Use of tree species by White-throated treerunner (Pygarrhichas albogularis King) in a secondary native forest of southern Chile

ABSTRACT In forest ecosystems, numerous species of insectivorous birds use certain tree species as feeding and nesting substrates. Between 2009 and 2010, the use of different floristic components as feeding substrate by the Pygarrhichas albogularis King, 1831 was evaluated in a southern Chilean secondary native forest. From a total of 13 trees and bush species, six tree species were used by P. albogularis as a feeding substrate. Tree use was limited to intermediate heights (11-20 m) and, mainly, to the trunk (40% of observations) and secondary branches (26%). Pygarrhichas albogularis showed a disproportionated use of N. dombeyi and an important use of trees with a greater age structure (DBH 81-100 cm). Nothofagus dombeyi presented a significantly greater tree bark crevice depth than E. cordifolia. In turn, covariance between crevice depth and invertebrate supply in tree bark was positive and significant. We consider bark depth and invertebrate supply to be the proximate causes explaining P. albogularis disproportionated use of Nothofagus dombeyi.

Dynamic matching and bargaining: the role of deadlines

We consider a dynamic model where traders in each period are matched randomly into pairs who then bargain about the division of a fixed surplus. When agreement is reached the traders leave the market. Traders who do not come to an agreement return next period in which they will be matched again, as long as their deadline has not expired yet. New traders enter exogenously in each period. We assume that traders within a pair know each other's deadline. We define and characterize the stationary equilibrium configurations. Traders with longer deadlines fare better than traders with short deadlines. It is shown that the heterogeneity of deadlines may cause delay. It is then shown that a centralized mechanism that controls the matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized mechanism is not as good for traders with long deadlines, it is shown that in a model where all traders can choose which mechanism to

Median stable matching for college admission

We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined stable matchings for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings.

Corrigendum to "On randomized matching mechanisms" [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381]

Ma (1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented - and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 - is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as ''symmetric.''

Paths to stability for matching markets with couples

We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to stability for decentralized singles markets. Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not weakly responsive, for some initial matchings there may not exist any path obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching.

Procedurally fair and stable matching

We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedurally fair and stable mechanisms: employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999) and the random order mechanism (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990, Ma, 1996). For both mechanisms we give various examples of probability distributions on the set of stable matchings and discuss properties that differentiate employment by lotto and the random order mechanism. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism, that combines aspects of procedural and "endstate'' fairness. Aldershof et al. (1999) and Ma (1996) that exist on the probability distribution induced by both mechanisms. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism.

On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model

For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. In order to prove this result, we also show that under this domain of preferences (which contains the domain of responsive preferences of the college admissions problem) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers and the Blocking Lemma holds as well. We exhibit an example showing that none of these three results remain true if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quota q-separable.

On bilateral agreements: just a matter of matching

This paper aims at assessing the importance of the initial technological endowments when firms decide to establish a technological agreement. We propose a Bertrand duopoly model where firms evaluate the advantages they can get from the agreement according to its length. Allowing them to exploit a learning process, we depict a strict connection between the starting point and the final result. Moreover, as far as learning is evaluated as an iterative process, the set of initial conditions that lead to successful ventures switches from a continuum of values to a Cantor set.

The principal-agent matching market

We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyze an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterize the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of principal-agent economies where the results fit into.

Balanceo distribuido del encaminamiento para topologías fat-tree sobre redes Infiniband

Las redes de interconexión juegan un papel importante en el rendimiento de los sistemas de altas prestaciones. Actualmente la gestión del encaminamiento de los mensajes es un factor determinante para mantener las prestaciones de la red. Nuestra propuesta es trabajar sobre un algoritmo de encaminamiento adaptativo, que distribuye el encaminamiento de los mensajes para evitar los problemas de congestión en las redes de interconexión, que aparecen por el gran volumen de comunicaciones de aplicaciones científicas ó comerciales. El objetivo es ajustar el algoritmo a una topología muy utilizada en los sistemas actuales como lo es el fat‐tree, e implementarlo en una tecnología Infiniband. En la experimentación realizada comparamos el método de control de congestión de la arquitectura Infiniband, con nuestro algoritmo. Los resultados obtenidos muestran que mejoramos los niveles de latencia por encima de un 50% y de throughput entre un 38% y un 81%.

Tree automorphisms and quasi-isometries of Thompson's group F

We prove that automorphisms of the infinite binary rooted tree T2 do not yield quasi-isometries of Thompson's group F, except for the map which reverses orientation on the unit interval, a natural outer automorphism of F. This map, together with the identity map, forms a subgroup of Aut(T2) consisting of 2-adic automorphisms, following standard terminology used in the study of branch groups. However, for more general p, we show that the analgous groups of p-adic tree automorphisms do not give rise to quasiisometries of F(p).

Predicting positive food challenges in children sensitised to peanuts/tree nuts.

BACKGROUND: Children with atopic diseases in early life are frequently found with positive IgE tests to peanuts/tree nuts without a history of previous ingestion. We aimed to identify risk factors for reactions to nuts at first introduction. METHODS: A retrospective case-note and database analysis was performed. Recruitment criteria were: patients aged 3-16 yr who had a standardized food challenge to peanut and/or tree nuts due to sensitisation to the peanut/tree nut (positive spIgE or SPT) without previous consumption. A detailed assessment was performed of factors relating to food challenge outcome with univariate and multivariate logistic regression analysis. RESULTS: There were 98 food challenges (47 peanut, 51 tree nut) with 29 positive, 67 negative and 2 inconclusive outcomes. A positive maternal history of allergy and a specific IgE >5 kU/l were strongly associated with a significantly increased risk of a positive food challenge (OR 3.73; 95% CI 1.31-10.59; p = 0.013 and OR 3.35; 95% CI 1.23-9.11; p = 0.007, respectively). Adjusting for age, a three year-old with these criteria has a 67% probability of a positive challenge. There was no significant association between types of peanut/tree nut, other food allergies, atopic conditions or severity of previous food reactions and positive challenges. CONCLUSIONS: We have demonstrated an association between the presence of maternal atopic history and a specific IgE >5 kU/l, with a significant increase in the likelihood of a positive food challenge. Although requiring further prospective validation these easily identifiable components should be considered when deciding the need for a challenge.

NAVA enhances tidal volume and diaphragmatic electro-myographic activity matching: a Range90 analysis of supply and demand.

Neurally adjusted ventilatory assist (NAVA) is a ventilation assist mode that delivers pressure in proportionality to electrical activity of the diaphragm (Eadi). Compared to pressure support ventilation (PS), it improves patient-ventilator synchrony and should allow a better expression of patient's intrinsic respiratory variability. We hypothesize that NAVA provides better matching in ventilator tidal volume (Vt) to patients inspiratory demand. 22 patients with acute respiratory failure, ventilated with PS were included in the study. A comparative study was carried out between PS and NAVA, with NAVA gain ensuring the same peak airway pressure as PS. Robust coefficients of variation (CVR) for Eadi and Vt were compared for each mode. The integral of Eadi (ʃEadi) was used to represent patient's inspiratory demand. To evaluate tidal volume and patient's demand matching, Range90 = 5-95 % range of the Vt/ʃEadi ratio was calculated, to normalize and compare differences in demand within and between patients and modes. In this study, peak Eadi and ʃEadi are correlated with median correlation of coefficients, R > 0.95. Median ʃEadi, Vt, neural inspiratory time (Ti_ ( Neural )), inspiratory time (Ti) and peak inspiratory pressure (PIP) were similar in PS and NAVA. However, it was found that individual patients have higher or smaller ʃEadi, Vt, Ti_ ( Neural ), Ti and PIP. CVR analysis showed greater Vt variability for NAVA (p < 0.005). Range90 was lower for NAVA than PS for 21 of 22 patients. NAVA provided better matching of Vt to ʃEadi for 21 of 22 patients, and provided greater variability Vt. These results were achieved regardless of differences in ventilatory demand (Eadi) between patients and modes.

Marriage as a Rat Race: Noisy Pre-Marital Investments with Assortative Matching

We study the incentive to invest to improve marriage prospects, in a frictionless marriage market with non-transferable utility. Stochastic returns to investment eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria in models with deterministic returns, and a unique equilibrium exists under reasonable conditions. Equilibrium investment is efficient when the sexes are symmetric. However, when there is any asymmetry, including an unbalanced sex ratio, investments are generically excessive. For example, if there is an excess of boys, then there is parental over-investment in boys and under-investment in girls, and total investment will be excessive.