A splitting result for the algebraic K-theory of projective toric schemes

Suppose X is a projective toric scheme defined over a ring R and equipped with an ample line bundle L . We prove that its K-theory has a direct summand of the form K(R)(k+1) where k = 0 is minimal such that L?(-k-1) is not acyclic. Using a combinatorial description of quasi-coherent sheaves we interpret and prove this result for a ring R which is either commutative, or else left noetherian.

Distinguished algebraic semantics for t-norm based fuzzy logics:Methods and algebraic equivalencies

This paper is a contribution to Mathematical fuzzy logic, in particular to the algebraic study of t-norm based fuzzy logics. In the general framework of propositional core and ?-core fuzzy logics we consider three properties of completeness with respect to any semantics of linearly ordered algebras. Useful algebraic characterizations of these completeness properties are obtained and their relations are studied. Moreover, we concentrate on five kinds of distinguished semantics for these logics-namely the class of algebras defined over the real unit interval, the rational unit interval, the hyperreals (all ultrapowers of the real unit interval), the strict hyperreals (only ultrapowers giving a proper extension of the real unit interval) and finite chains, respectively-and we survey the known completeness methods and results for prominent logics. We also obtain new interesting relations between the real, rational and (strict) hyperreal semantics, and good characterizations for the completeness with respect to the semantics of finite chains. Finally, all completeness properties and distinguished semantics are also considered for the first-order versions of the logics where a number of new results are proved. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Towards Understanding Man-In-The-Middle Attacks on IEC 60870-5-104 SCADA Networks

This paper investigates cyber attacks on ICS which rely on IEC 60870-5-104 for telecontrol communications. The main focus of the paper is on man-in-the-middle attacks, covering modification and injection of commands, it also details capture and replay attacks. An initial set of attacks are preformed on a local software simulated laboratory. Final experiments and validation of a man-in-the-middle attack are performed in a comprehensive testbed environment in conjunction with an electricity distribution operator.

Empirical evaluation of multi-device profiling side-channel attacks

Side-channel analysis of cryptographic systems can allow for the recovery of secret information by an adversary even where the underlying algorithms have been shown to be provably secure. This is achieved by exploiting the unintentional leakages inherent in the underlying implementation of the algorithm in software or hardware. Within this field of research, a class of attacks known as profiling attacks, or more specifically as used here template attacks, have been shown to be extremely efficient at extracting secret keys. Template attacks assume a strong adversarial model, in that an attacker has an identical device with which to profile the power consumption of various operations. This can then be used to efficiently attack the target device. Inherent in this assumption is that the power consumption across the devices under test is somewhat similar. This central tenet of the attack is largely unexplored in the literature with the research community generally performing the profiling stage on the same device as being attacked. This is beneficial for evaluation or penetration testing as it is essentially the best case scenario for an attacker where the model built during the profiling stage matches exactly that of the target device, however it is not necessarily a reflection on how the attack will work in reality. In this work, a large scale evaluation of this assumption is performed, comparing the key recovery performance across 20 identical smart-cards when performing a profiling attack.

Investigating Cyber-Physical Attacks against IEC 61850 Photovoltaic Inverter Installations

Cyber-attacks against Smart Grids have been found in the real world. Malware such as Havex and BlackEnergy have been found targeting industrial control systems (ICS) and researchers have shown that cyber-attacks can exploit vulnerabilities in widely used Smart Grid communication standards. This paper addresses a deep investigation of attacks against the manufacturing message specification of IEC 61850, which is expected to become one of the most widely used communication services in Smart Grids. We investigate how an attacker can build a custom tool to execute man-in-the-middle attacks, manipulate data, and affect the physical system. Attack capabilities are demonstrated based on NESCOR scenarios to make it possible to thoroughly test these scenarios in a real system. The goal is to help understand the potential for such attacks, and to aid the development and testing of cyber security solutions. An attack use-case is presented that focuses on the standard for power utility automation, IEC 61850 in the context of inverter-based distributed energy resource devices; especially photovoltaic (PV) generators.

Can Leakage Models Be More Efficient? Non-Linear Models in Side Channel Attacks

In the last decade, many side channel attacks have been published in academic literature detailing how to efficiently extract secret keys by mounting various attacks, such as differential or correlation power analysis, on cryptosystems. Among the most efficient and widely utilized leakage models involved in these attacks are the Hamming weight and distance models which give a simple, yet effective, approximation of the power consumption for many real-world systems. These leakage models reflect the number of bits switching, which is assumed proportional to the power consumption. However, the actual power consumption changing in the circuits is unlikely to be directly of that form. We, therefore, propose a non-linear leakage model by mapping the existing leakage model via a transform function, by which the changing power consumption is depicted more precisely, hence the attack efficiency can be improved considerably. This has the advantage of utilising a non-linear power model while retaining the simplicity of the Hamming weight or distance models. A modified attack architecture is then suggested to yield the correct key efficiently in practice. Finally, an empirical comparison of the attack results is presented.