Separation of Control and Cash-Flow Rights of State Owned Listed Enterprises: Channels of Expropriation after the Discriminated Share Reform in China

Literature on agency problems arising between controlling and minority owners claim that separation of cash flow and control rights allows controllers to expropriate listed firms, and further that separation emerges when dual class shares or pyramiding corporate structures exist. Dual class share and pyramiding coexisted in listed companies of China until discriminated share reform was implemented in 2005. This paper presents a model of controller to expropriate behavior as well as empirical tests of expropriation via particular accounting items and pyramiding generated expropriation. Results show that expropriation is apparent for state controlled listed companies. While reforms have weakened the power to expropriate, separation remains and still generates expropriation. Size of expropriation is estimated to be 7 to 8 per cent of total asset at mean. If the "one share, one vote" principle were to be realized, asset inflation could be reduced by 13 percent.

Brief for Amici Curiae Scholars of the Constitutional Rights of Children in Support of Respondent Edith Windsor Addressing the Merits and Supporting Affirmance

This amicus brief filed by Scholars of the Constitutional Rights of Children turns the spotlight on children in same-sex families. The brief enumerates the ways Section 3 of DOMA impairs children's interests by denying federal recognition of their parents' marriages.

Brief of Amici Curiae Scholars of the Constitutional Rights of Children in Support of Petitioners in Obergefell v. Hodges

Supreme Court precedent establishes that the government may not punish children for matters beyond their control. Same-sex marriage bans and non-recognition laws (“marriage bans”) do precisely this. The states argue that marriage is good for children, yet marriage bans categorically exclude an entire class of children – children of same-sex couples – from the legal, economic and social benefits of marriage. This amicus brief recounts a powerful body of equal protection jurisprudence that prohibits punishing children to reflect moral disapproval of parental conduct or to incentivize adult behavior. We then explain that marriage bans punish children of same-sex couples because they: 1) foreclose their central legal route to family formation; 2) categorically void their existing legal parent-child relationships incident to out-of-state marriages; 3) deny them economic rights and benefits; and 4) inflict psychological and stigmatic harm. States cannot justify marriage bans as good for children and then exclude children of same-sex couples based on moral disapproval of their same-sex parents’ relationships or to incentivize opposite-sex couples to “procreate” within the bounds of marriage. To do so, severs the connection between legal burdens and individual responsibility and creates a permanent class or caste distinction.