Affirmative Action Policy and Effort Levels. Sequential-Move Contest Game Argument

In this paper we analyse a simple two-person sequential-move contest game with heterogeneous players. Assuming that the heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination, we study the effects of implementation of affirmative action policy, which tackles this heterogeneity by compensating discriminated players, and compare them with the situation in which the heterogeneity is ignored and the contestants are treated equally. In our analysis we consider different orders of moves. We show that the order of moves of contestants is a very important factor in determination of the effects of the implementation of the affirmative action policy. We also prove that in such cases a significant role is played by the level of the heterogeneity of individuals. In particular, in contrast to the present-in-the-literature predictions, we demonstrate that as a consequence of the interplay of these two factors, the response to the implementation of the affirmative action policy option may be the decrease in the total equilibrium effort level of the contestants in comparison to the unbiased contest game.

How private is private information? The ability to spot deception in an economic game

We provide experimental evidence on the ability to detect deceit in a buyer-seller game with asymmetric information. Sellers have private information about the buyer's valuation of a good and sometimes have incentives to mislead buyers. We examine if buyers can spot deception in face-to-face encounters. We vary (1) whether or not the buyer can interrogate the seller, and (2) the contextual richness of the situation. We find that the buyers' prediction accuracy is above chance levels, and that interrogation and contextual richness are important factors determining the accuracy. These results show that there are circumstances in which part of the information asymmetry is eliminated by people's ability to spot deception.

Interactive Epistemology and Reasoning: On the Foundations of Game Theory

Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have been conducted so far. However, in the case of imperfect information some players are not fully informed about some choices. Game-theoretic analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, games are modelled by so-called form structures which extract and formalize the significant parts of the underlying strategic interaction. The basic and most commonly used models of games are the normal form, which rather sparsely describes a game merely in terms of the players' strategy sets and utilities, and the extensive form, which models a game in a more detailed way as a tree. In fact, it is standard to formalize static games with the normal form and dynamic games with the extensive form. Secondly, solution concepts are developed to solve models of games in the sense of identifying the choices that should be taken by rational players. Indeed, the ultimate objective of the classical approach to game theory, which is of normative character, is the development of a solution concept that is capable of identifying a unique choice for every player in an arbitrary game. However, given the large variety of games, it is not at all certain whether it is possible to device a solution concept with such universal capability. Alternatively, interactive epistemology provides an epistemic approach to game theory of descriptive character. This rather recent discipline analyzes the relation between knowledge, belief and choice of game-playing agents in an epistemic framework. The description of the players' choices in a given game relative to various epistemic assumptions constitutes the fundamental problem addressed by an epistemic approach to game theory. In a general sense, the objective of interactive epistemology consists in characterizing existing game-theoretic solution concepts in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as in proposing novel solution concepts by studying the game-theoretic implications of refined or new epistemic hypotheses. Intuitively, an epistemic model of a game can be interpreted as representing the reasoning of the players. Indeed, before making a decision in a game, the players reason about the game and their respective opponents, given their knowledge and beliefs. Precisely these epistemic mental states on which players base their decisions are explicitly expressible in an epistemic framework. In this PhD thesis, we consider an epistemic approach to game theory from a foundational point of view. In Chapter 1, basic game-theoretic notions as well as Aumann's epistemic framework for games are expounded and illustrated. Also, Aumann's sufficient conditions for backward induction are presented and his conceptual views discussed. In Chapter 2, Aumann's interactive epistemology is conceptually analyzed. In Chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Conrad Heilmann, a three-stage account for dynamic games is introduced and a type-based epistemic model is extended with a notion of agent connectedness. Then, sufficient conditions for backward induction are derived. In Chapter 4, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa, a topological approach to interactive epistemology is initiated. In particular, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge is defined and some implications for games considered. In Chapter 5, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa and Andrés Perea, Aumann's impossibility theorem on agreeing to disagree is revisited and weakened in the sense that possible contexts are provided in which agents can indeed agree to disagree.

Dynamic stackelberg game with risk-averse players: optimal risk-sharing under asymmetric information

The objective of this paper is to clarify the interactive nature of the leader-follower relationship when both players are endogenously risk-averse. The analysis is placed in the context of a dynamic closed-loop Stackelberg game with private information. The case of a risk-neutral leader, very often discussed in the literature, is only a borderline possibility in the present study. Each player in the game is characterized by a risk-averse type which is unknown to his opponent. The goal of the leader is to implement an optimal incentive compatible risk-sharing contract. The proposed approach provides a qualitative analysis of adaptive risk behavior profiles for asymmetrically informed players in the context of dynamic strategic interactions modelled as incentive Stackelberg games.

The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price vectors from the solutions of the dual linear program associated to the primal linear program defined to find optimal assignments. Using only linear programming tools, we also show (i) that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all optimal assignments, and vice versa; (ii) that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure; and (iii) how this structure is translated into the set of agents' utilities that are attainable at equilibrium.

On Cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria

We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Second, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.

A critical application of securitization theory: overcoming the normative dilemma of writing security

This article addresses the normative dilemma located within the application of `securitization,’ as a method of understanding the social construction of threats and security policies. Securitization as a theoretical and practical undertaking is being increasingly used by scholars and practitioners. This scholarly endeavour wishes to provide those wishing to engage with securitization with an alternative application of this theory; one which is sensitive to and self-reflective of the possible normative consequences of its employment. This article argues that discussing and analyzing securitization processes have normative implications, which is understood here to be the negative securitization of a referent. The negative securitization of a referent is asserted to be carried out through the unchallenged analysis of securitization processes which have emerged through relations of exclusion and power. It then offers a critical understanding and application of securitization studies as a way of overcoming the identified normative dilemma. First, it examines how the Copenhagen School’s formation of securitization theory gives rise to a normative dilemma, which is situated in the performative and symbolic power of security as a political invocation and theoretical concept. Second, it evaluates previous attempts to overcome the normative dilemma of securitization studies, outlining the obstacles that each individual proposal faces. Third, this article argues that the normative dilemma of applying securitization can be avoided by firstly, deconstructing the institutional power of security actors and dominant security subjectivities and secondly, by addressing countering or alternative approaches to security and incorporating different security subjectivities. Examples of the securitization of international terrorism and immigration are prominent throughout.

Detection of nandrolone metabolites in urine after a football game in professional and amateur players: a Bayesian comparison.

Nandrolone (19-nortestosterone) is a widely used anabolic steroid in sports where strength plays an essential role. Once nandrolone has been metabolised, two major metabolites are excreted in urine, 19-norandrosterone (NA) and 19-noretiocholanolone (NE). In 1997, in France, quite a few sportsmen had concentrations of 19-norandrosterone very close to the IOC cut off limit (2ng/ml). At that time, a debate took place about the capability of the human male body to produce by itself these metabolites without any intake of nandrolone or related compounds. The International Football Federation (FIFA) was very concerned with this problematic, especially because the World Cup was about to start in France. In this respect, a statistical study was held with all football players from the first and second divisions of the Swiss Football National League. All players gave a urine sample after effort and around 6% of them showed traces of 19-norandrosterone. These results were compared with amateur football players (control group) and around 6% of them had very small amounts of 19-norandrosterone and/or 19-noretiocholanolone in urine after effort, whereas none of them had detectable traces of one or the other metabolite before effort. The origin of these compounds in urine after a strenuous physical activity is still unknown, but three hypotheses can be put forward. First, an endogenous production of nandrolone metabolites takes place. Second, nandrolone metabolites are released from the fatty tissues after an intake of nandrolone, some related compounds or some contaminated nutritive supplements. Finally, the sportsmen may have taken something during or just before the football game.

"Michael's Game," a card game for the treatment of psychotic symptoms.

Objective: "Michael's Game" is a card game which aims at familiarizing healthcare professionals and patients with cognitive therapy of psychotic symptoms. The present study tests the feasibility and the impact of the intervention in naturalistic settings.Methods: 135 patients were recruited in 11 centres. They were assessed pre- and post-tests with the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS) and the Peters Delusion Inventory-21 items (PDI-21).Results: Data about 107 patients were included in the entire analyses. Significant improvements were observed on BCIS subscales as well as a reduction of severity of conviction and preoccupation scores on the PDI-21. The intervention has a moderate effect on the PDI-21 preoccupation and conviction as well as the BCIS subscales. Patients who benefit the most from the program are patients who have a low degree of self-reflectiveness and patients who are concomitantly preoccupied by their symptoms.Conclusion: The present study supports the feasibility and effectiveness of "Michael's Game" in naturalistic settings.Practical implications: The game seems to be a useful tool for patients with psychotic disorders. (C) 2010 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

Open Chess Game Analyzer

Aquest document detalla la feina que s'ha dut a terme per desenvolupar el projecte Open Chess Game Analyzer. La finalitat del mateix és desenvolupar un aplicatiu lliure que sigui capaç d'analitzar partides d'escacs a partir d'un fitxer PGN.

A Study of Tobacco, Alcohol and Drug Use among Irish Female Prisoners

The female prisoner population are a very specific group with very different needs to that of the general population. The study sets out to profile these women and to examine their use of tobacco, alcohol and other substances. A census sample of female prisoners was frequency matched for age with male prisoners and also the female general population. Response rate was 74.6%. Results illustrated that female prisoners are, in the majority from a lower social group, from deprived backgrounds and from families where unemployment is high and education is low. Female prisoners smoke more, take more drugs (including heroin and injection drugs) and drink considerably more when compared to the above groups. They have more alcohol related difficulties as a result of another persons drinking, illustrating high rates of verbal, physical and sexual assault. The prison setting may be the first and possibly the only opportunity for health education and promotion for this particular group. Therefore, with such high reported levels of smoking, alcohol and other substance use, the prison provides a good setting for health promotion interventions.This resource was contributed by The National Documentation Centre on Drug Use.