Understanding globalization through football: the new international division of labour, migratory channels and transnational trade circuits

Among all sports, football is the one that saw the largest diffusion during the 20th century. Professional leagues exist on all continents and professional footballers are constantly on the move, trying to reach the wealthiest European clubs. Using the football players' market as an example, this article highlights some key features of economic globalization: the new international division of labour, the ever increasing role played by intermediaries to bind the demand and supply of work on a transnational scale, and the setting up of spatially fragmented trade circuits. These processes form the basis for the creation of a global market of footballers in which clubs and championships play complementary roles and are more than ever functionally integrated beyond national borders.

Exposure to superfluous information reduces cooperation and increases antisocial punishment in reputation-based interactions

Human cooperation is often based on reputation gained from previous interactions with third parties. Such reputation can be built on generous or punitive actions, and both, one's own reputation and the reputation of others have been shown to influence decision making in experimental games that control for confounding variables. Here we test how reputation-based cooperation and punishment react to disruption of the cognitive processing in different kinds of helping games with observers. Saying a few superfluous words before each interaction was used to possibly interfere with working memory. In a first set of experiments, where reputation could only be based on generosity, the disruption reduced the frequency of cooperation and lowered mean final payoffs. In a second set of experiments where reputation could only be based on punishment, the disruption increased the frequency of antisocial punishment (i.e. of punishing those who helped) and reduced the frequency of punishing defectors. Our findings suggest that working memory can easily be constraining in reputation-based interactions within experimental games, even if these games are based on a few simple rules with a visual display that provides all the information the subjects need to play the strategies predicted from current theory. Our findings also highlight a weakness of experimental games, namely that they can be very sensitive to environmental variation and that quantitative conclusions about antisocial punishment or other behavioral strategies can easily be misleading.

A Mixed-method Social Networks Study Design for Research on Transnational Families

This paper advocates the adoption of a mixed-methods research design to describe and analyze ego-centered social networks in transnational family research. Drawing on the experience of the Social Networks Influences on Family Formation project (2004-2005), I show how the combined use of network generators and semistructured interviews (N = 116) produces unique data on family configurations and their impact on life course choices. A mixed-methods network approach presents specific advantages for research on children in transnational families. On the one hand, quantitative analyses are crucial for reconstructing and measuring the potential and actual relational support available to children in a context where kin interactions may be hindered by temporary and prolonged periods of separation. On the other hand, qualitative analyses can address strategies and practices employed by families to maintain relationships across international borders and geographic distance, as well as the implications of those strategies for children's well-being.

Catalan beauty and the transnational beast: Barcelona on screen

This article explores the case of Barcelona as paradigmatic global city in such transnational productions as Vicky Cristina Barcelona by Woody Allen (2008) and Biutiful by Alejandro González Iñárritu (2010). Allen"s film shows the extreme dilution that national and linguistic identity undergoes under foreign eyes in its rendition of a"hip Barcelona" for tourists"invaded" by transnational subjects in search of bourgeois pleasures. Maybe in pursuit of a more"real" city, Iñárritu"s Biutiful moves to the Barcelona of the immigrants and the undocumented, a transnational and paradoxical location inhabited by those who need to cross borders in order to survive. Through reference to the work of Manuel Castells, Saskia Sassen, Neil Smith and Michel De Certeau among others, we argue that neither of these representations of the city is more real or unreal than the other. In their drastically divergent ways, both films contribute their external perspectives to the imaginary construction of Barcelona as a fascinating global city and can be seen as a dyptich of a transnational Barcelona. Further, they contribute to the ongoing debate about the polarization between the local and the global, the construction of urban boarders inside cities through gentrification, the transformation of the places we (would like to) inhabit, and the translation of all these into visual terms.

Resistance to extreme strategies, rather than prosocial preferences, can explain human cooperation in public goods games.

The results of numerous economic games suggest that humans behave more cooperatively than would be expected if they were maximizing selfish interests. It has been argued that this is because individuals gain satisfaction from the success of others, and that such prosocial preferences require a novel evolutionary explanation. However, in previous games, imperfect behavior would automatically lead to an increase in cooperation, making it impossible to decouple any form of mistake or error from prosocial cooperative decisions. Here we empirically test between these alternatives by decoupling imperfect behavior from prosocial preferences in modified versions of the public goods game, in which individuals would maximize their selfish gain by completely (100%) cooperating. We found that, although this led to higher levels of cooperation, it did not lead to full cooperation, and individuals still perceived their group mates as competitors. This is inconsistent with either selfish or prosocial preferences, suggesting that the most parsimonious explanation is imperfect behavior triggered by psychological drives that can prevent both complete defection and complete cooperation. More generally, our results illustrate the caution that must be exercised when interpreting the evolutionary implications of economic experiments, especially the absolute level of cooperation in a particular treatment.

Mutual trust and cooperation in the evolutionary hawks-doves game

Using a new dynamical network model of society in which pairwise interactions are weighted according to mutual satisfaction, we show that cooperation is the norm in the hawks-doves game when individuals are allowed to break ties with undesirable neighbors and to make new acquaintances in their extended neighborhood. Moreover, cooperation is robust with respect to rather strong strategy perturbations. We also discuss the empirical structure of the emerging networks, and the reasons that allow cooperators to thrive in the population. Given the metaphorical importance of this game for social interaction, this is an encouraging positive result as standard theory for large mixing populations prescribes that a certain fraction of defectors must always exist at equilibrium.

A role for the alpha-chain connecting peptide motif in mediating TCR-CD8 cooperation.

To generate peripheral T cells that are both self-MHC restricted and self-MHC tolerant, thymocytes are subjected to positive and negative selection. How the TCR discriminates between positive and negative selection ligands is not well understood, although there is substantial evidence that the CD4 and CD8 coreceptors play an important role in this cell fate decision. We have previously identified an evolutionarily conserved motif in the TCR, the alpha-chain connecting peptide motif (alpha-CPM), which allows the TCR to deliver positive selection signals. Thymocytes expressing alpha-CPM-deficient receptors do not undergo positive selection, whereas their negative selection is not impaired. In this work we studied the ligand binding and receptor function of alpha-CPM-deficient TCRs by generating T cell hybridomas expressing wild-type or alpha-CPM-deficient forms of the T1 TCR. This K(d)-restricted TCR is specific for a photoreactive derivative of the Plasmodium berghei circumsporozoite peptide(252-260) IASA-YIPSAEK(ABA)I and is therefore amenable to TCR photoaffinity labeling. The experiments presented in this work show that alpha-CPM-deficient TCRs fail to cooperate with CD8 to enhance ligand binding and functional responses.

The co-evolution of social institutions, demography, and large-scale human cooperation.

Human cooperation is typically coordinated by institutions, which determine the outcome structure of the social interactions individuals engage in. Explaining the Neolithic transition from small- to large-scale societies involves understanding how these institutions co-evolve with demography. We study this using a demographically explicit model of institution formation in a patch-structured population. Each patch supports both social and asocial niches. Social individuals create an institution, at a cost to themselves, by negotiating how much of the costly public good provided by cooperators is invested into sanctioning defectors. The remainder of their public good is invested in technology that increases carrying capacity, such as irrigation systems. We show that social individuals can invade a population of asocials, and form institutions that support high levels of cooperation. We then demonstrate conditions where the co-evolution of cooperation, institutions, and demographic carrying capacity creates a transition from small- to large-scale social groups.

INdividual SUrveys in RAllies (INSURA), A new tool for exploring transnational activism?

Prior the middle of the 90', interviewing participants in protest events was quiet rare. INdividual SUrveys in RAllies (INSURA) did enter the social researcher's usual toolkit only in the following decade after Favre, Fillieule and Mayer (1997) conducted such a survey with as a primary ambition to build a solid methodological framework that could be subsequently applied by other researchers. After some years of intensive use of INSURA, one is entitled to wonder whether that technique has fulfilled social researchers' hopes or not. In that paper, results of a collective work on alter-global rallies in Evian and Saint- Denis are used to answer three interrelated questions. Firstly, some basic methodological questions about how to collect data on crowds are adressed. What are the specific constraints of interviewing people at the very moment they are "expressing" a political opinion? What specific constraints result from the morphology of the covered events, that is to say, how to build a valid sampling frame? The authors then turn to a more general point about the questions that can be solved, or not, using that technique. Secondly it is the strenghts and weaknesses of INSURA in exploring the transnational dimension of alter global protests that is adressed. The authors show that INSURA is certainly well suited to explore the demographics of alter-global events, as well as relational networks of individuals and multiple belongings. On the contrary, it is assumed that organization networks and movement's boundaries are far more difficult to explore through that method, a fact that seriously limits international cross comparisons of events and movements based on that tool.

The Impact of Cooperation on R&D, Innovation andProductivity: an Analysis of Spanish Manufacturing and Services Firms

This paper investigates relationships between cooperation, R&D, innovation and productivity in Spanish firms. It uses a large sample of firm-level micro-data and applies an extended structural model that aims to explain the effects of cooperation on R&D investment, of R&D investment on output innovation, and of innovation on firms’ productivity levels. It also analyses the determinants of R&D cooperation. Firms’ technology level is taken into account in order to analyse the differences between high-tech and low-tech firms, both in the industrial and service sectors. The database used was the Technological Innovation Panel (PITEC) for the period 2004-2010. Empirical results show that firms which cooperate in innovative activities are more likely to invest in R&D in subsequent years. As expected, R&D investment has a positive impact on the probability of generating an innovation, in terms of both product and process, for manufacturing firms. Finally, innovation output has a positive impact on firms’ productivity, being greater in process innovations.

The Impact of Cooperation on R&D, Innovation and Productivity: an Analysis of Spanish Manufacturing and Services Firms

This paper investigates relationships between cooperation, R&D, innovation and productivity in Spanish firms. It uses a large sample of firm-level micro-data and applies an extended structural model that aims to explain the effects of cooperation on R&D investment, of R&D investment on output innovation, and of innovation on firms’ productivity levels. It also analyses the determinants of R&D cooperation. Firms’ technology level is taken into account in order to analyse the differences between high-tech and low-tech firms, both in the industrial and service sectors. The database used was the Technological Innovation Panel (PITEC) for the period 2004-2010. Empirical results show that firms which cooperate in innovative activities are more likely to invest in R&D in subsequent years. As expected, R&D investment has a positive impact on the probability of generating an innovation, in terms of both product and process, for manufacturing firms. Finally, innovation output has a positive impact on firms’ productivity, being greater in process innovations. Keywords: innovation sources; productivity; R&D Cooperation

The role of reputation, punishment and their interplay in human cooperation

The problem of how cooperation can evolve between individuals or entities with conflicting interests is central to biology as many of the major evolutionary transitions, from the first replicating molecules to human societies, have required solving this problem. There are many routes to cooperation but humans seem to be distinct from other species as they have more complex and diverse mechanisms, often due to their higher cognitive skills, allowing them to reap the benefits from living in groups. Among those mechanisms, the use of reputation or past experience with others as well as sanctioning mechanisms both seem to be of major importance. They have often been considered separately but the interaction between the two might provide new insights as to how punishment could have appeared as a means to enforce cooperation in early humans. In this thesis, I firstly use theoretical approaches from evolutionary game theory to investigate the evolution of punishment and cooperation through a reputation system based on punitive actions, and compare the efficacy of this system, in terms of cooperation achieved, with one based on cooperative actions. On the other hand, I use empirical approaches from economics to test, in real life, predictions from theoretical models but also to explore further conditions such as environmental variation, constrained memory, or even the scale of competition between individuals. Both approaches have allowed contributing to the understanding of how these factors affect reputation and punishment use, and ultimately how cooperation is achieved.