Department of Commerce Iowa Utilities Board Performance Report Performance Results Achieved for Fiscal Year 2005, December 2005

The report highlights the services the IUB provided to Iowans, along with results achieved to ensure reliability, and to improve and expand utility service infrastructure in Iowa. This information is provided in accordance with the State of Iowa Accountable Government Act, Iowa Code chapter 8E. The two basic business functions of the IUB are utility regulation and compliance, and resource management. This report covers performance information for both of these areas.

Department of Commerce - Iowa Utilities Board, Performance Report, Performance Results Achieved for Fiscal Year 2006, December 2006

The report highlights the services the IUB provided to Iowans, along with results achieved to ensure reliability, and to improve and expand utility service infrastructure in Iowa. This information is provided in accordance with the State of Iowa Accountable Government Act, Iowa Code chapter 8E. The two basic business functions of the IUB are utility regulation and compliance, and resource management. This report covers performance information for both of these areas.

Department of Commerce - Alcoholic Beverages Division, Agency Performance Plan, 2007

Annual Report, Agency Performance Plan

Iowa Department of Commerce - Division of Banking, Agency Performance Plan, 2007

Annual Report, Agency Performance Plan

Iowa Department of Commerce - Credit Union Division, Agency Performance Plan, 2007

Annual Report, Agency Performance Plan

Iowa Department of Commerce - Insurance Division, Agency Performance Plan, 2007

Annual Report, Agency Performance Plan

Iowa Department of Commerce - Iowa Utilities Board, Agency Performance Plan, 2007

Annual Report, Agency Performance Plan

Attribution and reciprocity in a simulated labor market: An experimental investigation

While papers such as Akerlof and Yellen (1990) and Rabin (1993) argue that psychological considerations such as fairness and reciprocity are important in individual decision-making, there is little explicit empirical evidence of reciprocal altruism in economic environments. This paper tests whether attribution of volition in choosing a wage has a significant effect on subsequent costly effort provision. An experiment was conducted in which subjects are first randomly divided into groups of employers and employees. Wages were selected and employees asked to choose an effort level, where increased effort is costly to the employee, but highly beneficial to the employer. The wage-determination process was common knowledge and wages were chosen either by the employer or by an external process. There is evidence for both distributional concerns and reciprocal altruism. The slope of the effort/wage profile is clearly positive in all cases, but is significantly higher when wages are chosen by the employer, offering support for the hypothesis of reciprocity. There are implications for models of utility and a critique of some current models is presented.