Essays in mechanism design

This dissertation contains three essays on mechanism design. The common goal of these essays is to assist in the solution of different resource allocation problems where asymmetric information creates obstacles to the efficient allocation of resources. In each essay, we present a mechanism that satisfactorily solves the resource allocation problem and study some of its properties. In our first essay, ”Combinatorial Assignment under Dichotomous Preferences”, we present a class of problems akin to time scheduling without a pre-existing time grid, and propose a mechanism that is efficient, strategy-proof and envy-free. Our second essay, ”Monitoring Costs and the Management of Common-Pool Resources”, studies what can happen to an existing mechanism — the individual tradable quotas (ITQ) mechanism, also known as the cap-and-trade mechanism — when quota enforcement is imperfect and costly. Our third essay, ”Vessel Buyback”, coauthored with John O. Ledyard, presents an auction design that can be used to buy back excess capital in overcapitalized industries.

Knowledge modelling in aerospace design

This paper addresses the need for computer support in aerospace design. A review of current design methodologies and computer support tools is presented and the need for further support in aerospace design, particularly in the early formative stages of the design process, is discussed. A parameter-based model of design, founded on the assumption that a design process can be constructed from a predefined set of tasks, is proposed for aerospace design. This is supported by knowledge of possible tasks in which the confidence in key design parameters is used as a basis for identifying, or signposting, the next task. A prototype implementation of the signposting model, for use in the design of helicopter rotor blades, is described and results from trials of the tool are presented. Further areas of research are discussed