862 resultados para Small open economy
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Includes bibliography
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Includes bibliography
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Incluye Bibliografía
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OBJECTIVE In Europe, growth hormone (GH) treatment for children born small for gestational age (SGA) can only be initiated after 4 years of age. However, younger age at treatment initiation is a predictor of favourable response. To assess the effect of GH treatment on early growth and cognitive functioning in very young (<30 months), short-stature children born SGA. DESIGN A 2-year, randomized controlled, multicentre study (NCT00627523; EGN study), in which patients received either GH treatment or no treatment for 24 months. PATIENTS Children aged 19-29 months diagnosed as SGA at birth, and for whom sufficient early growth data were available, were eligible. Patients were randomized (1:1) to GH treatment (Genotropin(®) , Pfizer Inc.) at a dose of 0·035 mg/kg/day by subcutaneous injection, or no treatment. MEASUREMENTS The primary objective was to assess the change from baseline in height standard deviation score (SDS) after 24 months of GH treatment. RESULTS Change from baseline in height SDS was significantly greater in the GH treatment vs control group at both month 12 (1·03 vs 0·14) and month 24 (1·63 vs 0·43; both P < 0·001). Growth velocity SDS was significantly higher in the GH treatment vs control group at 12 months (P < 0·001), but not at 24 months. There was no significant difference in mental or psychomotor development indices between the two groups. CONCLUSIONS GH treatment for 24 months in very young short-stature children born SGA resulted in a significant increase in height SDS compared with no treatment.
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This paper sets out to explain why Spain experienced a full-fledged sovereign debt crisis and had to resort to euroarea financial assistance for its banks, whereas Italy did not. It undertakes a structured comparison, dissecting the sovereign debt crisis into a banking crisis and a balance of payments crisis. It argues that the distinctive features of bank business models and of national banking systems in Italy and Spain have considerable analytical leverage in explaining the different scenarios of the crises in each country. This ‘bank-based’ analysis contributes to the flourishing literature that examines changes in banking with a view to account for the differentiated impact of the global banking crisis first and the sovereign debt crisis in the euroarea later.
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How much leeway did governments have in designing bank bailouts and deciding on the height of intervention during the 2007-2009 financial crisis? This paper analyzes comparatively what explains government responses to banking crises. Why does the type of intervention during financial crises vary to such a great extent across countries? By analyzing the variety of bailouts in Europe and North America, we will show that the strategies governments use to cope with the instability of financial markets does not depend on economic conditions alone. Rather, they take root in the institutional and political setting of each country and vary in particular according to the different types of business-government relations banks were able to entertain with public decision-makers. Still, “crony capitalism” accounts overstate the role of bank lobbying. With four case studies of the Irish, Danish, British and French bank bailout, we show that countries with close one-on-one relationships between policy-makers and bank management tended to develop unbalanced bailout packages, while countries where banks have strong interbank ties and collective negotiation capacity were able to develop solutions with a greater burden sharing from private institutions.
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CIS Microfiche Accession Numbers: CIS 89 S721-4
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"January 1992."
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At a broad level, it has been shown that different institutional contexts, policy regimes and business systems affect the kinds of activities in which a nation specialises. This paper is concerned with the way in which different national business systems affect the nature of participation of a nation in the knowledge economy. The paper seeks to explain cross-national variations in the knowledge economy in the Australia, Denmark and Sweden with reference to dominant characteristics of the business system. Although Australia, Denmark and Sweden are all small wealthy countries, they each have quite distinctive business systems. Australia has been regarded as a variant of the competitive business system and has generally been described as an entrepreneurial economy with a large small firm population. In contrast Sweden has a coordinated business system that has favoured large industrial firms. The Danish variant of the coordinated model, with its well-developed vocational training system, is distinguishable by its large population of networked small and medium size enterprises. The three countries also differ significantly on two dimensions of participation in the knowledge economy. First, there is cross-national variation in patterns of specialisation in knowledge intensive industries and services. Second, the institutional infrastructure of the knowledge economy (or the existing stock of knowledge and competence in the economy, the potential for generation and diffusion a new knowledge and the capacity for commercialisation of new ideas) differs across the three countries. This paper seeks to explain variations in these two dimensions of the knowledge economy with reference to characteristics of the business system in the three countries.
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Electoral Rules and Leader Selection: Experimental Evidence from Ugandan Community Groups. Despite a large body of work documenting how electoral systems affect policy outcomes, less is known about their impact on leader selection. We study this by comparing two types of participatory decision making in Ugandan community groups: (i) vote by secret ballot and (ii) open discussion with consensus. Random assignment allows us to estimate the causal impact of the rules on leader types and social service delivery. Vote groups are found to elect leaders more similar to the average member while discussion group leaders are positively selected on socio-economic characteristics. Further, dropout rates are significantly higher in discussion groups, particularly for poorer members. After 3.5 years, vote groups are larger in size and their members save less and get smaller loans. We conclude that the secret ballot vote creates more inclusive groups while open discussion groups favor the already economically successful. Preparing for Genocide: Community Meetings in Rwanda. How do political elites prepare the civilian population for participation in violent conflict? We empirically investigate this question using data from the Rwandan Genocide in 1994. Every Saturday before 1994, Rwandan villagers had to meet to work on community infrastructure. The practice was highly politicized and, according to anecdotal evidence, regularly used by the political elites for spreading propaganda in the years before the genocide. This paper presents the first quantitative evidence of this abuse of the community meetings. To establish causality, we exploit cross-sectional variation in meeting intensity induced by exogenous weather fluctuations. We find that an additional rainy Saturday resulted in a five percent lower civilian participation rate in genocide violence. Selection into Borrowing: Survey Evidence from Uganda. In this paper, I study how changes to the standard credit contract affect loan demand and selection into borrowing, using a representative sample of urban micro enterprises, most with no borrowing experience. Hypothetical loan demand questions are used to test whether firm owners respond to changes in loans' contractual terms and whether take-up varies by firms' risk type and other firm owner characteristics. The results indicate that contracts with lower interest rates and less stringent collateral requirements attract less risky borrowers, suggesting that there is scope for improvement of standard financial contract terms. Credit Contract Structure and Firm Growth: Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial. We study the effects of credit contract structure on firm outcomes among small and medium sized firms. A randomized control trial was carried out to distinguish between some of the key constraints to efficient credit use connected to the firms' business environment and production function, namely (i) backloaded returns (ii) uncertain returns and (iii) indivisible fixed costs. Each firm was followed for the 1-year loan cycle. We describe the experiment and present preliminary results from the first 754 out of 2,340 firms to have completed the loan cycle. Firms offered a grace period have higher profits and higher household income than firms receiving a rebate later on as well as the control group. They also increased the number of paid employees and reduced the number of unpaid employees, an effect also found among firms that received a cash subsidy at the beginning of the loan cycle. We discuss potential mechanisms behind these effects.