Two new game birds from Peru.

v.39:no.32(1959)

Coalition formation in a contest game with three heterogeneous players

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.

A generalized assignment game

The proposed game is a natural extension of the Shapley and Shubik Assignment Game to the case where each seller owns a set of different objets instead of only one indivisible object. We propose definitions of pairwise stability and group stability that are adapted to our framework. Existence of both pairwise and group stable outcomes is proved. We study the structure of the group stable set and we finally prove that the set of group stable payoffs forms a complete lattice with one optimal group stable payoff for each side of the market.

Does affirmative action reduce effort incentives? A contest game analysis

In this paper a contest game with heterogeneous players is analyzed in which heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination. Based on the normative perception of the heterogeneity there are two policy options to tackle this heterogeneity: either it is ignored and the contestants are treated equally, or affirmative action is implemented which compensates discriminated players. The consequences of these two policy options are analyzed for a simple two-person contest game and it is shown that the frequently criticized trade-off between affirmative action and total effort does not exist: Instead, affirmative action fosters effort incentives. A generalization to the n-person case and to a case with a partially informed contest designer yields the same result if the participation level is similar under each policy.

Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.

Towards an emotion-driven interactive music system: ridging the gaps between affect, physiology and sound generation

Report for the scientific sojourn at the Stanford University from January until June 2007. Music is well known for affecting human emotional states, yet the relationship between specific musical parameters and emotional responses is still not clear. With the advent of new human-computer interaction (HCI) technologies, it is now possible to derive emotion-related information from physiological data and use it as an input to interactive music systems. Providing such implicit musical HCI will be highly relevant for a number of applications including music therapy, diagnosis, nteractive gaming, and physiologically-based musical instruments. A key question in such physiology-based compositions is how sound synthesis parameters can be mapped to emotional states of valence and arousal. We used both verbal and heart rate responses to evaluate the affective power of five musical parameters. Our results show that a significant correlation exists between heart rate and the subjective evaluation of well-defined musical parameters. Brightness and loudness showed to be arousing parameters on subjective scale while harmonicity and even partial attenuation factor resulted in heart rate changes typically associated to valence. This demonstrates that a rational approach to designing emotion-driven music systems for our public installations and music therapy applications is possible.

Affirmative Action Policy and Effort Levels. Sequential-Move Contest Game Argument

In this paper we analyse a simple two-person sequential-move contest game with heterogeneous players. Assuming that the heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination, we study the effects of implementation of affirmative action policy, which tackles this heterogeneity by compensating discriminated players, and compare them with the situation in which the heterogeneity is ignored and the contestants are treated equally. In our analysis we consider different orders of moves. We show that the order of moves of contestants is a very important factor in determination of the effects of the implementation of the affirmative action policy. We also prove that in such cases a significant role is played by the level of the heterogeneity of individuals. In particular, in contrast to the present-in-the-literature predictions, we demonstrate that as a consequence of the interplay of these two factors, the response to the implementation of the affirmative action policy option may be the decrease in the total equilibrium effort level of the contestants in comparison to the unbiased contest game.

How private is private information? The ability to spot deception in an economic game

We provide experimental evidence on the ability to detect deceit in a buyer-seller game with asymmetric information. Sellers have private information about the buyer's valuation of a good and sometimes have incentives to mislead buyers. We examine if buyers can spot deception in face-to-face encounters. We vary (1) whether or not the buyer can interrogate the seller, and (2) the contextual richness of the situation. We find that the buyers' prediction accuracy is above chance levels, and that interrogation and contextual richness are important factors determining the accuracy. These results show that there are circumstances in which part of the information asymmetry is eliminated by people's ability to spot deception.

Disseny d'un Battle Chess 3D (2)

Aquesta memòria descriu el projecte de final de carrera anomenat "Disseny d’un Battle Chess 3D (2)", que tracta de la creació, modelat i animació de peces per a un joc d’escacs en 3 dimensions amb certes temàtiques, i que posteriorment s’integren amb el projecte "Disseny d’un Battle Chess 3D (1)" per a formar un joc interactiu d’escacs en un applet de Java. Es descriuen les eines utilitzades, les fases de creació, tècniques simbòliques, mètodes més emprats, proves sotmeses, limitacions, i finalment s’arriba una conclusió de treball aconseguit.

The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price vectors from the solutions of the dual linear program associated to the primal linear program defined to find optimal assignments. Using only linear programming tools, we also show (i) that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all optimal assignments, and vice versa; (ii) that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure; and (iii) how this structure is translated into the set of agents' utilities that are attainable at equilibrium.

On Cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria

We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Second, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.

Detection of nandrolone metabolites in urine after a football game in professional and amateur players: a Bayesian comparison.

Nandrolone (19-nortestosterone) is a widely used anabolic steroid in sports where strength plays an essential role. Once nandrolone has been metabolised, two major metabolites are excreted in urine, 19-norandrosterone (NA) and 19-noretiocholanolone (NE). In 1997, in France, quite a few sportsmen had concentrations of 19-norandrosterone very close to the IOC cut off limit (2ng/ml). At that time, a debate took place about the capability of the human male body to produce by itself these metabolites without any intake of nandrolone or related compounds. The International Football Federation (FIFA) was very concerned with this problematic, especially because the World Cup was about to start in France. In this respect, a statistical study was held with all football players from the first and second divisions of the Swiss Football National League. All players gave a urine sample after effort and around 6% of them showed traces of 19-norandrosterone. These results were compared with amateur football players (control group) and around 6% of them had very small amounts of 19-norandrosterone and/or 19-noretiocholanolone in urine after effort, whereas none of them had detectable traces of one or the other metabolite before effort. The origin of these compounds in urine after a strenuous physical activity is still unknown, but three hypotheses can be put forward. First, an endogenous production of nandrolone metabolites takes place. Second, nandrolone metabolites are released from the fatty tissues after an intake of nandrolone, some related compounds or some contaminated nutritive supplements. Finally, the sportsmen may have taken something during or just before the football game.