THE DARK PERSONALITY AND JOB SUCCESS IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY: USE OF INTERPERSONAL MANIPULATION IN THE WORKPLACE

This dissertation relates job desires and outcomes to the Dark Personality (Psychopathy, Machiavellianism, Narcissism, Low Agreeableness, Low Honesty-Humility) in the United States Army. It purports that individuals high on the Dark Personality desire more power, money, and status, and that they obtain jobs that afford them these luxuries by using manipulation at work. Two pilot studies used samples of United States Army members to create and test index variables: Dark Personality, Total Manipulation in the workplace, Desire for Job Success, and Total Job Success in the Army. Individual personality traits, manipulation tactics, and job desires were examined in secondary analyses. Using a sample of 468 United States Army Members, central analyses indicated that Army members high on the Dark Personality desired Job Success. Likewise, army members higher on the Dark Personality used more Manipulation tactics at work, including the egregious tactics. Yet, using more Manipulation tactics at work predicted lower levels of Job Success in the Army. Most manipulation tactics had a negative impact on Job Success, with the exception of soft tactics like Reason and Responsibility Invocation. Together, these results indicate that selective use of soft manipulation predicted Job Success, but use of more manipulation tactics predicted less Job Success in the Army. Curvilinear results indicated that being either very low or very high on the Dark Personality predicted more Job Success in the Army, whereas having intermediate levels of the Dark Personality predicted less Job Success. Finally, possessing the Dark Personality and using more Manipulation tactics at work, together, predicted less Job Success in the Army. Collectively, the results indicate that army members with intermediate levels of the Dark Personality want more powerful and high paying jobs, yet their strategy of manipulating their coworkers to move up the job ladder does not result in higher ranking, higher paying Army positions. However, Army members highest on the Dark Personality achieved job success, defying the maladaptive influence that antisocial personality traits and manipulative behaviour had on job success for most Army members. Therefore, this dissertation indicates that successful corporate scoundrels exist in the Army, but there are few of them.

Russian army justifies its reforms. OSW Commentary No. 109, 2013-06-25

The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have been more active than usual since mid- -February this year, holding a number of previously unannounced military exercises aimed at testing combat readiness. They have also maintained, for many months, a Russian warship task force in the Mediterranean in connection with the civil war in Syria. Those activities stand out of the usual training routine of the Russian army. They have no precedent in Russia’s recent history in terms of the size of the forces involved, the measures employed, the territorial span, the number of exercises, or the scheduling and mode of carrying out the drills. The last combat-readiness tests on this scale were carried out by the Soviet army in the 1980s. The intensity of the Russian Navy’s activities in the Mediterranean and the military means engaged are comparable, in due proportion, with the activities of the Soviet fleet during the Vietnam war. The Russian leadership, including president Vladimir Putin, has been directly following the recent activities of the Russian Armed Forces and their evolution.

Towards a professional army. Changes to the structure of the officer cadre and the manning system of the Russian armed forces. OSW Commentary No. 73, 2012-03-28

The structure of the Russian army’s personnel has undergone a major transformation in recent years. The Armed Forces are no longer a downsized continuation of the Soviet-era mass army, but are gradually becoming a de facto professional army in which conscription, now employed on a diminishing scale, will primarily constitute a first step towards a continued professional military career. The cornerstone for the process of professionalisation has been laid by a personnel reform which cut the number of officer posts by nearly half and considerably restricted the recruitment of new officers, thus restoring traditional proportions to the structure of the officer corps. The plans to ultimately implement a manning system based predominantly on contract service are a natural consequence of these changes. The ongoing professionalisation of the Russian Armed Forces should be treated as a conscious effort which is mainly necessitated by global trends: despite the demographic changes taking place, Russia could still maintain an army with a declared strength of one million soldiers, most of them conscripts.

Federalist rhetoric or political tactics? The what, where, who, when and why of Juncker’s call for a common European army. EPC Commentary, 12 March 2015

In an interview with the German newspaper Welt am Sonntag on 8 March 2015, the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, strongly advocated a common European army to consolidate peace in Europe, react to security threats both within the continent and in its neighbourhood, defend European values vis-à-vis aggressive powers, notably Russia, and create economies of scale by consolidating demand for military equipment.

Wally Teninga passing, UM Football, vs Army 1949

[John Ghindia (23), Tom Peterson (19) blocking Wally Teninga (42), Leo Koceski (18) on pas route.]

Ron Kramer, UM football vs Army 1956

[Kramer making over-the-shoulder catch.]

Ron Kramer, UM football vs Army 1956

[Kramer making over-the-shoulder catch.]

Don Dufek, UM Football, 1949 vs Army, scoring TD

[Dufek's TD was U-M's only score in loss that broke 23 game winning streak.]