Jewish marriages and the English law

by H.S.Q. Henriques

Has Deregulation Affected Births, Deaths, and Marriages in the U.S. Commercial Banking Industry?

Regulatory change not seen since the Great Depression swept the U.S. banking industry beginning in the early 1980s and culminating with the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. Banking analysts anticipated dramatic consolidation with large numbers of mergers and acquisitions. Less well documented, but equally important, was the continuing entry of new banks, tempering the decline in the overall number of banking institutions. This paper examines whether deregulation affected bank new-charter (birth), failure (death), and merger (marriage) rates during the 1980s and 1990s after controlling for bank performance and state economic activity. We find evidence that intrastate deregulation stimulated births and marriages, but not deaths. Moreover, we find little evidence that interstate deregulation affected births, deaths, or marriages, except that the marriage rate rose after the implementation of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act. Finally, pair-wise temporal causality tests among births, deaths, and marriages show that mergers temporally lead new charters and that failures lead mergers (a demonstration effect).

Has Deregulation Affected Births, Deaths, and Marriages in the U.S. Commercial Banking Industry?

Regulatory change not seen since the Great Depression swept the U.S. banking industry beginning in the early 1980s and culminating with the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. Banking analysts anticipated dramatic consolidation with large numbers of mergers and acquisitions. Less well documented, but equally important, was the continuing entry of new banks, tempering the decline in the overall number of banking institutions. This paper examines whether deregulation affected bank new-charter, failure, and merger rates during the 1980s and 1990s after controlling for bank performance and state economic activity. We find evidence that intrastate deregulation stimulated new charters and mergers, but not failures. Moreover, we find little evidence that interstate deregulation affected new charters, failures, or mergers.

Cross-Nativity Marriages, Gender, and Human Capital Levels of Children

Because the demographic composition of todays immigrants to the US differs so much from those of natives, immigrants may be less likely to socially integrate into U.S. society, and specically less likely to marry natives. This paper explores the relationship between immigrants' marriage patterns and the academic outcomes of their children. Using 2000 Census data, it is found that while marital decisions of foreign born females do not affect their children's academic success, foreign born males that marry foreign born females are less likely to have children that are high school dropouts. These relationships remain after using various methods to control for the endogeneity of the intermarriage decision. Although we cannot disentangle whether the benefits of same-nativity marriages for foreign born males arise from a more efficient technology in human capital production within the household or from increased participation in ethnic networks, it does appear that immigrant males have better educated children when they marry immigrant females.

The Secret Life of Mundane Transaction Costs

Transaction costs, one often hears, are the economic equivalent of friction in physical systems. Like physicists, economists can sometimes neglect friction in formulating theories; but like engineers, they can never neglect friction in studying how the system actually does let alone should work. Interestingly, however, the present-day economics of organization also ignores friction. That is, almost single-mindedly, the literature analyzes transactions from the point of view of misaligned incentives and (especially) transaction-specific assets. The costs involved are certainly costs of running the economic system in some sense, but they are not obviously frictions. Stories about frictions in trade are not nearly as intriguing as stories about guileful trading partners and expensive assets placed at risk. But I will argue that these seemingly dull categories of cost what Baldwin and Clark (2003) call mundane transaction costs actually have a secret life. They are at least as important as, and quite probably far more important than, the more glamorous costs of asset specificity in explaining the partition between firm and market. These costs also have a secret life in another sense: they have a secret life cycle. I will argue that these mundane transaction costs provide much better material for helping us understanding how the boundaries among firms, markets, and hybrid forms change over time.

Lin KERNS, The secret of secrets (Secreta secretorum). A modern translation, with introduction, of “The governance of princes", with a foreword by Elizabeth Matthew, Lewiston (New York), The Edwin Mellen Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-7734-5118-6, 168 pp.

Fil: Cuccia, Emiliano Javier.

Lecturas sobre The Foundation. A Great American Secret (2007), Joel L. Fleishman, New York, Public Affairs

Fil: Quesada, Fernando. Universidad Nacional de Cuyo. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Instituto Multidisciplinario de Estudios Sociales Contemporáneos

Secret and power in social life

Secret and power constitute two fundamental instances of the social world. Secret takes care of the concealment of things and of social processes. Secret is also a power device. Power is the social capacity to do, create, not doing and stop from doing. Secret and power get mutual feedback. Power uses the secret to protect his potential, be it what may, to increment its operative strength. Secret uses the power to achieve its aims and proposals. Social sciences seem to ignore the huge explanatory capacity of these two interrelated concepts, and even more, their powerful intervention in societies.