The Single Supervisory Mechanism: A Sound First Step in Europe’s Banking Union? Egmont European Affairs Paper, March 2013

The financial and economic crisis has hit Europe in its core. While the crisis may not have originated in the European Union, it has laid bare structural weaknesses in the EU’s policy framework. Both public finances and the banking sector have been heavily affected. For a long time, the EU failed to take into account sufficiently the perverse link that existed between the two. Negative evolutions in one field of the crisis often dragged along the other in its downward spiral. In June 2012, in the early hours of a yet another EU Summit, the leaders of the eurozone finally decided to address the link between the banking and sovereign debt crises. Faced with soaring public borrowing costs in Spain and Italy, they decided to allow for the direct European recapitalisation of banks when the Member State itself would no longer be in a position to do so. In exchange, supervision of the banking sector would be lifted to the European level by means of a Single Supervisory Mechanism. The Single Supervisory Mechanism, or SSM in the EU jargon, is a first step in the broader revision of policies towards banks in Europe. The eventual goal is the creation of a Banking Union, which is to carry out effective surveillance and – if needed – crisis management of the banking sector. The SSM is to rely on national supervisors and the ECB, with the ECB having final authority on the matter. The involvement of the latter made it clear that the SSM would be centred on the eurozone – while it is to remain open to other Member States willing to join. Due to the ongoing problems and the link between the creation of the SSM and the recapitalisation of banks, the SSM became one of the key legislative priorities of the EU. In December 2012, Member States reached an agreement on the design of the SSM. After discussions with the European Parliament (which were still ongoing at the time of writing), the process towards making the SSM operational can be initiated. The goal is to have the SSM fully up and running in the first half of 2014. The decisions that were taken in June 2012 are likely to have had a bigger impact than the eurozone’s Heads of State and Government could have realised at the time for two important reasons. On the one hand, creating the SSM necessitates a full Banking Union and therefore shared risk. On the other hand, the decisions improved the ECB’s perception of the willingness of governments to take far-reaching measures. This undoubtedly played a significant role in the creation of the Outright Monetary Transactions programme by the ECB, which has led to a substantial easing of the crisis in the short-term. 1 These short-term gains should now be matched with a stable long-term framework for bank supervision and crisis management. The agreement on the SSM should be the first step in the direction of this goal. This paper provides an analysis of the SSM and its role in the creation of a Banking Union. The paper starts with a reminder of why the EU decided to put in place the SSM (§1) and the state of play of the ongoing negotiations on the SSM (§2). Subsequently, the supervisory responsibilities of the SSM are detailed, including its scope and the division of labour between the national supervisors and the ECB (§3). The internal functioning of the SSM (§4) and its relation to the other supervisors are discussed afterwards (§5). As mentioned earlier, the SSM is part of a wider move towards a Banking Union. Therefore, this paper sheds light on the other building blocks of this ambitious project (§6). The transition towards the Banking Union is important and will prove to be a bumpy ride. Before formulating a number of conclusions, this Working Paper therefore provides an overview of the planned road ahead (§7).

Strengthening the euro area. CHALLENGE EUROPE Issue 22. Challenges and new beginnings: Priorities for the EU's new leadership, September 2014

Since 2007, a series of acute crises have threatened the very existence of the euro area. The financial crisis which spilled into the currency union in 2007 was followed by an unexpectedly strong downturn of the real economy. As of 2010, the euro area was confronted with a severe sovereign debt and banking crisis. Despite these troublesome developments, the euro area has proven to have a considerable degree of resilience. In each phase, governance weaknesses were revealed – and national governments together with the EU institutions have designed an impressive series of policy responses in crisis management and institutional innovation. The euro area today is completed by a banking union with a Single Supervisory and a Single Resolution Mechanism. National budgetary and economic policies are more closely overseen and coordinated. With the European Stability Mechanism, the euro area now has a permanent tool in place to manage sovereign liquidity crises and instabilities in the banking sector. Most importantly, the euro area's only true federal institution, the European Central Bank (ECB), has become its most effective crisis manager: with the announcement of its Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme, the ECB finally managed to calm the self fulfilling crisis in 2012. Meanwhile, the announcement of credit easing and quasi-quantitative easing in September 2014 is a move towards reducing financial fragmentation and countering deflation. The euro area in 2014 is hence a lot different from the one in 2007. And yet, further challenges need to be overcome. Prevailing stagnation, fragmentation and problems of legitimacy require a rethink of policies and further governance reform.

The eurozone in bad need of a psychiatrist. EuropEos Commentary No. 6, 9 December 2010

Stefano Micossi, Director General of Assonime and member of the CEPS Board of Directors, observes in a new EuropEos Commentary that there is something surreal to the unfolding financial crisis of the eurozone, as the leaders grudgingly do what is needed to prevent disaster just minutes before it’s too late, and then in the next minute revert to the same behaviour that had brought them against the wall in the first place. He cites rising sovereign spreads within the area as the visible result of this strategy: they signal investors’ expectation that the future can only bring more of the same, a series of ever-larger sovereign debt crises, under Damocles’ sword that at some stage Germany, the paymaster of last resort, will close its purse and let Armageddon start.

The Eurozone crisis and the erosion of democratic legitimacy: Lessons from the gold standard. ACES Cases No. 2013.3

This paper makes four propositions. First, it argues that the euro’s institutional design makes it function like the interwar gold exchange standard during periods of stress. Just like the gold exchange standard during the 1930s, the euro created a ‘core’ of surplus countries and a ‘periphery’ of deficit countries. The latter have to sacrifice their internal domestic economic equilibrium in order to restore their external equilibrium, and therefore have no choice but to respond to balance of payments crises by a series of deflationary spending, price and wage cuts. The paper’s second claim is that the euro’s institutional design and the EU’s response to its ‘sovereign debt crisis’ during 2010-13 deepened the recession in the Eurozone periphery, as EMU leaders focused almost exclusively on austerity measures and structural reforms and paid only lip service to the need to rebalance growth between North and South. As Barry Eichengreen argued in Golden Fetters, the rigidity of the gold standard contributed to the length and depth of the Great Depression during the 1930s, but also underscored the incompatibility of the system with legitimate national democratic government in places like Italy, Germany, and Spain, which is the basis for the paper’s third proposition: the euro crisis instigated a crisis of democratic government in Southern Europe underlining that democratic legitimacy still mainly resides within the borders of nation states. By adopting the euro, EMU member states gave up their ability to control major economic policy decisions, thereby damaging their domestic political legitimacy, which in turn dogged attempts to enact structural reforms. Evidence of the erosion of national democracy in the Eurozone periphery can be seen in the rise of anti-establishment parties, and the inability of traditional center-left and center-right parties to form stable governments and implement reforms. The paper’s fourth proposition is that the euro’s original design and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis further widened the existing democratic deficit in the European Union, as manifested in rising anti-EU and anti-euro sentiment, as well as openly Eurosceptic political movements, not just in the euro periphery, but also increasingly in the euro core.

Preventing another Euro Area Crisis: EU Economic Governance ‘Six Pack’ – a case of too little, too late? Paper from the Colloquium: The Politics and Economics of the Euro Crisis, Institute for European Studies, University of Malta, 2 December 2011

Summary: The ‘Six Pack’ forms part of the economic governance reforms which are being implemented in order to prevent a repeat of the current sovereign debt crisis in the Euro Area. This legislative package involves strengthening the Stability and Growth Pact, with stronger financial sanctions and more focus on debt; a new directive on national budgetary frameworks and a new framework to monitor and correct macroeconomic imbalances. Furthermore, the implementation of the ‘Six Pack’ also involves procedural reforms, in particular reverse majority voting, as well as more oversight by the European Parliament. Inter-institutional negotiations on the ‘Six Pack’ took over a year. In the meantime, the sovereign debt crisis had deepened and broadened, implying that the ‘Six Pack’ may have come ‘too late’. The ‘Six Pack’ has also proved to be ‘too little’ to address the crisis and by the time it entered into force, further measures and proposals to strengthen economic governance had to be made. Nevertheless, the ‘Six Pack’ comprises some positive developments. In particular, recognising that fiscal policy is a matter of national sovereignty, it sets a new approach which relies on institutional reforms at national level. As such, it constitutes a first, small step to improve economic governance in the Euro Area.

EU Enlargement: Lessons from, and Prospects for. IES WORKING PAPER 3/2013

In 2009 the European Union (EU) reached a crucial moment in its history, in which the terms Europe and crisis became conjoined: the European sovereign-debt crisis, or Euro-crisis. Yet enlargement remains on the agenda, with the EU’s next enlargement starting on 1st July 2013 with the accession of Croatia, Iceland and FYROM looking set to follow in the near future, and probably other Western Balkan states and possibly Turkey in the long term. Enlargement therefore will soon come back into focus. Focusing on climate and energy security policy, this working paper first reflects upon the impact of the 2004/2007 enlargement on the EU. A reflection on the EU’s recent past with some of the lessons that can be learnt then follows, with a consideration that predictions of decision- and policy-making gridlock were not realised, that newer member states have proved influential, and that prospective member states cannot be expected to be passive nor impotent. The latter part of this paper evaluates the potential prospects and outcomes of these lessons with regard to future enlargement from within (Scotland and Catalonia), and without (Turkey), and the political factors which may dictate whether these possible enlargements are realised.

Is the EMU ready for future shocks? An overview of available backstops. European Policy Brief No. 20, March 2014

In recent years much has been accomplished to make the EMU more resilient to banking crises, sovereign-debt crises or balance-of-payment crises. Several ‘backstops’ or financial safety nets were progressively put in place to absorb the shocks that could have otherwise broken the EMU as a system. These substantial advances reflected a gradual, trial-and-error approach rather than a grand design that would have completely overhauled the EMU architecture. While flexibility and realism have advantages, complacency is a clear risk. With no roadmap to follow, efforts to complete the architecture of the EMU may fade with time. Maintaining a sense of direction is crucial while potential vulnerabilities remain.

State Transformation and the European Integration Project. Lessons from the financial crisis and the Greek paradigm. CEPS Special Report No. 130/February 2016

The financial crisis that erupted in the eurozone not only affected the EU’s financial governance mechanisms, but also the very nature of state sovereignty and balances in the relations of member states; thus, the actual inequalities between the member states hidden behind their institutional equality have deteriorated. This transformation is recorded in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the member states’ constitutional courts, particularly in those at the heart of the crisis, with Greece as the most prominent example. It is the issue of public debt (sovereign debt) of the EU member states that particularly reflects the influence of the crisis on state sovereignty as well as the intensely transnational (intergovernmental) character of European integration, which under these circumstances takes the form of a continuous, tough negotiation. The historical connection between public debt (sovereign debt) and state sovereignty has re-emerged because of the financial crisis. This development has affected not only the European institutions, but also, at the member state level, the actual institutional content of the rule of law (especially judicial review) and the welfare state in its essence, as the great social and political acquis of 20th century Europe. From this perspective, the way that the Greek courts have dealt with the gradual waves of fiscal austerity measures and structural reforms from 2010 to 2015 is characteristic. The effect of the financial crisis on the sovereignty of the member states and on the pace of European integration also has an impact on European foreign and security policy, and the correlations between the political forces at both the national and European level, thus producing even more intense pressures on European social democracy. In light of the experience of the financial crisis, the final question is whether the nation state (given the large real inequalities among the EU member states) currently functions as a brake or as an engine for future European integration.

The Portuguese Economic Crisis: Policies and Outcomes. Bertelsmann Policy Brief, 19.02.2015

The financial and economic crisis in the aftermath of 2008 is unique for several reasons: its depth, its speed and its global entanglement. Simultaneous economic decline in many economies around the globe sent out political shockwaves. In Europe, the crisis served as a wake-up call. Policymakers responded to the social and political insecurity triggered by economically unsound practices with solidarity and with EU-scepticism. The recession confronted Euro zone countries with a number of similar problems, although each was embedded in its own set of country-specific challenges. The tools with which each began to counteract the financial and sovereign debt crisis differed. This policy brief examines the Portuguese path to recovery. It outlines some of the great recession’s main impacts on the country’s labour market, as well as analyses the path it has taken to restore sustainable jobs.

Institutions and Growth in Europe. CEPS Working Document No. 421, April 2016

This paper provides empirical evidence in support of the view that the quality of institutions is an important determinant of long-term growth of European countries. When also taking into account the initial level of GDP per capita and government debt, cross-country institutional differences can explain to a great extent the relative long-term GDP performance of European countries. It also shows that an initial government debt level above a threshold (e.g. 60-70%) coupled with institutional quality below the EU average tends to be associated with particularly poor long-term real growth performance. Interestingly, the detrimental effect of high debt levels on long-term growth seems cushioned by the presence of very sound institutions. This might be because good institutions help to alleviate the debt problem in various ways, e.g. by ensuring sufficient fiscal consolidation in the longer-run, allowing for better use of government expenditures and promoting sustainable growth, social fairness and more efficient tax administration. The quality of national institutions seems to enhance the long-term GDP performance across a large sample of countries, also including OECD countries outside Europe. The paper offers some evidence that, in the presence of good institutions, conditions for catching-up seem generally good also for euro-area and fixed exchange rate countries. Looking at sub-groupings, it seems that sound institutions may be particularly important for long-term growth in the countries where the exchange rate tool is no longer available (and where also sovereign debt is high), and less so in the countries with flexible exchange rate regimes. However, this result is preliminary and requires further research. The empirical findings on the importance of institutions are robust to various measures of output growth, different measures of institutional indicators, different sample sizes, different country groupings and to the inclusion of additional control variables. Overall, the results tend to support the call for structural reforms in general and reforms enhancing the efficiency of public administration and regulation, the rule of law and the fight against rent-seeking and corruption in particular.

Drivers of populism - A four-country comparison of party communication in the run-up to the 2014 European Parliament elections

The aim of this paper is to analyze what different types of populist communication styles emerged during the 2014 EP election campaign and under which conditions political parties selected specific populist communication styles. To do this, a comparative quantitative content analysis of press releases in the run-up of the latest EP elections has been conducted for parties in France, Germany, Austria and Greece. The paper presents a definition of populism based on the contemporary academic discourse, which focuses on the transnational nature of the European political field. It is shown that populist party communication is more pronounced on the fringes of the political spectrum and in countries struggling with severe macroeconomic difficulties. Contrary to intuitive expectations, the perceived populist rhetoric of exclusivity in the context of the European sovereign debt crisis, which is identified as a central feature of right-wing populism, barely takes place within populist party communication.

ANÁLISE DAS MUDANÇAS DOS FATORES DETERMINANTES DA ESTRUTURA DE CAPITAL EM FUNÇÃO DO CICLO DE VIDA DAS EMPRESAS BRASILEIRAS SÃO BERNARDO DO CAMPO

As várias teorias acerca da estrutura de capital despertam interesse motivando diversos estudos sobre o assunto sem, no entanto, ter um consenso. Outro tema aparentemente pouco explorado refere-se ao ciclo de vida das empresas e como ele pode influenciar a estrutura de capital. Este estudo teve como objetivo verificar quais determinantes possuem maior relevância no endividamento das empresas e se estes determinantes alteram-se dependendo do ciclo de vida da empresa apoiada pelas teorias Trade Off, Pecking Order e Teoria da Agência. Para alcançar o objetivo deste trabalho foi utilizado análise em painel de efeito fixo sendo a amostra composta por empresas brasileiras de capital aberto, com dados secundários disponíveis na Economática® no período de 2005 a 2013, utilizando-se os setores da BM&FBOVESPA. Como resultado principal destaca-se o mesmo comportamento entre a amostra geral, alto e baixo crescimento pelo endividamento contábil para o determinante Lucratividade apresentando uma relação negativa, e para os determinantes Oportunidade de Crescimento e Tamanho, estes com uma relação positiva. Para os grupos de alto e baixo crescimento alguns determinantes apresentaram resultados diferentes, como a singularidade que resultou significância nestes dois grupos, sendo positiva no baixo crescimento e negativa no alto crescimento, para o valor colateral dos ativos e benefício fiscal não dívida apresentaram significância apenas no grupo de baixo crescimento. Para o endividamento a valor de mercado foi observado significância para o Benefício fiscal não dívida e Singularidade. Este resultado reforça o argumento de que o ciclo de vida influência a estrutura de capital

Wealth shocks, credit-supply shocks, and asset allocation:evidence from household and firm portfolios

We use a unique dataset with bank clients’ security holdings for all German banks to examine how macroeconomic shocks affect asset allocation preferences of households and non-financial firms. Our analysis focuses on two alternative mechanisms which can influence portfolio choice: wealth shocks, which are represented by the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area, and credit-supply shocks which arise from reductions in borrowing abilities during bank distress. While households with large holdings of securities from stressed Euro area countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) de-crease the degree of concentration in their security portfolio as a result of the Euro area crisis, non-financial firms with similar levels of holdings from stressed Euro area countries do not. Credit-supply shocks at the bank level result in lower concentration, for both households and non-financial corporations. Only shocks to corporate credit bear ramifications on bank clients’ portfolio concentration. Our results are robust to falsification tests, and instrumental variables estimation.

Wealth shocks, credit-supply shocks, and asset allocation:evidence from household and firm portfolios

We use a unique dataset with bank clients’ security holdings for all German banks to examine how macroeconomic shocks affect asset allocation preferences of households and non-financial firms. Our analysis focuses on two alternative mechanisms which can influence portfolio choice: wealth shocks, which are represented by the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, and credit-supply shocks which arise from reductions in borrowing abilities during bank distress. We document het- erogeneous responses to these two types of shocks. While households with large holdings of secu- rities from stressed Eurozone countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) decrease the degree of concentration in their security portfolio as a result of the Eurozone crisis, non-financial firms with similar levels of holdings from stressed Eurozone countries do not. Credit-supply shocks at the bank level (caused by bank distress) result in lower concentration, for both households and non-financial corporations. We also show that only shocks to corporate credit bear ramifications on bank clients’ portfolio concentration, while shocks in retail credit are inconsequential. Our results are robust to falsification tests, propensity score matching techniques, and instrumental variables estimation.

Rules-based economic governance in the European Union: A reappraisal of national fiscal rules.

The economic and financial crisis of 2007/2009 has posed unexpected challenges on both the global and the regional level. Besides the US, the EU has been the most severely hit by the current economic crisis. The financial and banking crisis on the one hand and the sovereign debt crisis on the other hand have clearly shown that without a bold, constructive and systematic change of the economic governance structure of the Union, not just the sustainability of the monetary zone but also the viability of the whole European integration process can be seriously undermined. The current crisis is, however, only a symptom, which made all those contradictions overt that were already heavily embedded in the system. Right from the very beginning, the deficit and the debt rules of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact have proved to be controversial cornerstones in the fiscal governance framework of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Yet, member states of the EU (both within and outside of the EMU) have shown an immense interest in adopting numerical constraints on the domestic level without hesitation. The main argument for the introduction of national fiscal rules was mostly to strengthen the accountability and credibility of national fiscal policy-making. The paper, however, claims that a relatively large portion of national rules were adopted only after the start of deceleration of the debt-to-GDP ratios. Accordingly, national rules were hardly the sole triggering factors of maintaining fiscal discipline; rather, they served as the key elements of a comprehensive reform package of public budgeting. It can be safely argued, therefore, that countries decide to adopt fiscal rules because they want to explicitly signal their strong commitment to fiscal discipline. In other words, it is not fiscal rules per se what matter in delivering fiscal stability but a strong political commitment.