983 resultados para Indivisible goods
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In this paper I study optimal auctions of identical goods. There is synergy in the number of goods and independent bidder’s signals.
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Este trabalho investiga como os padrões de compras de consumidores de bens estocáveis são afetados por suas expectativas de preços. Usando um modelo dinâmico padrão de maximização da utilidade, deriva-se uma expressão analítica para as compras dos consumidores como uma função das suas expectativas em relação aos preços futuros. Em seguida, uma versão mais tratável do modelo é construída, de forma a ilustrar graficamente como os diferentes tipos de expectativas de preços implicam diferentes padrões de compras dos consumidores. Além disso, na aplicação empírica, investigo qual o modelo de expectativas de preços, entre aqueles comumente utilizados na literatura, é consistente com os dados. Por fim, encontra-se suficiente heterogeneidade em expectativa de preços dos consumidores. Mostra-se que famílias de pequeno porte acreditam que os preços seguem um processo de Markov de primeira ordem, enquanto famílias de alta renda são racionais.
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We study the impact of distortions in the investment goods sector on aggregate total factor productivity (TFP). We develop a two-sector neo-classical growth model in which TFP in the capital goods sector relative to TFP in the consumption sector is inversely related to the price of investment relative to consumption, so that we use relative prices to measure TFP in the investment goods sector. The model is calibrated to Brazil and we nd that distortions in the investment goods sector may explain most of the decline in Brazilian TFP relative to the United States since the mid-1970s.
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We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games wi.th incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991). we consider comribution and subscription games. In the former. comrioutions are :1ot rcfunded if the project is not completed. while in thp. iatter they are. For the special case whp.re provision by a single player is possible we show the existence of an equilibrium in Doth cootribution and subscription games where a player decides to provide the good by himself. For the case where is not feasible for a single player to provide the good by himself, we show that any equilibriwn of both games is inefficient. WE also provide a sufficient condition for "contributing zero" to be the unique equilibrium of the contribution garoe with n players and characterize e
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We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games with incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the tenninology of Admati and Perry (1991), we consider contribution and subscription games. In the former, contributions are not refunded ifthe project is not completed, while in the latter they are. For the special case where provision by a single player is possible we show the existence of an equihbrium in both contnbution and subscription games where a player decides to provide the good by himself. For the case where is not feasible for a single player to provide the good by himself: we show that there exist equilibria of the subscription game where each participant pays the same amount. Moreover, using the technical apparatus from Myerson (1981) we show that neither the subscription nor the contribution games admit ex-post eÁ cient equibbria. hl addition. we provide a suÁ cient condition for êontributing zero 'to be the unique equihbrium of the contnbution game with n players.
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When, in a dynamic model, choices by an agent : i) are not observed, and; ii) affect preferences conditional on the realization of types, new and unexpected features come up in Mirrlees’ (1971) optimal taxation frame- work. In the simplest possible model where a non-trivial filtration may be incorporated, we show how these two characteristics make it neces- sary for IC constraints to be defined in terms of strategies rather than pure announcements. Tax prescriptions are derived, and we are able to show that uniform taxation prescription of Atkinson and Stiglitz fails to hold, in general. Clean results regarding capital income taxation are not easy to come about because usual assumption on preferences do not allow for determining which constraints bind at the optimum. However, in the most ’natural’ cases, we show that return on capital ought to be taxed.
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This classical way to manage product development processes for massive production seems to be changing: high pressure for cost reduction, higher quality standards, markets reaching for innovation lead to the necessity of new tools for development control. Into this, and learning from the automotive and aerospace industries factories from other segments are starting to understand and apply manufacturing and assembly oriented projects to ease the task of generate goods and from this obtain at least a part of the expected results. This paper is intended to demonstrate the applicability of the concepts of Concurrent Engineering and DFM/DFA (Design for Manufacturing and Assembly) in the development of products and parts for the White Goods industry in Brazil (major appliances as refrigerators, cookers and washing machines), showing one case concerning the development and releasing of a component. Finally is demonstrated in a short term how was reached a solution that could provide cost savings and reduction on the time to delivery using those techniques.
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Includes bibliography