The Optimal Degree of Monetary-Discretion in a New Keynesian Model with Private Information

This paper considers the optimal degree of discretion in monetary policy when the central bank conducts policy based on its private information about the state of the economy and is unable to commit. Society seeks to maximize social welfare by imposing restrictions on the central bank's actions over time, and the central bank takes these restrictions and the New Keynesian Phillips curve as constraints. By solving a dynamic mechanism design problem we find that it is optimal to grant "constrained discretion" to the central bank by imposing both upper and lower bounds on permissible inflation, and that these bounds must be set in a history-dependent way. The optimal degree of discretion varies over time with the severity of the time-inconsistency problem, and, although no discretion is optimal when the time-inconsistency problem is very severe, our numerical experiment suggests that no-discretion is a transient phenomenon, and that some discretion is granted eventually.

'Modern' Phillips Curves and the Implications For The Statistical Process of Inflation

'Modern' theories of the Phillips curve imply that inflation is an integrated, or near integrated process. This paper explains this implication and why these 'modern' theories are logically inconsistent with what is commonly known about the statistical process of inflation.

Inflation dynamics and the New Keynesian Phillips curve in EU-4

The paper seeks to shed light on inflation dynamics of four new EU member states: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. To this end, the New Keynesian Phillips curve augmented for open economies is estimated and additional statistical tests applied. We find the following. (1) The claim of New Keynesians that the real marginal cost is the main inflation-forcing variable is fragile. (2) Inflation seems to be driven by external factors. (3) Although inflation holds a forward-looking component, the backward-looking component is substantial. An intuitive explanation for higher inflation persistence may be rather adaptive than rational price setting of local firms.

1-6-19, [l'Américain Richard L.] Byrd lançant le disque [championnats d'athlétisme de l'armée américaine à Colombes] : [photographie de presse] / [Agence Rol]

Référence bibliographique : Rol, 54202

El gran juego: la guerra secreta por el control de Asia Central (1836-1919)

Durant el segle XIX i les primeres dècades del XX, Àsia Central va patir de primera mà la rivalitat entre les dues grans potències europees del moment: Anglaterra i Rússia. Aquest enfrontament va ser batejat pels seus propis participants amb el nom d'El Gran Joc. A diferència d'altres lluites històriques prèvies, el Gran Joc no es va resumir en una guerra, sinó en un cúmul d'elles, que es van succeir al llarg del temps en diferents territoris del centre del continent asiàtic i a les que van acompanyar accions diplomàtiques igualment nombroses. Tot i l'extensió del conflicte, Afganistan es va erigir com el punt clau més rellevant al voltant del qual l'Imperi rus i el britànic van desenvolupar les seves intrigues. Els dos poders europeus, amb els seus respectius objectius en ment, no van dubtar a dur a terme un dels majors desplegaments estratègics mai vist a la zona, valent-se, a més dels seus efectius, dels habitants asiàtics com peons al tauler del seu joc i marcant profundament el futur de les nacions centreasiàtiques, així com establint un precedent en la manera de fer la guerra on la victòria d'una facció sobre una altra mai estaria clara.