Observability and overcoming coordination failure in organizations

Many organizations suffer poor performance because its members fail to coordinate on efficient patterns of behavior. In previous research, we have shown that financial incentives can be used to find a way out of such performance traps. Here we examine the sensitivity of this result to the ability of people to observe others' choices. Our experiments are set in a corporate environment where subjects' payoffs depend on coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by the employees of an experimental firm is a weak-link game. Treatments vary along two dimensions. First, subjects either start with low financial incentives for coordination, which typically leads to coordination failure, and then are switched to higher incentives or start with high incentives, which typically yield effective coordination, and are switched to low incentives. Second, as the key treatment variable, subjects either observe the effort levels chosen by all employees in their experimenta

A change would do you good . . . An experimental study on how to overcome coordination failure in organizations

Many organizations suffer poor performance because individuals within the organization fail to coordinate on efficient patterns of behavior. Using controlled laboratory experiments, we study how financial incentives can be used to find a way out of such performance traps. Our experiments are set in a corporate environment where subjects' payoffs depend on coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak-link game. In an initial phase, the benefits of coordination are low relative to the cost of increased effort. Play in this initial phase typically converges to an inefficient outcome with employees failing to coordinate at high effort levels. The experimental design then explores the effects of varying the financial incentives to coordinate at a higher effort level. We find that an increase in the benefits of coordination leads to improved coordination, but, surprisingly, large increases have no more impact than small increases. Once subj

Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs

We study how the heterogeneity of agents affects the extent to which changes in financial incentives can pull a group out of a situation of coordination failure. We focus on the connections between cost asymmetries and leadership. Experimental subjects interact in groups of four in a series of weak-link games. The treatment variable is the distribution of high and low effort cost across subjects. We present data for one, two and three low-cost subjects as well as control sessions with symmetric costs. The overall pattern of coordination improvement is common across treatments. Early coordination improvements depend on the distribution of high and low effort costs across subjects, but these differences disappear with time. We find that initial leadership in overcoming coordination failure is not driven by low-cost subjects but by subjects with the most frequent cost. This conformity effect can be due to a kind of group identity or to the cognitive simplicity of acting with identical others.

Objective analysis of gait coordination for total knee arthroplasty outcome

Introduction: Coordination is a strategy chosen by the central nervous system to control the movements and maintain stability during gait. Coordinated multi-joint movements require a complex interaction between nervous outputs, biomechanical constraints, and pro-prioception. Quantitatively understanding and modeling gait coordination still remain a challenge. Surgeons lack a way to model and appreciate the coordination of patients before and after surgery of the lower limbs. Patients alter their gait patterns and their kinematic synergies when they walk faster or slower than normal speed to maintain their stability and minimize the energy cost of locomotion. The goal of this study was to provide a dynamical system approach to quantitatively describe human gait coordination and apply it to patients before and after total knee arthroplasty. Methods: A new method of quantitative analysis of interjoint coordination during gait was designed, providing a general model to capture the whole dynamics and showing the kinematic synergies at various walking speeds. The proposed model imposed a relationship among lower limb joint angles (hips and knees) to parameterize the dynamics of locomotion of each individual. An integration of different analysis tools such as Harmonic analysis, Principal Component Analysis, and Artificial Neural Network helped overcome high-dimensionality, temporal dependence, and non-linear relationships of the gait patterns. Ten patients were studied using an ambulatory gait device (Physilog®). Each participant was asked to perform two walking trials of 30m long at 3 different speeds and to complete an EQ-5D questionnaire, a WOMAC and Knee Society Score. Lower limbs rotations were measured by four miniature angular rate sensors mounted respectively, on each shank and thigh. The outcomes of the eight patients undergoing total knee arthroplasty, recorded pre-operatively and post-operatively at 6 weeks, 3 months, 6 months and 1 year were compared to 2 age-matched healthy subjects. Results: The new method provided coordination scores at various walking speeds, ranged between 0 and 10. It determined the overall coordination of the lower limbs as well as the contribution of each joint to the total coordination. The difference between the pre-operative and post-operative coordination values were correlated with the improvements of the subjective outcome scores. Although the study group was small, the results showed a new way to objectively quantify gait coordination of patients undergoing total knee arthroplasty, using only portable body-fixed sensors. Conclusion: A new method for objective gait coordination analysis has been developed with very encouraging results regarding the objective outcome of lower limb surgery.

Who Matters in Coordination Problems?

We consider a common investment project that is vulnerable to a self-ful lling coordination failure and hence is strategically risky. Based on their private information, agents - who have heterogeneous investment incentives - form expectations or 'sentiments' about the project's outcome. We find that the sum of these sentiments is constant across di erent strategy profiles and it is independent of the distribution of incentives. As a result, we can think of sentiment as a scarce resource divided up among the di erent payo types. Applying this nding, we show that agents who bene t little from the project's success have a large impact on the coordination process. The agents with small bene ts invest only if their sentiment towards the project is large per unit investment cost. As the average sentiment is constant, a subsidy decreasing the investment costs of these agents will \free up" a large amount of sentiment, provoking a large impact on the whole economy. Intuitively, these agents, insensitive to the project's outcome and hence to the actions of others, are in uential because they modify their equilibrium behavior only if the others change theirs substantially.

Le code-switching comme ressource stratégique pour la gestion de l'interaction multilingue : coordination et leadership dans un groupe de travail

In this article, we analyze a multilingual interaction in a students' working group and hypothesize a correlation between management of languages in interaction and leadership. We consider Codeswitching as one of the most relevant observables in multilingual interaction and attempt to analyze how it is used by speakers. After a brief presentation of three theoretical and analytical conceptions of Code-switching in interaction (Auer, Mondada & Myers Scotton), we define Code-switching as an interactional, strategical, multilingual resource exploited by speakers to achieve various interactionaland non interactional goals. We then show in two CA-like analysis how multilingual strategical resources occur in the interactional practices of the analyzed working group, and how they are exploited by speakers in order to organize interaction, work, tasks, and to construct one's leadership.We also consider the metadiscourses of the students about their own practices and multilingualism in general, in order to confront them to their actual multilingual practices. We draw the hypothesis that discrepancies observed between metadiscourses and practices can be explained through the development of (meta)discourses showing a unilingual conception in describing multilingual practices.

Using Effluent Charges in Promoting Investment in Water Pollution Control Technology: A Model of Coordination Failure among Firms

Untreated wastewater being directly discharged into rivers is a very harmful environmental hazard that needs to be tackled urgently in many countries. In order to safeguard the river ecosystem and reduce water pollution, it is important to have an effluent charge policy that promotes the investment of wastewater treatment technology by domestic firms. This paper considers the strategic interaction between the government and the domestic firms regarding the investment in the wastewater treatment technology and the design of optimal e­ffluent charge policy that should be implemented. In this model, the higher is the proportion of non-investing firms, the higher would be the probability of having to incur an e­ffluent charge and the higher would be that charge. On one hand the government needs to impose a sufficiently strict policy to ensure that firms have strong incentive to invest. On the other hand, it cannot be too strict that it drives out firms which cannot afford to invest in such expensive technology. The paper analyses the factors that affect the probability of investment in this technology. It also explains the difficulty of imposing a strict environment policy in countries that have too many small firms which cannot afford to invest unless subsidised.

Expectations Traps and Coordination Failures with Discretionary Policymaking

Discretionary policymakers cannot manage private-sector expectations and cannot coordinate the actions of future policymakers. As a consequence, expectations traps and coordination failures can occur and multiple equilibria can arise. To utilize the explanatory power of models with multiple equilibria it is first necessary to understand how an economy arrives to a particular equilibrium. In this paper we employ notions of learnability and self-enforceability to motivate and identify equilibria of particular interest. Central among these criteria are whether the equilibrium is learnable by private agents and jointly learnable by private agents and the policymaker. We use two New Keynesian policy models to identify the strategic interactions that give rise to multiple equilibria and to illustrate our methods for identifying equilibria of interest. Importantly, unless the Pareto-preferred equilibrium is learnable by private agents, we find little reason to expect coordination on that equilibrium.

Monetary Policy Delegation and Equilibrium Coordination

This paper revisits the argument that the stabilisation bias that arises under discretionary monetary policy can be reduced if policy is delegated to a policymaker with redesigned objectives. We study four delegation schemes: price level targeting, interest rate smoothing, speed limits and straight conservatism. These can all increase social welfare in models with a unique discretionary equilibrium. We investigate how these schemes perform in a model with capital accumulation where uniqueness does not necessarily apply. We discuss how multiplicity arises and demonstrate that no delegation scheme is able to eliminate all potential bad equilibria. Price level targeting has two interesting features. It can create a new equilibrium that is welfare dominated, but it can also alter equilibrium stability properties and make coordination on the best equilibrium more likely.

Coordination in Public Good Provision: How Individual Volunteering is Impacted by the Volunteering of Others

In this analysis, we examine the relationship between an individual's decision to volunteer and the average level of volunteering in the community where the individual resides. Our theoretical model is based on a coordination game , in which volunteering by others is informative regarding the benefit from volunteering. We demonstrate that the interaction between this information and one's private information makes it more likely that he or she will volunteer, given a higher level of contributions by his or her peers. We complement this theoretical work with an empirical analysis using Census 2000 Summary File 3 and Current Population Survey (CPS) 2004-2007 September supplement file data. We control for various individual and community characteristics, and employ robustness checks to verify the results of the baseline analysis. We additionally use an innovative instrumental variables strategy to account for reflection bias and endogeneity caused by selective sorting by individuals into neighborhoods, which allows us to argue for a causal interpretation. The empirical results in the baseline, as well as all robustness analyses, verify the main result of our theoretical model, and we employ a more general structure to further strengthen our results.

Coordination in Public Good Provision: How Individual Volunteering is Impacted by the Volunteering of Others

In this analysis, we examine the relationship between an individual’s decision to volunteer and the average level of volunteering in the community where the individual resides. Our theoretical model is based on a coordination game , in which volunteering by others is informative regarding the benefit from volunteering. We demonstrate that the interaction between this information and one’s private information makes it more likely that he or she will volunteer, given a higher level of contributions by his or her peers. We complement this theoretical work with an empirical analysis using Census 2000 Summary File 3 and Current Population Survey (CPS) 2004-2007 September supplement file data. We control for various individual and community characteristics, and employ robustness checks to verify the results of the baseline analysis. We additionally use an innovative instrumental variables strategy to account for reflection bias and endogeneity caused by selective sorting by individuals into neighbourhoods, which allows us to argue for a causal interpretation. The empirical results in the baseline, as well as all robustness analyses, verify the main result of our theoretical model, and we employ a more general structure to further strengthen our results.

Gare aux hybrides : mythes et réalités de la gouvernance de la mondialisation

Hybrid is often used as a default attribute reflecting lack of clear understanding of the influence of new patterns and actors of structural change beyond states, firms and institutions traditionally involved in regulatory practices across nations. The article argues that the notion of hybrid has a distinct relevance for engaging shortcomings of global governance literature. It explores the lessons to be drawn from ancient mythology by highlighting that ontological ambiguity and emotional ambivalence represent core features of hybrid creatures. It then builds upon critical scholarship in global political economy to conceptualise three generic levels of transfers of authority at which situating the hybrid dimension of governance in contemporary capitalism. Following this approach, the concept of hybrid explicates the ambiguity between formal and informal transfers of authority, which in turn provides an insight into the contested nature of the procedures used to reinforce this type of governance practices.