On the strategic equivalence of multiple-choice test scoring rules

A disadvantage of multiple-choice tests is that students have incentives to guess. To discourage guessing, it is common to use scoring rules that either penalize wrong answers or reward omissions. These scoring rules are considered equivalent in psychometrics, although experimental evidence has not always been consistent with this claim. We model students' decisions and show, first, that equivalence holds only under risk neutrality and, second, that the two rules can be modified so that they become equivalent even under risk aversion. This paper presents the results of a field experiment in which we analyze the decisions of subjects taking multiple-choice exams. The evidence suggests that differences between scoring rules are due to risk aversion as theory predicts. We also find that the number of omitted items depends on the scoring rule, knowledge, gender and other covariates.

The strategic behavior of rational novices

There is a growing amount of experimental evidence that suggests people often deviate from the predictions of game theory. Some scholars attempt to explain the observations by introducing errors into behavioral models. However, most of these modifications are situation dependent and do not generalize. A new theory, called the rational novice model, is introduced as an attempt to provide a general theory that takes account of erroneous behavior. The rational novice model is based on two central principals. The first is that people systematically make inaccurate guesses when they are evaluating their options in a game-like situation. The second is that people treat their decisions similar to a portfolio problem. As a result, non optimal actions in a game theoretic sense may be included in the rational novice strategy profile with positive weights.

The rational novice model can be divided into two parts: the behavioral model and the equilibrium concept. In a theoretical chapter, the mathematics of the behavioral model and the equilibrium concept are introduced. The existence of the equilibrium is established. In addition, the Nash equilibrium is shown to be a special case of the rational novice equilibrium. In another chapter, the rational novice model is applied to a voluntary contribution game. Numerical methods were used to obtain the solution. The model is estimated with data obtained from the Palfrey and Prisbrey experimental study of the voluntary contribution game. It is found that the rational novice model explains the data better than the Nash model. Although a formal statistical test was not used, pseudo R^2 analysis indicates that the rational novice model is better than a Probit model similar to the one used in the Palfrey and Prisbrey study.

The rational novice model is also applied to a first price sealed bid auction. Again, computing techniques were used to obtain a numerical solution. The data obtained from the Chen and Plott study were used to estimate the model. The rational novice model outperforms the CRRAM, the primary Nash model studied in the Chen and Plott study. However, the rational novice model is not the best amongst all models. A sophisticated rule-of-thumb, called the SOPAM, offers the best explanation of the data.

Curriculum: directions, decisions and debate.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the factors which may effect, stimulate or be the cause of curriculum changes in higher education (HE) in Scotland. This overview leads to a series of questions which could be used to encourage debate within and across institutions on strategic developments, which may enhance and inform the development of and support for the curriculum. The paper will begin by offering a definition of the term 'curriculum' before identifying the current areas of influence on how the curriculum, in its broadest sense, is shaped and delivered. This paper will provide an outline of some of the different approaches to the design and delivery of the curriculum which enhance the student experience in Scottish higher education, but which will of course have a wider relevance to HE in the UK and perhaps beyond.

"Call for prices": Strategic implications of raising consumers' costs

Many consumer durable retailers often do not advertise their prices and instead ask consumers to call them for prices. It is easy to see that this practice increases the consumers' cost of learning the prices of products they are considering, yet firms commonly use such practices. Not advertising prices may reduce the firm's advertising costs, but the strategic effects of doing so are not clear. Our objective is to examine the strategic effects of this practice. In particular, how does making price discovery more difficult for consumers affect competing retailers' price, service decisions, and profits? We develop a model in which a manufacturer sells its product through a high-service retailer and a low-service retailer. Consumers can purchase the retail service at the high-end retailer and purchase the product at the competing low-end retailer. Therefore, the high-end retailer faces a free-riding problem. A retailer first chooses its optimal service levels. Then, it chooses its optimal price levels. Finally, a retailer decides whether to advertise its prices. The model results in four structures: (1) both retailers advertise prices, (2) only the low-service retailer advertises price, (3) only the high-service retailer advertises price, and (4) neither retailer advertises price. We find that when a retailer does not advertise its price and makes price discovery more difficult for consumers, the competition between the retailers is less intense. However, the retailer is forced to charge a lower price. In addition, if the competing retailer does advertise its prices, then the competing retailer enjoys higher profit margins. We identify conditions under which each of the above four structures is an equilibrium and show that a low-service retailer not advertising its price is a more likely outcome than a high-service retailer doing so. We then solve the manufacturer's problem and find that there are several instances when a retailer's advertising decisions are different from what the manufacturer would want. We describe the nature of this channel coordination problem and identify some solutions. © 2010 INFORMS.

The Rational Adolescent: Strategic Information Processing during Decision Making Revealed by Eye Tracking.

Adolescence is often viewed as a time of irrational, risky decision-making - despite adolescents' competence in other cognitive domains. In this study, we examined the strategies used by adolescents (N=30) and young adults (N=47) to resolve complex, multi-outcome economic gambles. Compared to adults, adolescents were more likely to make conservative, loss-minimizing choices consistent with economic models. Eye-tracking data showed that prior to decisions, adolescents acquired more information in a more thorough manner; that is, they engaged in a more analytic processing strategy indicative of trade-offs between decision variables. In contrast, young adults' decisions were more consistent with heuristics that simplified the decision problem, at the expense of analytic precision. Collectively, these results demonstrate a counter-intuitive developmental transition in economic decision making: adolescents' decisions are more consistent with rational-choice models, while young adults more readily engage task-appropriate heuristics.

Transaction Costs and Organizational Learning in Strategic Oursourcing Relationships

The present paper examines the role of organisational learning and transaction costs economics in strategic outsourcing decisions. Interorganisational learning is critical to competitive success, and organisations often learn more effectively by collaborating with other organisations. However, learning processes may also complicate the process of forming interorganisational partnerships which may increase transaction costs. Based on the literature, the authors develop refutable implications for outsourcing supply chain logistics and a sample of 121 firms in the supply chain logistics industry is used to test the hypotheses. The results show that trust and transaction costs are significant and substantial drivers of strategic outsourcing of supply chain logistics (a strategic flexibility action). Learning intent and knowledge acquisition have no significant influence on the decision to outsource supply chain logistics. The paper concludes with a discussion of the different and often conflicting implications for managing interorganisational learning processes.

MASCEM: electricity markets simulation with strategic agents

Electricity markets are complex environments, involving numerous entities trying to obtain the best advantages and profits while limited by power-network characteristics and constraints.1 The restructuring and consequent deregulation of electricity markets introduced a new economic dimension to the power industry. Some observers have criticized the restructuring process, however, because it has failed to improve market efficiency and has complicated the assurance of reliability and fairness of operations. To study and understand this type of market, we developed the Multiagent Simulator of Competitive Electricity Markets (MASCEM) platform based on multiagent simulation. The MASCEM multiagent model includes players with strategies for bid definition, acting in forward, day-ahead, and balancing markets and considering both simple and complex bids. Our goal with MASCEM was to simulate as many market models and player types as possible. This approach makes MASCEM both a short- and mediumterm simulation as well as a tool to support long-term decisions, such as those taken by regulators. This article proposes a new methodology integrated in MASCEM for bid definition in electricity markets. This methodology uses reinforcement learning algorithms to let players perceive changes in the environment, thus helping them react to the dynamic environment and adapt their bids accordingly.

Strategic Bidding in Electricity Markets: An agent-based simulator with game theory for scenario analysis

Electricity markets are complex environments, involving a large number of different entities, with specific characteristics and objectives, making their decisions and interacting in a dynamic scene. Game-theory has been widely used to support decisions in competitive environments; therefore its application in electricity markets can prove to be a high potential tool. This paper proposes a new scenario analysis algorithm, which includes the application of game-theory, to evaluate and preview different scenarios and provide players with the ability to strategically react in order to exhibit the behavior that better fits their objectives. This model includes forecasts of competitor players’ actions, to build models of their behavior, in order to define the most probable expected scenarios. Once the scenarios are defined, game theory is applied to support the choice of the action to be performed. Our use of game theory is intended for supporting one specific agent and not for achieving the equilibrium in the market. MASCEM (Multi-Agent System for Competitive Electricity Markets) is a multi-agent electricity market simulator that models market players and simulates their operation in the market. The scenario analysis algorithm has been tested within MASCEM and our experimental findings with a case study based on real data from the Iberian Electricity Market are presented and discussed.

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).

Does the existing Corporate Governance structure and strict Legal Framework, affect the strategic decisionmaking of CEOs?

This thesis is a case study on Corporate Governance and Business Ethics, using the Portuguese Corporate Law as a general setting. The thesis was conducted in Portugal with illustrations on past cases under the Business Judgment Rule of the State of Delaware, U.SA along with illustrations on current cases in Portugal under the Portuguese Judicial setting, along with a comparative analysis between both. A debate is being considered among scholars and executives; a debate on best practices within corporate governance and corporate law, associated with recent discoveries of unlawful investments that lead to the bankruptcy of leading institutions and an aggravation of the crisis in Portugal. The study aimed at learning possible reasons and causes for the current situation of the country’s corporations along with attempts to discover the best way to move forward. From the interviews and analysis conducted, this paper concluded that the corporate governance structure and legal frameworks in Portugal were not the sole influencers behind the actions and decisions of Corporate Executives, nor were they the main triggers for the recent corporate mishaps. But it is rather a combination of different factors that played a significant role, such as cultural and ethical aspects, individual personalities, and others all of which created gray areas beyond the legal structure, which in turn accelerated and aggravated the corporate governance crisis in the country.

Marketing Brock University in the 1980's: assessing freshman student feedback in strategic planning approach

Universities have entered a period of rapid change and upheaval due to an external environment beyond their control which includes shifting demographic patterns, accelerating technology, funding shortages, and keener competition for students. Strategic planning, a comprehensive vision which challenges universities to take bold and creative measures to meet the threats and opportunities of the future, is an institutional imperative in the 1980's. This paper examines freshman student feedback in an effort to incorporate this important element into a strategic plan for Brock University, a small, predominantly liberal arts university in St. Catharines, Ontario. The study was designed to provide information on the characteristics of the 1985-86 pool of freshman registrants: their attitudes towards Brock's recruitment measures, their general university priorities, and their influences in regard to university selection (along with other demographical and attitudinal data). A survey involving fixed-alternative questions of a subjective and objective nature was administered in two large freshman classes at Brock in which a broad cross-section of academic programs was anticipated. Computer analysis of the data for the 357 respondents included total raw frequencies and rounded percentages, as well as subgroup cross-tabulation by geographic home area of respondent, academic major, and high school graduating average. The four directional hypotheses put forward were all substantiatied by the survey data, indicating that 1) the university's current recruitment program had been a positive influence during their university search 2) parents were the most influential group in the students' decisions related to university 3) respondents viewed institutional reputation as less of a priority than an enjoyable university lifestyle in a personal learning atmosphere 4) students had a decided preference for co-operative study and internship programs. Strategic planning recommendations included a reduction in the faculty/student ratio through faculty hirings to restore the close rapport between professors and students, increased recruitment presentations in Ontario high schools to enlarge the applicant pool, creation of an Office of Co-operative Study and Internship Programs, institutional emphasis on a "customer orientation", and an extension of research into student demographics and attitudinal data.

Evaluation of strategic knowledge of students through authentic tasks of writingin science classroom

The difficulties at evaluating strategic knowledge have been connected to the use of deconxetualized tests that, at the end, do not involve the use of this knowledge. For this reason, an interest in developing authentic writing tasks that offer advantages for these kinds of evaluation have arisen. Throughout this research, authentic writing tasks were developed in a natural sciences class, with the purpose of evaluating the students' strategic knowledge. Different instruments were used to collect data, e.g. Interviews, questionnaires, a self-inform, as well as three samples of writing by the students, with the objective of analyzing the changes that occurred between one and the others, as well as to determine the decisions that students made in order to complete the assigned tasks successfully. An authentic writing task gives great opportunities to evaluate strategic knowledge. These tasks lead students to arrange their knowledge about the topic in hand, organize and adapt it to fit the objectives and the audience, also, it allows them to control and adjust their decisions on the task. This last stage became the perfect opportunity to take notes on the knowledge and regulation of cognitive processes that the students brought into play, as well as to evaluating their understanding of writing and the demands given on the different discursive genres. As a result, the students showed different degrees of strategic knowledge in the task. The students who showed a better strategic knowledge trust in their structural abilities know about discursive genres and have a good performance in basic linguistic abilities. The students who showed weak strategic knowledge distrust their writing skills, seem extremely worried about organizing the content of their texts, fail when checking their writings, and overlook or are unaware of the basic requirements of the discursive genre they are asked to exemplify. It appears that the previous knowledge and experiences at writing the students have been exposed to may affect the strategic knowledge shown when writing in this subject. 

Relational architecture and relational capability: organisational levers to support strategic supplier relationships

The resource based view of strategy suggests that competitiveness in part derives from a firms ability to collaborate with a subset of its supply network to co-create highly valued products and services. This relational capability relies on a foundational intra and inter-organisational architecture, the manifestation of strategic, people, and process decisions facilitating the interface between the firm and its strategic suppliers. Using covariance-based structural equation modelling we examine the relationships between internal and external features of relational architecture, and their relationship with relational capability and relational quality. This is undertaken on data collected by mail survey. We find significant relationships between both internal and external relational architecture and relational capability and between relational capability and relational quality. Novel constructs for internal and external elements of relational architecture are specified to demonstrate their positive influence on relational capability and relationship quality.

Revising the Program Portfolio: Elevating Academic Program Performance and Strategic Alignment

At many institutions, program review is an underproductive exercise. Review of existing programs is often a check-the-box formality, with inconsistent criteria and little connection to institutional priorities or funding considerations. Decisions about where to concentrate resources across the portfolio can be highly politicized. This report profiles how academic planning exemplars use program review as a strategic tool, integrating data on academic quality, student demand, and resource utilization to improve the economics of challenged programs and prioritize programs for investment and expansion.

Strategic adoption in a two-sided market : a study of college applications in Brazil

This paper measures the importance of indirect network effects in the adoption by colleges and students of ENEM, a standardized exam for high-school students in Brazil that can be used in college application processes. We estimate network effects and find that they are economically significant. Students are more likely to take ENEM the larger the number of colleges adopting it. Similarly, colleges are more likely to adopt it the larger the number of students taking the exam. Moreover, we find evidence that colleges play strategically and that heterogeneity determines their decisions. A college is less likely to adopt ENEM the larger the number of competitors adopting it. Colleges’ characteristics such as ownership and organization affect adoption decisions. In a counterfactual exercise we compare colleges’ adoption decisions under competition and under joint colleges’ payoffs maximization. Adoption rates are significantly reduced when colleges internalize the competitive effect, i.e., the effect of their decisions on other colleges’ payoffs. On the other hand, they increase when indirect network effects - the effect of students’ response to their decisions on other colleges’ payoffs - are also internalized. Competitive adoption rates are found to exceed joint optimum rates by a small difference. These results suggest that, without considering students’ welfare, adoption rates are excessive, but close to the joint optimum.