Hyaluronan Synthesis and Myogenesis: A requirement for hyaluronan synthesis during myogenic differentiation independent of pericullular matrix formation

Background
The role endogenously synthesized hyaluronan plays in myogenesis is not yet known.

Results
Hyaluronan synthase genes were expressed during skeletal muscle growth and regeneration; inhibiting these synthases prevents myoblast differentiation and fusion.

Conclusion
Endogenous hyaluronan synthesis is required for myogenic differentiation.

Significance
The necessity for hyaluronan in myogenesis has implications when considering promoting muscle growth or regeneration.

How sensitive are bargaining outcomes to changes in disagreement payoffs?

We use a human-subjects experiment to investigate how bargaining outcomes are affected by changes in bargainers’ disagreement payoffs. Subjects bargain against changing opponents, with randomly drawn asymmetric disagreement outcomes that vary over plays of the game, and with complete information about disagreement payoffs and the cake size. We find that subjects only respond about half as much as theoretically predicted to changes in their own disagreement payoff and to changes in their opponent’s disagreement payoff. This effect is observed in a standard Nash demand game and a related unstructured bargaining game, in both early and late rounds, and is robust to moderate changes in stake sizes. We show theoretically that standard models of expected utility maximisation are unable to account for this under-responsiveness, even when generalised to allow for risk aversion. We also show that quantal-response equilibrium has, at best, mixed success in characterising our results. However, a simple model of other-regarding preferences can explain our main results.

Lying about the price? Ultimatum bargaining with messages and imperfectly observed offers

We introduce the taxicab game, related to the ultimatum game and Gehrig et al.'s (2007) yes/no game. The proposer makes an offer, and simultaneously sends a cheap talk message indicating (possibly falsely) the amount of the offer. The responder observes the message with certainty and the offer with probability p before accepting or rejecting the offer. We investigate versions with p=. 0 and p=. 0.5 along with the ultimatum game as a baseline. Intuition and a model comprising both standard economic agents and others who dislike inequity, lies and lying provide clear predictions that our experimental results support. As the likelihood increases of offers being seen, the offers themselves increase, messages over-state them less, and responders are more likely to accept (even when the offer is unseen). Also, responders are more likely to accept after truthful messages than after lies or when no message is sent.

Comparing bargaining solutions in the shadow of conflict: how norms against threats can have real effects

In many economic environments agents make costly and irreversible investments (in ``guns'') that may enhance their respective threat payoffs but also shrink the utility possibilities set. In such settings, with variable threats and a variable utility possibilities set, it becomes possible to rank different bargaining solutions in terms of efficiency. We compare bargaining solutions within a class in which the influence of the threat point on the bargaining outcome varies across solutions. Under symmetry, we find that the solution in which the threat point is least influential the equal sacrifice solution Pareto-dominates the other solutions. Since the equal sacrifice solution puts the least weight on the threat point, norms against threats (that can be seen in many seemingly rhetorical pronouncements in adversarial relations) can mitigate some of the costs of conflict and therefore have efficiency- enhancing effects.

Collective bargaining in Brazilian manufacturing, 1978-95

Collective bargaining, it is widely claimed, has been on the increase in Brazil since the late 1970s. This is seen as part of a broader change in Brazilian industrial relations towards a hybrid system of interest representation, in which elements of both the old state corporatism and pluralism now coexist. However, there is little or no systematic empirical evidence available to support this conclusion. This thesis addresses the question of the strengthening of collective bargaining as a method of job regulation in Brazil by providing a detailed empirical study. The questions of this study are: (a) how important has collective bargaining become in establishing provisions on the terms and conditions of the employment relationship which are not simply reproducing rules established via state regulation?; and (b) what factors accounted for changes in the content of these provisions? An analysis of 10,734 provisions in 287 collective agreements in manufacturing industries in the Metropolitan Area of Porto Alegre, the capital of the southernmost state of Rio Grande do Sul, was carried out for the period of 1978-95. This analysis offers support for the thesis that the significance of collective bargaining has increased. It shows that: (a) most substantive provisions created rules that were not established in other forms of regulation; (b) provisions that replicate the contents of regulatory legislation accounted for one out of seven substantive provisions, but in spite of being a copy of the law, these provisions are not entirely neutral for job regulation; (c) collective agreements also laid down substantive provisions benefiting employers, and not simply employees; and (d) the pace of change in bargaining outcomes oscillated with changes in the economic, legal and judicial contexts. This pace of change was mostly affected by (i) the rate of unemployment, (ii) the degree of openness of the economy to foreign competition, (iii) the capacity of employers to pass on costs to costumers, (iv) stabilisation policies aimed at curbing inflation, (v) the Federal Constitution made in 1988, (vi) the official rate of minimum wages, and (vii) the conduct of the labour judicial system in settling collective disputes.

Income and bargaining effects on education and health

In this paper, we examine the impacts of the reform in the rural pension system in Brazil in 1991 on schooling and health indicators. In addition, we use the reform to investigate the validity of the unitary model of household allocation by testing if there were uneven impacts on those indicators depending on the gender of the recipient. The main conclusion of the paper is that the reform had significantly positive effects on the outcomes of interest, especially on those co-residing with a male pensioner, indicating that the unitary model is not a well-specified framework to understand family allocation decisions. The highest impacts were on school attendance for boys, literacy for girls and illness for middle-age people. We explore a collective model as defined by Chiappori (1992) as one possible alternative representation for the decision-making process of the poor rural Brazilian families. In the cooperative Nash equilibrium, the reform effects can be divided into two pieces: a direct income effect and bargaining power effect. The data support the existence of these two different effects

Tax filing choices for the household under separable spheres bargaining

If household choices can be rationalized by the maximization of a well defined utility function, allowing spouses to file individually or jointly is equivalent to offering the envelope of the two tax schedules. If, instead, household ’preferences’ are constantly being redefined through bargaining, the option to file separately may affect outcomes even if it is never chosen. We use Lundberg and Pollak’s (1993) separate spheres bargaining model to assess the impact of filing options on the outcomes of primary and secondary earners. Threat points of the household’s bargain are given for each spouse by the utility that he or she attains as a follower of a counter-factual off-equilibrium Stackelberg game played by the couple. For a benchmark tax system which treats a couple’s average taxable income as if it were that of a single individual, we prove that if choices are not at kinks, allowing couples to choose whether to file jointly or individually usually benefits the secondary earner. In our numeric exercises this is also the case when choices are at kinks as well. These findings are, however, quite sensitive to the details of the tax system, as made evident by the examination of an alternative tax system.

Requirement for cobalamin by Salmonella enterica serovars Typhimurium, Pullorum, Gallinarum and Enteritidis during infection in chickens

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Dietary digestible lysine requirement and essential amino acid to lysine ratio for pacu Piaractus mesopotamicus

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Disulfide Biochemistry in 2-Cys Peroxiredoxin: Requirement of Glu50 and Arg146 for the Reduction of Yeast Tsa1 by Thioredoxin

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)