Risk sharing with the monarch: Excusable defaults and contingent debt in the age of Philip II, 1556-1598

Contingent sovereign debt can create important welfare gains. Nonetheless,there is almost no issuance today. Using hand-collected archival data, we examine thefirst known case of large-scale use of state-contingent sovereign debt in history. Philip IIof Spain entered into hundreds of contracts whose value and due date depended onverifiable, exogenous events such as the arrival of silver fleets. We show that this allowedfor effective risk-sharing between the king and his bankers. The data also stronglysuggest that the defaults that occurred were excusable they were simply contingenciesover which Crown and bankers had not contracted previously.

Endogenous spillovers, increased competition and re-organization waves

We consider an entrepreneur that is the sole producer of a costreducing skill, but the entrepreneur that hires a team to usethe skill cannot prevent collusive trade for the innovation related knowledge between employees and competitors. We showthat there are two types of diffusion avoiding strategies forthe entrepreneur to preempt collusive communication i) settingup a large productive capacity (the traditional firm) and ii)keeping a small team (the lean firm). The traditional firm ischaracterized by its many "marginal" employees that work shortdays, receive flat wages and are incompletely informed about the innovation. The lean firm is small in number of employees,engages in complete information sharing among members, that are paid with stock option schemes. We find that the lean firm is superior to the traditional firm when technological entry costsare low and when the sector is immature.

International consumption risk sharing

This paper formally examines the implications of international consumptionrisk sharing for a panel of industrialized countries. We theoretically derivethe international consumption insurance proposition in a simple setup and showhow it should be modified in more complicated models. We empirically analyzethe implications of the theory for pairs of countries across frequencies of thespectrum and find that aggregate domestic consumption is almost completelyinsured against idiosyncratic real, demographic, fiscal and monetary shocksover short cycles, but that it covaries with these variables over medium andlong cycles. The cross equation restrictions imposed by the theory are, ingeneral, rejected. The policy implications of the results are discussed.

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Warning: "Work-at-Home" Schemes, October 2004

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Consumer Advisory Bulletin, International Lottery Schemes: You're the Loser!, April 2004

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Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Avoid Pyramid Schemes, January 2008

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Consumer Advisory Bulletin, International Lottery Schemes: You're the Loser!, April 2004

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: International Lottery Schemes: You're the Loser!

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Magazine Subscription Schemes, January 2008

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Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Advance Fee Loans and Credit Repair Schemes, January 2008

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Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets

Two-stage game models of information acquisition in stochastic oligopoliesrequire the unrealistic assumption that firms observe the precision ofinformation chosen by their competitors before determining quantities. Thispaper analyzes secret information acquisition as a one-stage game. Relativeto the two-stage game firms are shown to acquire less information. Policyimplications based on the two-stage game yield, therefore, too high taxes ortoo low subsidies for research activities. For the case of heterogeneousduopoly it is shown that comparative statics results partly depend on theobservability assumption.

Endogenous policy leads to inefficient risk sharing

We analyze risk sharing and fiscal spending in a two-region model withcomplete markets. Fiscal policy determines tax rates for each state ofnature. When fiscal policy is decentralized, it can be used to affect prices of securities. To manipulate prices to their beneffit, regionschoose pro-cyclical fiscal spending. This leads to incomplete risk sharing,despite the existence of complete markets and the absence of aggregaterisk. When a fiscal union centralizes fiscal policy, securities pricescan no longer be manipulated and complete risk sharing ensues. If regionsare homogeneous, median income residents of both regions prefer the fiscalunion. If they are heterogeneous, the median resident of the rich regionprefers the decentralized setting.