994 resultados para Scientists Against Nuclear Arms
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The exon theory of genes proposes that the introns of protein-encoding nuclear genes are remnants of the DNA spacers between ancient minigenes. The discovery of an intron at a predicted position in the triose-phosphate isomerase (EC 5.3.1.1) gene of Culex mosquitoes has been hailed as an evidential pillar of the theory. We have found that that intron is also present in Aedes mosquitoes, which are closely related to Culex, but not in the phylogenetically more distant Anopheles, nor in the fly Calliphora vicina, nor in the moth Spodoptera littoralis. The presence of this intron in Culex and Aedes is parsimoniously explained as the result of an insertion in a recent common ancestor of these two species rather than as the remnant of an ancient intron. The absence of the intron in 19 species of very diverse organisms requires at least 10 independent evolutionary losses in order to be consistent with the exon theory.
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In Drosophila the response to the hormone ecdysone is mediated in part by Ultraspiracle (USP) and ecdysone receptor (EcR), which are members of the nuclear receptor superfamily. Heterodimers of these proteins bind to ecdysone response elements (EcREs) and ecdysone to modulate transcription. Herein we describe Drosophila hormone receptor 38 (DHR38) and Bombyx hormone receptor 38 (BHR38), two insect homologues of rat nerve growth factor-induced protein B (NGFI-B). Although members of the NGFI-B family are thought to function exclusively as monomers, we show that DHR38 and BHR38 in fact interact strongly with USP and that this interaction is evolutionarily conserved. DHR38 can compete in vitro against EcR for dimerization with USP and consequently disrupt EcR-USP binding to an EcRE. Moreover, transfection experiments in Schneider cells show that DHR38 can affect ecdysone-dependent transcription. This suggests that DHR38 plays a role in the ecdysone response and that more generally NGFI-B type receptors may be able to function as heterodimers with retinoid X receptor type receptors in regulating transcription.
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In inflammatory states, nitric oxide (.NO) may be synthesized from precursor L-arginine via inducible .NO synthase (iNOS) in large amounts for prolonged periods of time. When .NO acts as an effector molecule under these conditions, it may be toxic to cells by inhibition of iron-containing enzymes or initiation of DNA single-strand breaks. In contrast to molecular targets of .NO, considerably less is known regarding mechanisms by which cells become resistant to .NO. Metallothionein (MT), the major protein thiol induced in cells exposed to cytokines and bacterial products, is capable of forming iron-dinitrosyl thiolates in vitro. Therefore, we tested the hypothesis that overexpression of MT reduces the sensitivity of NIH 3T3 cells to the .NO donor, S-nitrosoacetylpenicillamine (SNAP), and to .NO released from cells (NIH 3T3-DFG-iNOS) after infection with a retroviral vector expressing human iNOS gene. There was a 4-fold increase in MT in cells transfected with the mouse MT-1 gene (NIH 3T3/MT) compared to cells transfected with the promoter-free inverted gene (NIH 3T3/TM). NIH 3T3/MT cells were more resistant than NIH 3T3/TM cells to the cytotoxic effects of SNAP (0.1-1.0 mM) or .NO released from NIH 3T3-DFG-iNOS cells. A brief (1 h) exposure to 10 mM SNAP caused DNA single-strand breaks that were 9-fold greater in NIH 3T3/TM compared to NIH 3T3/MT cells. Electron paramagnetic resonance spectroscopy of NIH 3T3 cells revealed a greater peak at g = 2.04 (e.g., iron-dinitrosyl complex) in NIH 3T3/MT than NIH 3T3/TM cells. These data are consistent with a role for cytoplasmic MT in interacting with .NO and reducing .NO-induced cyto- and nuclear toxicity.
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MyoD, a member of the family of helix-loop-helix myogenic factors that plays a crucial role in skeletal muscle differentiation, is a nuclear phosphoprotein. Using microinjection of purified MyoD protein into rat fibroblasts, we show that the nuclear import of MyoD is a rapid and active process, being ATP and temperature dependent. Two nuclear localization signals (NLSs), one present in the basic region and the other in the helix 1 domain of MyoD protein, are demonstrated to be functional in promoting the active nuclear transport of MyoD. Synthetic peptides spanning these two NLSs and biochemically coupled to IgGs can promote the nuclear import of microinjected IgG conjugates in muscle and nonmuscle cells. Deletion analysis reveals that each sequence can function independently within the MyoD protein since concomittant deletion of both sequences is required to alter the nuclear import of this myogenic factor. In addition, the complete cytoplasmic retention of a beta-galactosidase-MyoD fusion mutant protein, double deleted at these two NLSs, argues against the existence of another functional NLS motif in MyoD.
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EBNA 2 (Epstein-Barr virus nuclear antigen 2) is an acidic transactivator essential for EBV transformation of B lymphocytes. We show that EBNA 2 directly interacts with general transcription factor IIH. Glutathione S-transferase (GST)-EBNA 2 acidic domain fusion protein depleted transcription factor IIH activity from a TFIIH nuclear fraction. The p89 (ERCC3), p80 (ERCC2), and p62 subunits of TFIIH were among the proteins retained by GST-EBNA 2. Eluates from the GST-EBNA 2 beads reconstituted activity in a TFIIH-dependent in vitro transcription assay. The p62 and p80 subunits of TFIIH independently bound to GST-EBNA 2, whereas the p34 subunit of TFIIH only bound in the presence of p62. A Trp-->Thr mutation in the EBNA 2 acidic domain abolishes EBNA 2 transactivation in vivo and greatly compromised EBNA 2 association with TFIIH activity and with the p62 and p80 subunits, providing a link between EBNA 2 transactivation and these interactions. Antibodies directed against the p62 subunit of TFIIH coimmunoprecipitated EBNA 2 from EBV-transformed B lymphocytes, indicating that EBNA 2 associates with TFIIH in vivo.
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North Korea's regime has one goal, to guarantee its survival. To accomplish that goal it desired the U.S. to maintain a strong presence on the Korean Peninsula to act as an international deterrent against possible foreign occupation of its nation. The DPRK encouraged the U.S. by signing the 1994 Agreed Framework, a formal commitment between the two countries that froze North Korea's nuclear programs in exchange for U.S. energy aid. In 2002 the Bush Administration did not honour its commitment and blamed North Korea for the Agreed Framework's collapse. North Korea retaliated by choosing to become a nuclear nation, an action guaranteed to insure a constant U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula.
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After the presidential elections on June 14th, the Iranian regime will continue its catch-me-if-you-can game with the international community until it has reached the nuclear threshold. Paradoxically, the key to a solution on the nuclear issue might just lie in discussions on a WMD-free Middle East, but only after Iran has obtained nuclear military capability. At that point, and in the context of a new arms race, both regional and international players may be persuaded that the Middle East has more to gain from negotiations on non-proliferation than from prolonged isolation and the prospect of intractable war.
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The German government’s final decision to abandon nuclear power as of 2022 has been expected for months. However, instead of calming the waters, providing solutions and answering the question ‘What next?’, it has only fanned the flames. Even the adoption of legal amendments enforcing the government’s decision by the German parliament (both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat) in late June and early July has not calmed the situation. It is more than apparent that these decisions have been made under emotional pressure: there was not enough time for accurate calculations to be made and consideration to be given to the consequences of Germany abandoning nuclear power. Chancellor Angela Merkel has so far been unable to fully convince the public that the ‘energy shift is a huge opportunity’ and that this process will be carried out on condition that ‘the supplies remain secure, the climate protected and the whole process economically efficient’1. German economic associations have warned against a politically motivated, ill-judged and irreversible abandonment of nuclear energy. They are anxious about an increase in electricity prices, the instability of supplies and environmental damage. The government believes, however, that green technologies will become a new driving force for the German economy and its main export commodity. Before that happens the industry will have to increase its use of electricity produced from fossil fuels, mainly natural gas imported from Russia. This may be exploited by Gazprom which will try to strengthen its position on the German market, and thus in the entire EU.
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With a growing number of threats to governance in the international system that result from globalization and technological innovation, it is no surprise that states have come to rely more heavily on each other and the global community for support. While the EU is partially constrained by the ultimate outcome of its own integration process, limited knowledge on this issue, and the national interests of its Member States, other governments are also experiencing difficulty in domestic implementation of international resolutions. To better understand the impact of the most recent sanctioning efforts, this paper will explore the development of the non-proliferation regime, examine implementation mechanisms of non-proliferation agreements, and analyze the impact of increased cooperation among states to thwart the spread of WMD technology and material. Case studies of unilateral measures undertaken by the US and EU against Iran will provide insight into the political and economic implications of economic sanctions from individual governments. New and emerging methods for limiting rogue states and non-state actors from acquiring the means to develop WMD will also be discussed in an effort to further discussion for future policy debates on this critical topic.
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Summary. On 11 March 2011, a devastating earthquake struck Japan and caused a major nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. The disaster confirmed that nuclear reactors must be protected even against accidents that have been assessed as highly unlikely. It also revealed a well-known catalogue of problems: faulty design, insufficient back-up systems, human error, inadequate contingency plans, and poor communications. The catastrophe triggered the rapid launch of a major re-examination of nuclear reactor security in Europe. It also stopped in its tracks what had appeared to be a ‘nuclear renaissance’, both in Europe and globally, especially in the emerging countries. Under the accumulated pressure of rising demand and climate warming, many new nuclear projects had been proposed. Since 2011 there has been more ambivalence, especially in Europe. Some Member States have even decided to abandon the nuclear sector altogether. This Egmont Paper aims to examine the reactions of the EU regarding nuclear safety since 2011. Firstly, a general description of the nuclear sector in Europe is provided. The nuclear production of electricity currently employs around 500,000 people, including those working in the supply chain. It generates approximately €70 billion per year. It provides roughly 30% of the electricity consumed in the EU. At the end of 2013, there were 131 nuclear power reactors active in the EU, located in 14 countries. Four new reactors are under construction in France, Slovakia and Finland. Secondly, this paper will present the Euratom legal framework regarding nuclear safety. The European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom) Treaty was signed in 1957, and somewhat obscured by the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty. It was a more classical treaty, establishing institutions with limited powers. Its development remained relatively modest until the Chernobyl catastrophe, which provoked many initiatives. The most important was the final adoption of the Nuclear Safety Directive 2009/71. Thirdly, the general symbiosis between Euratom and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be explained. Fourthly, the paper analyses the initiatives taken by the EU in the wake of the Fukushima catastrophe. These initiatives are centred around the famous ‘stress tests’. Fifthly, the most important legal change brought about by this event was the revision of Directive 2009/71. Directive 2014/87 has been adopted quite rapidly, and has deepened in various ways the role of the EU in nuclear safety. It has reinforced the role and effective independence of the national regulatory authorities. It has enhanced transparency on nuclear safety matters. It has strengthened principles, and introduced new general nuclear safety objectives and requirements, addressing specific technical issues across the entire life cycle of nuclear installations, and in particular, nuclear power plants. It has extended monitoring and the exchange of experiences by establishing a European system of peer reviews. Finally, it has established a mechanism for developing EU-wide harmonized nuclear safety guidelines. In spite of these various improvements, Directive 2014/87 Euratom still reflects the ambiguity of the Euratom system in general, and especially in the field of nuclear safety. The use of nuclear energy remains controversial among Member States. Some of them remain adamantly in favour, others against or ambivalent. The intervention of the EAEC institutions remains sensitive. The use of the traditional Community method remains limited. The peer review method remains a very peculiar mechanism that deserves more attention.
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On 2 April in Lausanne, after months of intense negotiations, Iran and the E3+3 (France, Germany, and the UK plus China, Russia, and the US) agreed on a framework deal for the resolution of the nuclear dispute. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, and Iran's Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, issued a joint statement announcing that "solutions on key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action" have been found. While differences remain on several issues, including the scope of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and sanctions relief, the statement has nevertheless raised hopes that a final deal may be reached this summer. If accomplished, an agreement would bring an end to more than a decade of tensions between Iran and the international community. This would result in the lifting of several sanctions, which were adopted against Iran by the United Nations, the EU, and the US. Unsurprisingly therefore, Iran's economy and in particular its energy sector are now the subject of worldwide attention.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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"1 Oct 58."
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Mode of access: Internet.
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"March 1987"--P. i.