Preferences, actions and voting rules

In this paper we address several issues related to collective dichotomous decision-making by means of quaternary voting rules, i.e., when voters may choose between four actions: voting yes, voting no, abstaining and not turning up-which are aggregated by a voting rule into a dichotomous decision: acceptance or rejection of a proposal. In particular we study the links between the actions and preferences of the actors. We show that quaternary rules (unlike binary rules, where only two actions -yes or no- are possible) leave room for "manipulability" (i.e., strategic behaviour). Thus a preference profile does not in general determine an action profile. We also deal with the notions of success and decisiveness and their ex ante assessment for quaternary voting rules, and discuss the role of information and coordination in this context.

Group size and decision rules in legislative bargaining

We conduct experiments to investigate the effects of different majority requirements on bargaining outcomes in small and large groups. In particular, we use a Baron-Ferejohn protocol and investigate the effects of decision rules on delay (number of bargaining rounds needed to reach agreement) and measures of "fairness" (inclusiveness of coalitions, equality of the distribution within a coalition). We find that larger groups and unanimity rule are associated with significantly larger decision making costs in the sense that first round proposals more often fail, leading to more costly delay. The higher rate of failure under unanimity rule and in large groups is a combination of three facts: (1) in these conditions, a larger number of individuals must agree, (2) an important fraction of individuals reject offers below the equal share, and (3) proposers demand more (relative to the equal share) in large groups.

Fisheries rules and regulations in 23 states of Nigeria: a note

In order to make a sound proposal to the Kainji Lake Fisheries Management and Conservation Unit regarding the amendment of the existing Fisheries Laws and Regulations, including the raise of fishing license fees, the Fisheries Departments of 21 Nigerian States were visited in August-September 2000. In that occasion the staff was interviewed, existing documents were revised, and the results were compared with those of Kebbi and Niger State

On the Benefits of Including Age-structure in Harvest Control Rules

This paper explores the benefits of including age-structure in the control rule (HCR) when decision makers regard their (age-structured) models as approximations. We find that introducing age structure into the HCR reduces both the volatility of the spawning biomass and the yield. Although at a fairly imprecise level the benefits are lower, there are still major advantages for actual assessment precision of the case study. Moreover, we find that when age-structure is included in the HCR the relative ranking of different policies in terms of variance in biomass and yield does not differ. These results are shown both theoretically and numerically by applying the model to the Southern Hake fishery.

Intermediate serial cost-sharing rules

In this paper we give a generalization of the serial cost-sharing rule defined by Moulin and Shenker (1992) for cost sharing problems. According to the serial cost sharing rule, agents with low demands of a good pay cost increments associated with low quantities in the production process of that good. This fact might not always be desirable for those agents, since those cost increments might be higher than others, for example with concave cost functions. In this paper we give a family of cost sharing rules which allocates cost increments in all the possible places in the production process. And we characterize axiomatically each of them by means of an axiomatic characterization related to the one given for the serial cost-sharing rule by Moulin and Shenker (1994).

Characterizing distribution rules for cost sharing games

In noncooperative cost sharing games, individually strategic agents choose resources based on how the welfare (cost or revenue) generated at each resource (which depends on the set of agents that choose the resource) is distributed. The focus is on finding distribution rules that lead to stable allocations, which is formalized by the concept of Nash equilibrium, e.g., Shapley value (budget-balanced) and marginal contribution (not budget-balanced) rules.

Recent work that seeks to characterize the space of all such rules shows that the only budget-balanced distribution rules that guarantee equilibrium existence in all welfare sharing games are generalized weighted Shapley values (GWSVs), by exhibiting a specific 'worst-case' welfare function which requires that GWSV rules be used. Our work provides an exact characterization of the space of distribution rules (not necessarily budget-balanced) for any specific local welfare functions remains, for a general class of scalable and separable games with well-known applications, e.g., facility location, routing, network formation, and coverage games.

We show that all games conditioned on any fixed local welfare functions possess an equilibrium if and only if the distribution rules are equivalent to GWSV rules on some 'ground' welfare functions. Therefore, it is neither the existence of some worst-case welfare function, nor the restriction of budget-balance, which limits the design to GWSVs. Also, in order to guarantee equilibrium existence, it is necessary to work within the class of potential games, since GWSVs result in (weighted) potential games.

We also provide an alternative characterization—all games conditioned on any fixed local welfare functions possess an equilibrium if and only if the distribution rules are equivalent to generalized weighted marginal contribution (GWMC) rules on some 'ground' welfare functions. This result is due to a deeper fundamental connection between Shapley values and marginal contributions that our proofs expose—they are equivalent given a transformation connecting their ground welfare functions. (This connection leads to novel closed-form expressions for the GWSV potential function.) Since GWMCs are more tractable than GWSVs, a designer can tradeoff budget-balance with computational tractability in deciding which rule to implement.

Measurement of the neutron (^3He) spin structure function at low Q^2 : a connection between the Bjorken and Drell-Hearn-Gerasimov sum rules

The spin dependent cross sections, σT_1/2 and σT_3/2 , and asymmetries, A_∥ and A_⊥ for ³He have been measured at the Jefferson Lab's Hall A facility. The inclusive scattering process ³He(e,e)X was performed for initial beam energies ranging from 0.86 to 5.1 GeV, at a scattering angle of 15.5°. Data includes measurements from the quasielastic peak, resonance region, and the deep inelastic regime. An approximation for the extended Gerasimov-Drell-Hearn integral is presented at a 4-momentum transfer Q² of 0.2-1.0 GeV².

Also presented are results on the performance of the polarized ³He target. Polarization of ³He was achieved by the process of spin-exchange collisions with optically pumped rubidium vapor. The ³He polarization was monitored using the NMR technique of adiabatic fast passage (AFP). The average target polarization was approximately 35% and was determined to have a systematic uncertainty of roughly ±4% relative.

A common axiom for classical division rules for claims problems

In this paper we introduce a new axiom, denoted claims separability, that is satisfied by several classical division rules defined for claims problems. We characterize axiomatically the entire family of division rules that satisfy this new axiom. In addition, employing claims separability, we characterize the minimal overlap rule, given by O'Neill (1982), Piniles rule and the rules in the TAL-family, introduced by Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2006), which includes the uniform gains rule, the uniform losses rule and the Talmud rule.

Sex-change rules, stock dynamics, and the performance of spawning-per-recruit measures in protogynous stocks

Predicting and under-standing the dynamics of a population requires knowledge of vital rates such as survival, growth, and reproduction. However, these variables are influenced by individual behavior, and when managing exploited populations, it is now generally realized that knowledge of a species’ behavior and life history strategies is required. However, predicting and understanding a response to novel conditions—such as increased fishing-induced mortality, changes in environmental conditions, or specific management strategies—also require knowing the endogenous or exogenous cues that induce phenotypic changes and knowing whether these behaviors and life history patterns are plastic. Although a wide variety of patterns of sex change have been observed in the wild, it is not known how the specific sex-change rule and cues that induce sex change affect stock dynamics. Using an individual based model, we examined the effect of the sex-change rule on the predicted stock dynamics, the effect of mating group size, and the performance of traditional spawning-per-recruit (SPR) measures in a protogynous stock. We considered four different patterns of sex change in which the probability of sex change is determined by 1) the absolute size of the individual, 2) the relative length of individuals at the mating site, 3) the frequency of smaller individuals at the mating site, and 4) expected reproductive success. All four pat-terns of sex change have distinct stock dynamics. Although each sex-change rule leads to the prediction that the stock will be sensitive to the size-selective fishing pattern and may crash if too many reproductive size classes are fished, the performance of traditional spawning-per-recruit measures, the fishing pattern that leads to the greatest yield, and the effect of mating group size all differ distinctly for the four sex-change rules. These results indicate that the management of individual species requires knowledge of whether sex change occurs, as well as an understanding of the endogenous or exogenous cues that induce sex change.