Letter to S.D. Woodruff signed by Wm. Shelley, treasurer of the Jarvis-Conklin Mortgage Trust Company

Letter (1 page, typed) to S.D. Woodruff asking for the papers for the Crick loan. This is signed by Wm. Shelley, treasurer of the Jarvis-Conklin Mortgage Trust Company. The letter is torn, has holes in it and is somewhat crumpled and stained. This does not affect the text, June 7, 1887.

Letter to S.D. Woodruff from Wm. Shelley, treasurer of the Jarvis-Conklin Mortgage Trust Company

Letter (1 page, typed) to S.D. Woodruff from Wm. Shelley, treasurer of the Jarvis-Conklin Mortgage Trust Company requesting the papers for the Crew and Atkins loans. The letter is discoloured along the folds. This does not affect the text, Nov. 20, 1887.

Letter to S.D. Woodruff from Wm. Shelley, treasurer of the Jarvis-Conklin Mortgage Trust Company

Letter (1 page, typed) to S.D. Woodruff from Wm. Shelley, treasurer of the Jarvis-Conklin Mortgage Trust Company requesting the Dennis loan papers, Jan. 6, 1888.

Letter to S.D. Woodruff from Wm. Shelley, treasurer of the Jarvis-Conklin Mortgage Trust Company

Letter to S.D. Woodruff from Wm. Shelley, treasurer of the Jarvis-Conklin Mortgage Trust Company to please look for the Maria Cogswell loan papers, Aug. 14, 1888.

Letter to S.D. Woodruff from Wm. Shelley, treasurer of the Jarvis-Conklin Mortgage Trust Company

Letter to S.D. Woodruff which accompanied to check for the Maria Cogswell account. The letter was sent by Wm. Shelley, treasurer of Jarvis-Conklin Mortgage Trust Company, May 25, 1889.

Letter to S.D. Woodruff which accompanied the payment on the John Schmidt loan signed by S.L. Conklin, assistant secretary of Jarvis-Conklin Mortgage Trust Company

Letter to S.D. Woodruff (1 page, typed) which accompanied the payment on the John Schmidt loan signed by S.L. Conklin, assistant secretary of Jarvis-Conklin Mortgage Trust Company, July 9, 1889.

Letter to S.D. Woodruff to please return coupons signed by the Jarvis-Conklin Mortgage Trust Co.,

Letter (1 page, typed) to S.D. Woodruff to please return coupons signed by the Jarvis-Conklin Mortgage Trust Co., Nov. 30, 1889.

Letter - Herbert Mills of Jarvis-Conklin Mortgage Trust Company to S.D. Woodruff

Letter (1 page, typed) to S.D. Woodruff which accompanied the Rothrock account papers. Signed by Herbert Mills, assistant treasurer of Jarvis-Conklin Mortgage Trust Company, Oct. 27, 1890.

Indenture of mortgage between Robert and Eunice Telfer of the Township of London to Ira Spaulding of the Township of Stamford

Indenture of mortgage between Robert and Eunice Telfer of the Township of London to Ira Spaulding of the Township of Stamford for Lot 17 in Block U in the Village of Komoka, Middlesex – instrument no. 1044. This was recorded on Dec. 21, 1857 in Liber B, folio 945, Apr. 7, 1857.

Indenture of assignment of mortgage between Executors of the Zimmerman Estate and the Bank of Upper Canada

Indenture of assignment of mortgage between Executors of the Zimmerman Estate and the Bank of Upper Canada regarding Lot no. 4 in block O in the Town of Elgin – instrument no. 6360, May 14, 1858.

Discharge of Mortgage signed by Henry Kalar, President of the Niagara Permanent Building Society

Discharge of Mortgage signed by Henry Kalar, President of the Niagara Permanent Building Society stating that John McNeilly [?] has satisfied all money due and the mortgage is therefore discharged. The right hand side of this document is burned. Text is slightly affected, Aug. 8, 1853.

Indenture (vellum) of mortgage between the Port Hope, Lindsay and Beaverton Railway Company and Joseph Augustus Woodruff of Niagara and Gilbert McMicken of the Village of Elgin in Welland

Indenture (vellum) of mortgage between the Port Hope, Lindsay and Beaverton Railway Company and Joseph Augustus Woodruff of Niagara and Gilbert McMicken of the Village of Elgin in Welland. This document was registered Jan.4, 1856 – instrument no. 586, Dec. 29, 1855.

Environmental Risks : Should Banks Be Liable?

This paper studies the impact of banks' liability for environmental damages caused by their borrowers. Laws or court decisions that declare banks liable for environmental damages have two objectives : (1) finding someone to pay for the damages and (2) exerting a pressure on a firm's stakeholders to incite them to invest in environmental risk prevention. We study the effect that such legal decisions can have on financing relationships and especially on the incentives to reduce environmental risk in an environment where banks cannot commit to refinance the firm in all circumstances. Following an environmental accident, liable banks more readily agree to refinance the firm. We then show that bank liability effectively makes refinancing more attractive to banks, therefore improving the firm's risk-sharing possibilities. Consequently, the firm's incentives to invest in environmental risk reduction are weakened compared to the (bank) no-liability case. We also show that, when banks are liable, the firm invests at the full-commitment optimal level of risk reduction investment. If there are some externalities such that some damages cannot be accounted for, the socially efficient level of investment is greater than the privately optimal one. in that case, making banks non-liable can be socially desirable.

Environmental Risk: Should Banks Be Liable?

This paper studies the impact of banks' liability for environmental damages caused by their borrowers. Laws or court decisions that declare banks liable for environmental damages have two objectives : (1) finding someone to pay for the damages and (2) exerting a pressure on a firm's stakeholders to incite them to invest in environmental risk prevention. We study the effect that such legal decisions can have on financing relationships and especially on the incentives to reduce environmental risk in an environment where banks cannot commit to refinance the firm in all circumstances. Following an environmental accident, liable banks more readily agree to refinance the firm. We then show that bank liability effectively makes refinancing more attractive to banks, therefore improving the firm's risk-sharing possibilities. Consequently, the firm's incentives to invest in environmental risk reduction are weakened compared to the (bank) no-liability case. We also show that, when banks are liable, the firm invests at the full-commitment optimal level of risk reduction investment. If there are some externalities such that some damages cannot be accounted for, the socially efficient level of investment is greater than the privately optimal one. in that case, making banks non-liable can be socially desirable.