PHA Corporate business plan 2011-2012

The PHA Corporate Business Plan 2011-2012 is based on the four core goals and the common themes from the Corporate Strategy 2011-2015 and sets out a corporate picture of how the goals will be taken forward in year one (2011-2012) in line with existing AMT and board direction.�All Directorates were involved in developing the Corporate Business Plan and it reflects the content of each of the Directorate business plans.�It identifies a number of measurable indicators taken from the DHSSPS Commissioning Directions 2011-2012, as well as from each of the Directorate business plans.The Corporate Business Plan was approved by AMT on 1 November and by the PHA board on 17 November. Quarterly monitoring reports on progress against the indicators will be brought to the PHA board.

PHA Corporate Strategy 2011-2015

The PHA Corporate Strategy has been developed with input from staff across the PHA and taking account of feedback from external stakeholders.� It is a high level document, setting out the direction for the PHA over the next few years, and will be supported by the annual PHA Corporate Business Plan, Directorate Business Plans and the Joint Commissioning Plan.� The Strategy was approved by the PHA board at the November 2011 board meeting.�The PHA Corporate strategy sets out the role, direction and priorities of the PHA for the next four years, taking account of the requirements of the Comprehensive Spending Review.The goals set out in this strategy�are supported by annual plans detailing how the goals will be achieved.The strategy outlines the following:protecting health;improving health and wellbeing;improving quality and safety;improving early detection.

PHA corporate plan 2009-2010

This report explains the purpose of the PHA, its vision for public health and wellbeing, and the values that underpins its work.�

Investment, duration, and exit strategies for corporate and independent venture capital-backed start-ups

We propose a model of investment, duration, and exit strategies for start-ups backed by venture capital (VC) funds that accounts for the high level of uncertainty, the asymmetry of information between insiders and outsiders, and the discount rate. Our analysis predicts that start-ups backed by corporate VC funds remain for a longer period of time before exiting and receive larger investment amounts than those financed by independent VC funds. Although a longer duration leads to a higher likelihood of an exit through an acquisition, a larger investment increases the probability of an IPO exit. These predictions find strong empirical support.

A study of governance practices in corporate foundations

Implementation of social investments through corporate foundations is growing and, therefore, it is important to study their governance aspects better. Governance is conceptualized as a set of control and incentive mechanisms to overcome the so-called agency conflicts, which originate from the separation of property and management in for-profit organizations, a concept also applied to nonprofit institutions. It is argued that corporate foundations have the characteristics both of companies and of civil society organizations, which distinguishes them from both types of organizations. This paper analyses a study in which a set of governance mechanisms, adapted from those identified by a literature review of corporate and nonprofit governance, was selected for study. It is an exploratory descriptive case study, which analyzed data about eight organizations collected through publications and interviews with their CEOs. The data analysis indicates that it is appropriate to distinguish the different organization types and to apply the agency theory. Research results indicate that the selected governance mechanisms may be adapted and used in corporate foundations. However, they are only partially applied in the observed cases, which suggests the need for further studies that might consolidate these practices in such organizations.

Essays in banking and corporate finance

Abstract This paper presents a model of executive compensation in which the executive is risk-averse and has specific knowledge -knowledge about the optimal actions to take that is costly to transfer to the principal. The model generates predictions that are consistent with the available evidence and provides a rationale for a number of unresolved puzzles in executive compensation. Notably, we find that relative performance evaluation is optimal only if the quality of specific knowledge is low. We also show (1) why some common risk components are not filtered out of executives' pay, (2) why performance is more likely to be evaluated relative to aggregate market movements than relative to industry movements, and (3) why executives with higher perceived abilities are given stronger incentives. Finally, we demonstrate that the relation between risk and incentives may be positive or negative, depending on the quality of the executive's specific knowledge.

O Papel das Demonstrações Financeiras na Corporate Governance: O caso da Cabo Verde Telecom

O fenómeno da Corporate Governance tem vindo a ocupar um lugar importante na literatura moderna dada a sua importância no mercado global e competitivo em que vivemos. A partir do final dos anos 80, esta matéria ganhou um grande relevo devido ao aumento da participação activa dos investidores institucionais e pequenos investidores individuais nos mercados de capitais e sua crescente exigência por uma gestão mais rigorosa, transparente e que defende os interesses dos accionistas ou shareholders. Os grandes escândalos financeiros, envolvendo diversas empresas nos EUA e na Europa, que causaram prejuízos incomensuráveis ao mercado, despertaram a atenção do mundo para a relevância das boas práticas de Corporate Governance. O maior destaque para este tema aconteceu em 2002, após a ocorrência os escândalos com as multinacionais Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat, entre outros. Naturalmente, para os países em desenvolvimento, a qualidade da Corporate Governance local é de fundamental importância para o crescimento económico duradouro. Essa visão global e transversal da Corporate Governance veio acentuar a procura de soluções para o alinhamento dos interesses entre gestores e accionistas. A solução para os conflitos de agência e a melhoria dos mecanismos de gestão estão no cerne do debate sobre o tema. Este estudo faz uma análise das teorias da Corporate Governance, a sua evolução e importância e o papel das demonstrações financeiras como um dos elementos que suportam a boa Corporate Governance, aplicada na gestão de uma empresa cabo-verdiana – A CVTelecom. Pretende-se, assim, identificar os benefícios advindos da aplicação das boas práticas de Corporate Governace para a gestão da empresa e para a sociedade como um todo. A escolha da CVTelecom, operadora de telecomunicações, prende-se com dois aspectos fundamentais: i) ser a empresa privada que exerce maior impacto sobre a economia cabo-verdiana, empregando cerca de 1,3% do total dos trabalhadores do sector privado no País; ii) o crescimento da economia cabo-verdiana estar suportado, mais do que nunca, nas TIC, constituindo, por essa razão, num dos principais desafios do País. Concluiu-se que a CVTelecom, embora esteja localizada num país onde ainda não existe uma entidade com a responsabilidade de fazer a avaliação da gestão das empresas no quadro das normas que enformam a Corporate Governance, encontra-se bem encaminhada ao nível da implementação de normas e procedimentos que favoreçam uma boa Corporate Governance.