295 resultados para Legislators
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This article presents a game-theoretic partisan model of voting and political bargaining. In a two-period setup, voters ¯rst elect an executive incumbent and the legislators from a pool of candidates belonging to di®erent parties. Once elected, the executive and the legislature bargain over a budget. Party origin and a relevant parameter of the economy, the state of the world, in°uence the bargaining cost, such that political gridlocks may occur. At the end of the ¯rst period voters observe the outcome of bargaining but do not observe the true estate of the world, and decide whether or not to reelect the same parties for the Executive and the Legislature. The model con¯rms the very recent literature by showing that voters tend to have more °exible reelection criteria when they believe the true state of the world is likely to be unfavorable. On the other hand, when voters believe the true state of the world is likely to be favorable, they become more demanding in order to reelect the incumbents. In particular, there will be government shutdown with positive probability in equilibrium. Gridlocks occur due to the imperfect information of voters and they constitute indeed an information revelation mechanism that improves electoral control in the second period.
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Much research has explored the relationship between economics and elections, and scholars have begun to explore how institutions mediate that link. However, the relationship between presidential institutions and electoral accountability remains largely unexplored in comparative politics. Because voters in presidential systems can cast votes for executive and legislative elections separately, we have good reasons to suspect that the institutions of presidentialism might generate different forms or degrees of accountability than parliamentarism. Powell and Whitten (1993) suggest that the partisan or institutional “clarity of responsibility” might mediate the relationship between economics and elections: when responsibility for outcomes is clear, the relationship should be strong, and vice-versa. I develop this notion for use in presidential systems, and explore executive and legislative elections in 24 countries. The results indicate that economics always influences the incumbent vote in executive elections, regardless of the partisan or institutional clarity of responsibility. Economics also affects vote swings in legislative elections, but the institutional clarity of responsibility does mediate this relationship: legislative accountability for national economic outcomes is lowest when clarity of responsibility is highest, a situation that arises when the president is relatively more powerful and the bases for electing legislators and the president differ. By providing an empirical basis for a discussion of accountability under presidentialism, these findings contribute to important debates in comparative politics.
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Com o fortalecimento recente dos órgãos de controle, o avanço na adequação da legislação vigente no combate à corrupção e a atuação cada vez mais investigativa da mídia em casos de corrupção, o tema tem ganho destaque no cotidiano do cidadão brasileiro. Os avanços obtidos, refletem não somente a preocupação em relação aos efeitos da corrupção que incidem sobre a administração pública e sobre o cidadão, mas também com relação à legitimidade do sistema político. Apesar disso, por se tratar a corrupção, e outras transgressões às leis, de um fenômeno oculto, pouco se conhece acerca das condições de ocorrência deste mercado ilegal. O cidadão descontente reivindica das instituições sanção aos envolvidos neste mercado. A percepção da população acerca do caráter punitivo dos órgãos de controle é ainda de insuficiência. Nesse sentido, se faz necessário conhecer as configurações que desencadeiam na sanção e não sanção de parlamentares envolvidos em casos de corrupção a fim de compreender se, de fato, houve ou não leniência na condução dos processos investigativos e punitivos. Desta forma, este trabalho objetiva compreender quais fatores condicionam a ocorrência de sanção em casos de corrupção, assim como analisar as configurações que deflagram no impasse entre o agir coletivamente (protegendo o acusado e, consequentemente a rede de envolvidos) ou individualmente dos atores políticos (não protegendo o acusado e, o acusado não protegendo a rede) em diferentes casos. Os casos adotados foram: 1) do superfaturamento das obras do TRT-SP, 2) da criação e funcionamento de um mercado ilegal de jogos de azar no Estado de Goiás e, 3) da edição e não publicação de atos administrativos no Senado. Proponho uma análise qualitativa comparativa entre os casos, utilizando-me do método configuracional. Os resultados apresentados nesta pesquisa, não tem pretensão de explicar todo e qualquer caso de corrupção, mas contribuir para o debate acerca do tema.
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The present work has for object the Jury under the democratic optics, looking for to demonstrate its democratic validation. The purpose of this work was to revisit the institution, in order to bring its importance while instrument of popular participation. The work presents, first, a systematic and chronological approach of the institution of the Jury and its evolution inside of Brazilian constitutional history, objectifying, with this, to approach the narrow entailing of the Jury with the constitutional postulates. After that, the constitutional principles of the Jury had been examined, looking for to establish the popular identity of the institution and its approach with the human rights system of the Brazilian Federal Constitution. More ahead, had been examined the direct participation of the society in the Jury, going deep the questions related with the election of the jurors and the jury nullification on the American Jury. Finally, had been dedicated the study of the current conjuncture of the Brazilian Jury, its problems and the possible solutions, beyond the study of the limitation's mechanisms in the constitutional principle of the popular supremacy and the reform's projects suggested for legislators and jurists. In this way, had been looked elaborate a constitutional construction of the Jury, defending its permanence in the Brasil law system, for being a fundamental guarantee to protect the freedom, moreover for being essential to validate the Democratic State of Right, for to be the materialization of the democratic principle. For opportune, it's necessary to allege that this work had been directed to the constitutional analysis of the Jury, its legitimacy and its democratic vocation, using themselves as ideological north the American Jury System and as philosophical base the social contract theory, understanding the Jury as an instrument of protection of the society front to the state supremacy and its hierarchy structure of the power
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As a result of the prediction of irreversible changes on necessary conditions to maintain life, including human, on the planet, environmental education got the spotlight in the political scenario, due to social pressure for the development of individual and collective values, knowledge, skills, attitudes and competences towards environmental preservation. In Brazil, only in 1999 the right for environmental education was officially granted to people, having the status of essential and permanent component in the country s education. Since then, it has been Government s duty, in each federal branch, to plan actions to make it happen, in an articulate way in all levels and modalities of the education process, both formally and informally. This work of research has environmental education in the school as subject matter, and aims on analyzing social and political mediations established between this National Environmental Education policy and the contexts associated to the legislative production process, the political nature of the conceptions about environmental education that underlie Law 9.795/99 (Brazil, 2009c) and also Rio Grande do Norte Government s actions and omissions related to the imperative nature of the insertion of environmental education in the schools ran by the state, during the ten years this law has been in force. The investigation of the subject matter was led by a social and historical understanding of the social and environmental phenomena, as well as of the education system as a whole, considering that only through a dialectical view we can see the real world, by destroying the pseudo-concreteness that surrounds the topic. While analyzing, we assumed that in face of the dominance of a social organization in which market regulations rule on environmental ones, by developing individual and collective critical conscience, environmental education can become a threat to dominant economical interests in exploiting natural resources. The results of this research suggest that as an educational practice to be developed in an integrated, continuous and permanent fashion in all levels and modalities of formal education, environmental education has not yet come to pass in the state of Rio Grande do Norte, due to the neglect and disrespect of the government when facing the need of promoting the necessary and legally appointed measures to make it present in the basic education provided by the state. The legislators silence when it comes to approving a regulation on environmental education essential to define policies, rules and criteria to teaching the subject in the state and the omission from the public administration regarding critical actions in order to integrate in public schools the activities related to the National Environmental Education Policy, represent a political decision for not doing anything, despite the legal demand for an active position. This neglecting attitude for the actualizing of strategically concrete actions, urgent and properly planned for the implementation of environmental education in schools in a multidisciplinary way, exposes the lack of interest the predominant classes have in such kind of education being made available, as it could be developed based on a critic political view, becoming a political and educational action against dominance. When analyzing the basic principles and fundamental goals in Law 9.795/99 (Brazil, 2009c) the development of a critic environmental education is really possible and concurs with the National Environmental Education Policy, reflecting the social and political mediations established between this public policy and the contexts associated to its legislative production process, which are responsible for approving a regulation which also represents the mind of the people about environmental protection above anything else
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Includes bibliography
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After 20 years of reestablished democracy in Brazil, what do the state legislators think about the regime? The goal of the article is to show the views of state legislators of the Legislative Assemblies of the States of São Paulo and Paraná on democracy. For the views we use a structured and self-administered questionnaire. The results show that for the state legislators: i) democracy is stable, ii) it is superior to any other kind of regime, iii) it's support comes from some public policy and the use of voting and iv) parties and elections are important for democracy.
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Pós-graduação em Direito - FCHS
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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)
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Includes bibliography.
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Pós-graduação em Direito - FCHS
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Pós-graduação em Ciências Sociais - FFC
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OBJETIVO – O propósito de minha pesquisa é analisar os mecanismos que estruturam os governos de gabinete e as coalizões cíclicas no ultrapresidencialismo estadual do Amazonas. Em outras palavras, tenho como foco explicar a lógica do sucesso do governador, de sua coalizão legislativa e de seu gabinete na constituição de uma rede de superdominância nas arenas eleitoral, parlamentar e executiva. PERÍODO – Neste estudo de caso, analiso quatro administrações de três governadores do Amazonas: Gilberto Mestrinho (1991-1994), Amazonino Mendes (1995-1998 e 1999-2002) e Eduardo Braga (2003-2006); e quatro legislaturas da Assembleia Legislativa (ALEAM). TEORIA – Como orientação teórica, uso as contribuições da teoria da escolha pública e da análise institucional. Parto da premissa de que o governador joga tentando maximizar sua renda de utilidade dentro de uma dada estrutura institucional (permeada pela lógica do gubernatorial coattails) que incentiva a interação estratégica cooperativa e durável entre os principais jogadores (governador, deputados estaduais, secretários e cidadãos-eleitores) em múltiplas arenas decisórias. METODOLOGIA – Primeiramente, utilizo o banco de dados do Laboratório de Estudos Experimentais (LEEX) para montar um mapa da dinâmica eleitoral, partidária e parlamentar recente. Depois, trabalho com o banco de dados da Assembleia Legislativa do Amazonas para verificar a organização da produção legislativa (os projetos de lei ordinária aprovados) e a eficácia da coalizão partidário-parlamentar do governador. Finalmente, manuseio o meu próprio banco de dados sobre a rotatividade do secretariado e, por conseguinte, aplico e calculo o índice de coalescência para estimar os níveis de proporcionalidade dos governos de gabinetes ultrapresidenciais. CONCLUSÃO E RESULTADOS – Os governadores acumulam o monopólio do poder de agenda decisória do Executivo e controlam com muita eficiência a agenda do Legislativo; além do mais distribuem recursos de patronagem como incentivos seletivos para os seus aliados nos jogos em múltiplas arenas. Como consequência, cheguei à conclusão de que a formação de maiorias no contexto do ultrapresidencialismo estadual se realiza, por um lado, pelo surgimento de coalizões cíclicas de amplo apoio partidário na arena legislativa; e, por outro, pela edificação de governos de gabinete com a participação pendular de parlamentares, partidários e especialistas.
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Esse artigo analisa os esforços dos parlamentares que buscaram aprimorar as regras internas da Câmara dos Deputados após a promulgação da Constituição de 1988. Através da leitura dos documentos elaborados pelas comissões de reforma do regimento interno, pode-se observar, de um lado, que o tema da reforma das instituições configura-se como um terreno de difícil concretização das intenções dos atores proponentes de medidas de mudanças; de outro, que o uso empírico das modificações propostas pode desencadear conseqüências não-intencionadas e, não raramente, contrárias ao que fora almejado, forçando assim os atores a repensarem suas posições, resultando em maiores incertezas no processo deliberativo da Câmara.
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Pós-graduação em Direito - FCHS