Perry Municipal Waterworks, Independent Auditor's Reports, Basic Financial Statement and Supplementary Information, Schedule of Findings, June 30, 2005

Other Audit Reports - Utilities

Perry Community School District, Independent Auditor's Reports, Basic Financial Statements and Supplementary Information, Schedule of Findings and Questioned Costs, June 30, 2005

Community School District Audit Report

Perry Municipal Waterworks, Independent Auditor's Report, Basic Financial Statements and Supplementary Information, Schedule of Findings, June 30, 2006

Other Audit Reports - Utilities

City of Perry, Independent Auditor's Reports, Basic Financial Statements and Supplementary Information, Schedule of Findings, June 30, 2006

City Audit Report

Perry Community School District, Independent Auditor's Reports, Basic Financial Statements and Supplementary Information, Schedule of Findings and Questioned Costs, June 30, 2006

Community School District Audit Report

Espécies de Adelpha Hübner, [1819] (Lepidoptera, Nymphalidae, Limenitidinae) ocorrentes no Rio Grande do Sul, Brasil

Species of Adelpha Hübner, [1819] (Lepidoptera, Nymphalidae, Limenitidinae) occurring in Rio Grande do Sul State, Brazil. Based on literature, collections and sampled butterflies, a list of twelve species of Adelpha Hübner occurring in Rio Grande do Sul State is presented, including host plants. Adelpha epizygis Fruhstorfer, [1916], Adelpha falcipennis Fruhstorfer, [1916], Adelpha goyama Schaus, 1902 and Adelpha isis (Drury, 1782) are new reports to Rio Grande do Sul. The species are illustrated and keyed.

An attempt to refine rockfall hazard zoning based on the kinetic energy, frequency and fragmentation degree

Rockfall hazard zoning is usually achieved using a qualitative estimate of hazard, and not an absolute scale. In Switzerland, danger maps, which correspond to a hazard zoning depending on the intensity of the considered phenomenon (e.g. kinetic energy for rockfalls), are replacing hazard maps. Basically, the danger grows with the mean frequency and with the intensity of the rockfall. This principle based on intensity thresholds may also be applied to other intensity threshold values than those used in Switzerland for rockfall hazard zoning method, i.e. danger mapping. In this paper, we explore the effect of slope geometry and rockfall frequency on the rockfall hazard zoning. First, the transition from 2D zoning to 3D zoning based on rockfall trajectory simulation is examined; then, its dependency on slope geometry is emphasized. The spatial extent of hazard zones is examined, showing that limits may vary widely depending on the rockfall frequency. This approach is especially dedicated to highly populated regions, because the hazard zoning has to be very fine in order to delineate the greatest possible territory containing acceptable risks.

Audit report on the Perry Municipal Waterworks, Perry, Iowa for the year ended June 30, 2007

Audit report on the Perry Municipal Waterworks, Perry, Iowa for the year ended June 30, 2007

Audit report on Perry Community School District in Perry, Iowa for the year ended June 30, 2007

Audit report on Perry Community School District in Perry, Iowa for the year ended June 30, 2007

Audit report on the City of Perry, Iowa for the year ended June 30, 2007

Audit report on the City of Perry, Iowa for the year ended June 30, 2007

Special investigation of selected transactions at Perry High School for the period July 1, 2005 through November 30, 2007

Special investigation of selected transactions at Perry High School for the period July 1, 2005 through November 30, 2007

A note on the convergence to competitive equilibria in economies with moral hazard

We examine the conditions under which competitive equilibria can beobtained as the limit, when the number of strategic traders getslarge, of Nash equilibria in economies with asymmetric informationon agents' effort and possibly imperfect observability of agents'trades. Convergence always occur when either effort is publiclyobserved (no matter what is the information available tointermediaries on agents' trades); or effort is private informationbut agents' trades are perfectly observed; or no information at allis available on agents' trades. On the other hand, when eachintermediary can observe its trades with an agent, but not theagent's trades with other intermediaries, the (Nash) equilibriawith strategic intermediaries do not converge to any of thecompetitive equilibria, for an open set of economies. The source ofthe difficulties for convergence is the combination of asymmetricinformation and the restrictions on the observability of tradeswhich prevent the formation of exclusive contractual relationshipsand generate barriers to entry in the markets for contracts.