The maximun and the addition of assigment games

[cat] En el context dels mercats a dues bandes, considerem, en primer lloc, que els jugadors poden escollir on dur a terme les seves transaccions. Mostrem que el joc corresponent a aquesta situació, que es representa pel màxim d’un conjunt finit de jocs d’assignació, pot ser un joc no equilibrat. Aleshores proporcionem condicions per a l’equilibri del joc i, per aquest cas, analitzem algunes propietats del core del joc. En segon lloc, considerem que els jugadors poden fer transaccions en diversos mercats simultàniament i, llavors, sumar els guanys obtinguts. El joc corresponent, representat per la suma d’un conjunt finit de jocs d’assignació, és equilibrat. A més a més, sota certes condicions, la suma dels cores dels dos jocs d’assignació coincideix amb el core del joc suma.

Hierarchy of interactive functions in father-mother-baby three-way games

In developmental research, the family has mainly been studied through dyadic interaction. Three-way interactions have received less attention, partly because of their complexity. This difficulty may be overcome by distinguishing between four hierarchically embedded functions in three-way interactions: (1) participation (inclusion of all participants), (2) organization (partners keeping to their roles), (3) focalization (sharing a common focus) and (4) affective contact (being in tune). We document this hierarchical model on a sample of 80 families observed in the Lausanne Trilogue Play situation across four different sites. Hierarchy between functions was demonstrated by means of Guttman scalability coefficient. Given the importance of the child's development in a threesome, the pertinence of this model for family assessment is discussed.

A bio-inspired agent-based programming environment for pervasive platforms

Abstract in English : Ubiquitous Computing is the emerging trend in computing systems. Based on this observation this thesis proposes an analysis of the hardware and environmental constraints that rule pervasive platforms. These constraints have a strong impact on the programming of such platforms. Therefore solutions are proposed to facilitate this programming both at the platform and node levels. The first contribution presented in this document proposes a combination of agentoriented programming with the principles of bio-inspiration (Phylogenesys, Ontogenesys and Epigenesys) to program pervasive platforms such as the PERvasive computing framework for modeling comPLEX virtually Unbounded Systems platform. The second contribution proposes a method to program efficiently parallelizable applications on each computing node of this platform. Résumé en Français : Basée sur le constat que les calculs ubiquitaires vont devenir le paradigme de programmation dans les années à venir, cette thèse propose une analyse des contraintes matérielles et environnementale auxquelles sont soumises les plateformes pervasives. Ces contraintes ayant un impact fort sur la programmation des plateformes. Des solutions sont donc proposées pour faciliter cette programmation tant au niveau de l'ensemble des noeuds qu'au niveau de chacun des noeuds de la plateforme. La première contribution présentée dans ce document propose d'utiliser une alliance de programmation orientée agent avec les grands principes de la bio-inspiration (Phylogénèse, Ontogénèse et Épigénèse). Ceci pour répondres aux contraintes de programmation de plateformes pervasives comme la plateforme PERvasive computing framework for modeling comPLEX virtually Unbounded Systems . La seconde contribution propose quant à elle une méthode permettant de programmer efficacement des applications parallélisable sur chaque noeud de calcul de la plateforme

The evolution of anti-social rewarding and its countermeasures in public goods games.

Cooperation in joint enterprises can easily break down when self-interests are in conflict with collective benefits, causing a tragedy of the commons. In such social dilemmas, the possibility for contributors to invest in a common pool-rewards fund, which will be shared exclusively among contributors, can be powerful for averting the tragedy, as long as the second-order dilemma (i.e. withdrawing contribution to reward funds) can be overcome (e.g. with second-order sanctions). However, the present paper reveals the vulnerability of such pool-rewarding mechanisms to the presence of reward funds raised by defectors and shared among them (i.e. anti-social rewarding), as it causes a cooperation breakdown, even when second-order sanctions are possible. I demonstrate that escaping this social trap requires the additional condition that coalitions of defectors fare poorly compared with pro-socials, with either (i) better rewarding abilities for the latter or (ii) reward funds that are contingent upon the public good produced beforehand, allowing groups of contributors to invest more in reward funds than groups of defectors. These results suggest that the establishment of cooperation through a collective positive incentive mechanism is highly vulnerable to anti-social rewarding and requires additional countermeasures to act in combination with second-order sanctions.

Resistance to extreme strategies, rather than prosocial preferences, can explain human cooperation in public goods games.

The results of numerous economic games suggest that humans behave more cooperatively than would be expected if they were maximizing selfish interests. It has been argued that this is because individuals gain satisfaction from the success of others, and that such prosocial preferences require a novel evolutionary explanation. However, in previous games, imperfect behavior would automatically lead to an increase in cooperation, making it impossible to decouple any form of mistake or error from prosocial cooperative decisions. Here we empirically test between these alternatives by decoupling imperfect behavior from prosocial preferences in modified versions of the public goods game, in which individuals would maximize their selfish gain by completely (100%) cooperating. We found that, although this led to higher levels of cooperation, it did not lead to full cooperation, and individuals still perceived their group mates as competitors. This is inconsistent with either selfish or prosocial preferences, suggesting that the most parsimonious explanation is imperfect behavior triggered by psychological drives that can prevent both complete defection and complete cooperation. More generally, our results illustrate the caution that must be exercised when interpreting the evolutionary implications of economic experiments, especially the absolute level of cooperation in a particular treatment.

English grammar games in primary education

The purpose of this study was to analyse pupils’ English grammar acquisition from competitive and cooperative approaches. After searching a wide range of authors’ contribution to English language learning, grammar acquisition, classroom environment and language games. A hundred and twenty pupils from three schools; two from Ripoll and one from Campdevànol were enrolled in a specific grammar games intervention. This was imparted in three different phases: first of all, I interviewed the three teachers from the three schools, then I put into practice my competitive and cooperative games which I designed especially for this study (all the sessions were carried, assessed and registered by myself); finally, all pupils answered a questionnaire related to their experiences in my grammar games intervention. Analysis of teaching interventions showed that, in terms of English language acquisition, pupils used different strategies to show up understanding and achieve the objective of the game such as: recalling their background knowledge, expressing sentences influenced by their internal language and their mother tongue. Data collected revealed that most difficulties were founded in team work, even more in competitive games. The results also showed that team work is something which has to be developed step by step in order to achieve language learning and all pupils’ active participation successfully.

Cooperative games with size-truncated information

[Eng] We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the socalled Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and only if the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, the intersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for non-consecutive ones. Spanish education system.

Cooperative games with size-truncated information

[Eng] We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the socalled Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and only if the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, the intersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for non-consecutive ones. Spanish education system.

Axiomatization of the nucl eolus of assignment games

On the domain of general assignment games (with possible reservation prices) the core is axiomatized as the unique solution satisfying two consistency principles: projection consistency and derived consistency. Also, an axiomatic characterization of the nucleolus is given as the unique solution that satisfies derived consistency and equal maximum complaint between groups. As a consequence, we obtain a geometric characterization of the nucleolus. Maschler et al. (1979) provide a geometrical characterization for the intersection of the kernel and the core of a coalitional game, showing that those allocations that lie in both sets are always the midpoint of certain bargaining range between each pair of players. In the case of the assignment game, this means that the kernel can be determined as those core allocations where the maximum amount, that can be transferred without getting outside the core, from one agent to his / her optimally matched partner equals the maximum amount that he / she can receive from this partner, also remaining inside the core. We now prove that the nucleolus of the assignment game can be characterized by requiring this bisection property be satisfied not only for optimally matched pairs but also for optimally matched coalitions. Key words: cooperative games, assignment game, core, nucleolus

Advertising in Mobile Games - A Business Model Evaluation

Tämän tutkimuksen tavoitteena oli selvittää kuinka houkuttelevan liiketoimintamahdollisuuden mobiilipelit tarjoavat mainostusalustana. Tutkimus suoritettiin tapaustutkimuksena. Tutkimus aloitettiin määrittelemällä liiketoimintamalli, jonka jälkeen suoritettiin yleinen katsaus Suomen mobiilipelimarkkinoille. Tämän jälkeen arvoketju-, arvoverkko- sekä markkina-analyysin avulla selvitettiin liiketoimintamallin mahdollisuudet sekä rajoitukset. Tutkimukseen käytettiinteorettista viitekehystä joka pohjautui Hamelin liiketoimintamalliin, Porterin arvoketjuun sekä Alleenin arvoverkoon. Tutkimuksen tuloksena todettiin, että mainostaminen mobiilipeleissä tarjoaa liiketoimintamahdollisuuden ilman esteitä sentoteuttamiselle. Suomalaiset mobiilipelimarkkinat ovat kuitenkin pirstoutuneet,minkä johdosta tutkittu 'mainosten hallinta-alusta'-liiketoimintamalli aiheuttaa liian suuret integraatiokustannukset. Myös suuri määrä pelitoimittajia heikentää mallin tehokkuutta.