Concentration in the ownership of plant variety rights: Some implications for developing countries

This paper explores concentration levels in the ownership of intellectual property rights over plant varieties worldwide. An analysis of data for 30 UPOV member-countries shows a high degree of concentration in the ownership of plant variety rights for six major crops at the national level in the developed world. Much of this concentration has arisen owing to the rapid consolidation of the seed industry through mergers and acquisitions, especially in the 1990s. A high degree of concentration in the ownership of plant variety rights, in combination with recent efforts to strengthen plant variety protection regimes, is likely to have significant effects on the prospects for future innovation in plant breeding and the distribution of market power between companies. For developing countries, concentration in intellectual property right ownership may have important implications for the structure of domestic seed industries and access to protected varieties and associated plant breeding technologies. These implications for developing countries are likely to become apparent in the context of the rapid spread of plant variety protection and access legislation, emerging changes in the international exchange regime for plant material and liberalised investment policies permitting foreign investment in the seeds sector.

Exploring the feasibility of farmers' rights

In many developing countries, there is concern that a conventional system of plant breeders' rights provides no rewards to farmers for their role in the conservation and enhancement of agro-biodiversity. To redress this imbalance, developing countries are incorporating farmers' rights provisions in their plant variety protection legislation. This article examines the feasibility of farmers' rights provisions based on intellectual property rights. It argues that the farmers' rights provisions crafted by some developing countries will involve enormous operational difficulties, while IPR-based farmers' rights are unlikely to provide significant economic returns to farmers or farming communities. At the same time, farmers' rights provisions, as currently conceived, are likely significantly to dilute the incentives for innovation provided to institutional plant breeders.

Concentration in ownership of plant variety rights: some implications for developing countries

This paper explores concentration levels in the ownership of intellectual property rights over plant varieties worldwide. An analysis of data for 30 UPOV member-countries shows a high degree of concentration in the ownership of plant variety rights for six major crops at the national level in the developed world. Much of this concentration has arisen owing to the rapid consolidation of the seed industry through mergers and acquisitions, especially in the 1990s. A high degree of concentration in the ownership of plant variety rights, in combination with recent efforts to strengthen plant variety protection regimes, is likely to have significant effects on the prospects for future innovation in plant breeding and the distribution of market power between companies. For developing countries, concentration in intellectual property right ownership may have important implications for the structure of domestic seed industries and access to protected varieties and associated plant breeding technologies. These implications for developing countries are likely to become apparent in the context of the rapid spread of plant variety protection and access legislation, emerging changes in the international exchange regime for plant material and liberalised investment policies permitting foreign investment in the seeds sector. (C) 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

India’s disappearing common lands: fuzzy boundaries, encroachment, and evolving property rights

Opportunistic land encroachment occurs in many low-income countries, gradually yet pervasively, until discrete areas of common land disappear. This paper, motivated by field observations in Karnataka, India, demonstrates that such an evolution of property rights from common to private may be efficient when the boundaries between common and private land are poorly defined, or ‘‘fuzzy.’’ Using a multi-period optimization model, and introducing the concept of stock and flow enforcement, I show how effectiveness of enforcement effort, whether encroachment is reversible, and punitive fines, influence whether an area of common land is fully defined and protected or gradually or rapidly encroached.

Institutional capacity and implementation issues in farmers' rights

Armed with the ‘equity’ and ‘conservation’ arguments that have a deep resonance with farming communities, developing countries are crafting a range of measures designed to protect farmers’ access to innovations, reward their contributions to the conservation and enhancement of plant genetic resources and provide incentives for sustained on-farm conservation. These measures range from the commericialization of farmers’ varieties to the conferment of a set of legally enforceable rights on farming communities – the exercise of which is expected to provide economic rewards to those responsible for on-farm conservation and innovation. The rights-based approach has been the cornerstone of legislative provision for implementing farmers’ rights in most developing countries. In drawing up these measures, developing countries do not appear to have systematically examined or provided for the substantial institutional capacity required for the effective implementation of farmers’ rights provisions. The lack of institutional capacity threatens to undermine any prospect of serious implementation of these provisions. More importantly, the expectation that significant incentives for on-farm conservation and innovation will flow from these ‘rights’ may be based on a flawed understanding of the economics of intellectual property rights. While farmers’ rights may provide only limited rewards for conservation, they may still have the effect of diluting the incentives for innovative institutional breeding programs – with the private sector increasingly relying on non-IPR instruments to profit from innovation. The focus on a rights-based approach may also draw attention away from alternative stewardship-based approaches to the realization of farmers’ rights objectives.

Conscience, discretion and the creation of property rights

This paper considers the utility of the concept of conscience or unconscionable conduct as a contemporary rationale for intervention in two principles applied where a person seeks to renege on an informal agreement relating to land: the principle in Rochefoucauld v Boustead; and transfers 'subject to' rights in favour of a claimant. By analysing the concept in light of our current understanding of the nature of judicial discretion and the use of general principles, it responds to arguments that unconscionability is too general a concept on which to base intervention. In doing so, it considers the nature of the discretion that is actually in issue when the court intervenes through conscience in these principles. However, the paper questions the use of constructive trusts as a response to unconscionability. It argues that there is a need, in limited circumstances, to separate the finding of unconscionability from the imposition of a constructive trust. In these limited circumstances, once unconscionability is found, the courts should have a discretion as to the remedy, modelled on that developed in the context of proprietary estoppel. The message underlying this paper is that many of the concerns expressed about unconscionability that have led to suggestions of alternative rationales for intervention can in fact be addressed whilst retaining an unconscionability analysis. Unconscionability remains a preferable rationale for intervention as it provides a common thread that links apparently separate principles and can assist our understanding of their scope.