Maximizing revenue in Grid markets using an economically enhanced resource manager

Traditional resource management has had as its main objective the optimization of throughput, based on parameters such as CPU, memory, and network bandwidth. With the appearance of Grid markets, new variables that determine economic expenditure, benefit and opportunity must be taken into account. The Self-organizing ICT Resource Management (SORMA) project aims at allowing resource owners and consumers to exploit market mechanisms to sell and buy resources across the Grid. SORMA's motivation is to achieve efficient resource utilization by maximizing revenue for resource providers and minimizing the cost of resource consumption within a market environment. An overriding factor in Grid markets is the need to ensure that the desired quality of service levels meet the expectations of market participants. This paper explains the proposed use of an economically enhanced resource manager (EERM) for resource provisioning based on economic models. In particular, this paper describes techniques used by the EERM to support revenue maximization across multiple service level agreements and provides an application scenario to demonstrate its usefulness and effectiveness. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Principal-agent issues in asset acquisition: UK institutions and their investment agents

This paper explores principal‐agent issues in the stock selection processes of institutional property investors. Drawing upon an interview survey of fund managers and acquisition professionals, it focuses on the relationships between principals and external agents as they engage in property transactions. The research investigated the extent to which the presence of outcome‐based remuneration structures could lead to biased advice, overbidding and/or poor asset selection. It is concluded that institutional property buyers are aware of incentives for opportunistic behaviour by external agents, often have sufficient expertise to robustly evaluate agents’ advice and that these incentives are counter‐balanced by a number of important controls on potential opportunistic behaviour. There are strong counter‐incentives in the need for the agents to establish personal relationships and trust between themselves and institutional buyers, to generate repeat and related business and to preserve or generate a good reputation in the market.