) e a prevenção da possibilidade de ruína financeira para quaisquer das partes no caso de uma mudança brusca no contexto dos negócios. O trabalho está centrado em uma investigação teórica acerca dos temas de readaptação contratual; diferenças entre sistemas jurídicos de estados-nações, e suas consequências no comércio internacional; e a cláusula de hardship em si. Como forma de contribuir para uma compreensão prática na questão da adaptação do contrato de investimento internacional devido a fatores imprevistos, este trabalho analisa casos reais e tendências atuais observadas na arbitragem internacional.

Optimal Contract Pricing of Distributed Generation in Distribution Networks

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Location and contract pricing of distributed generation using a genetic algorithm

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Optimal contract pricing of distributed generation under a competitive framework

A bilevel programming approach for the optimal contract pricing of distributed generation (DG) in distribution networks is presented. The outer optimization problem corresponds to the owner of the DG who must decide the contract price that would maximize his profits. The inner optimization problem corresponds to the distribution company (DisCo), which procures the minimization of the payments incurred in attending the expected demand while satisfying network constraints. The meet the expected demand the DisCo can purchase energy either form the transmission network through the substations or form the DG units within its network. The inner optimization problem is substituted by its Karush- Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions, turning the bilevel programming problem into an equivalent single-level nonlinear programming problem which is solved using commercially available software. © 2010 IEEE.

Bilevel approach for optimal location and contract pricing of distributed generation in radial distribution systems using mixed-integer linear programming

In this study, a novel approach for the optimal location and contract pricing of distributed generation (DG) is presented. Such an approach is designed for a market environment in which the distribution company (DisCo) can buy energy either from the wholesale energy market or from the DG units within its network. The location and contract pricing of DG is determined by the interaction between the DisCo and the owner of the distributed generators. The DisCo intends to minimise the payments incurred in meeting the expected demand, whereas the owner of the DG intends to maximise the profits obtained from the energy sold to the DisCo. This two-agent relationship is modelled in a bilevel scheme. The upper-level optimisation is for determining the allocation and contract prices of the DG units, whereas the lower-level optimisation is for modelling the reaction of the DisCo. The bilevel programming problem is turned into an equivalent single-level mixed-integer linear optimisation problem using duality properties, which is then solved using commercially available software. Results show the robustness and efficiency of the proposed model compared with other existing models. As regards to contract pricing, the proposed approach allowed to find better solutions than those reported in previous works. © The Institution of Engineering and Technology 2013.