Effects of growth regulators on productivity of soybean (Glycine max cv. Davis) under competition

The effects of growth substances on productivity of 'Davis' soybean maintained under competition was investigated. Before the flowering, Agrostemmin (1 g/10 ml/3 1), gibberellic acid (GA) 100 ppm, and (2-chloroethyl) trimethylammonium chloride (CCC) 2,000 ppm were applied. At the flower anthesis, 2,3,5-triiodobenzoic acid (TIBA) 20 ppm was applied. Other two applications with TIBA, with intervals of four days, were realized. The growth regulators did not affect the productivity of 'Davis' soybean maintened under competition. The competition among plants did not affect the stem dry weight and number of pods, and seeds. The competition reduced weight of pods without seeds, seed weight, and weight of 100 seeds.

Vertical competition and multi-period interaction : a theoretical and behavioral analysis on the impact of strategic inventories in supply chain management

Otto-von-Guericke-Universtität Magdeburg, Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Univ., Dissertation, 2015

Effects of intraspecific competition and food deprivation on the immature phase of Ascia monuste orseis (Lepidoptera, Pieridae)

The effect of intraspecific competition for food on larvae and of food deprivation for 24 h on 2nd and 4th instars of Ascia monuste orseis (Godart, 1819) was investigated. Intraspecific competition for food during the immature phase leads to long pupation time, high larval mortality, reduced adult weight, and reduced number of eggs per female. In food deprivation experiments, the major differences in A. monuste orseis performance were long pupation time in the group that was deprived during the 2nd instar; and a negative effect on reproduction in the group that was deprived during the 4th instar, with reduced adult weight. Both food deprived periods tested are critical, and deprivation during the 2nd instar seems to have an effect as drastic as during the 4th instar because it directly affects larvae survival. Immatures can resist food deprivation for 24 h during the 2nd and 4th instars (low mortality), have a compensatory behaviour (high ingestion and biomass gain) during the 5th instar, and do not demonstrate cannibalistic behaviour during food deprivation.

Secondary sexual characters and ecological competition.

v.34:no.6(1952)

Competition and well-being

We study the effects of competition in a context in which people's actions can not be contractually fixed. We find that in such an environment the very presence of competition does neither increase efficiency nor does it yield any payoff gains for the short side of the market. We also find that competition has a strong negative impact on social well-being, the disposition towards others, and individually experienced well-being, the emotional state, of those on the long side of the market. We conjecture that this limits the possibilities of satisfactory interaction in the future and, hence, has negative implications for efficiency in the longer-run

Imperfect competition and market liquidity with a supply informed trader

We develop a model of insider trading where agents have private information either about liquidation value or about supply and behave strategically to maximize their profits. The supply informed trader plays a dual role in market making and in information revelation. This trader not only reveals a part of the information he owns, but he also induces the other traders to reveal more of their private information. The presence of different types of information decreases market liquidity and induces non-monotonicity of the market indicators with respect to the variance of liquidation value. Replacing the noise introduced by liquidity traders with a random supply also allows us to study the effect the shocks on different components of supply have on prices and quantities.

Competition with forward contracts: a laboratory analysis motivated by electricity market design

We use experiments to study the efficiency effects for a market as a whole of adding the possibility of forward contracting to a pre-existing spot market. We deal separately with the cases where spot market competition is in quantities and where it is in supply functions. In both cases we compare the effect of adding a contract market with the introduction of an additional competitor, changing the market structure from a triopoly to a quadropoly. We find that, as theory suggests, for both types of competition the introduction of a forward market significantly lowers prices. The combination of supply function competition with a forward market leads to high efficiency levels.

Spatial competition between two candidates of different quality: the effects of candidate ideology and private information

This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candidate. The candidates care about winning and also have policy preferences. There is two-dimensional private information. Candidate ideal points as well as their tradeoffs between policy preferences and winning are private information. The distribution of this two-dimensional type is common knowledge. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, with a distribution that is commonly known by both candidates. Pure strategy equilibria always exist in this model. We characterize the effects of increased uncertainty about the median voter, the effect of candidate policy preferences, and the effects of changes in the distribution of private information. We prove that the distribution of candidate policies approaches the mixed equilibrium of Aragones and Palfrey (2002a), when both candidates' weights on policy preferences go to zero.

Price competition under cost uncertainty: A laboratory analysis

We study the relation between the number of firms and price-cost margins under price competition with uncertainty about competitors' costs. We present results of an experiment in which two, three and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. In line with the theoretical prediction, market prices decrease with the number of firms, but on average stay above marginal costs. Pricing is less aggressive in duopolies than in triopolies and tetrapolies. However, independently from the number of firms, pricing is more aggressive than in the theoretical equilibrium. Both the absolute and the relative surpluses increase with the number of firms. Total surplus is close to the equilibrium level, since enhanced consumer surplus through lower prices is counteracted by occasional displacements of the most efficient firm in production.

Can competition in the credit market be excessive?

We study how market power affects investment and welfare when banks choose between restricting loan sizes and monitoring, in order to alleviate an underlying moral hazard problem. The impact of market power on aggregate welfare is the result of two countervailing effects. An increase in banks' market power results in: (i) higher lending rates, which worsens the borrower's incentive problem and reduces investment by unmonitored firms, (ii) higher monitoring effort, which reduces the proportion of credit-constrained firms. Whenever the second effect dominates, it is optimal to provide banks with some degree of market power.

On the relation between tax rates and evasion in a multi-period economy

We extend the basic tax evasion model to a multi-period economy exhibiting sustained growth. When individuals conceal part of their true income from the tax authority, they face the risk of being audited and hence of paying the corresponding fine. Both taxes and fines determine individual saving and the rate of capital accumulation. In this context we show that the sign of the relation between the level of the tax rate and the amount of evaded income is the same as that obtained in static setups. Moreover, high tax rates on income are typically associated with low growth rates as occurs in standard growth models that disregard the tax evasion phenomenon.

Settlement in tax evasion prosecution

It is often argued that even if optimal ex-post, settlement dilutes deterrence ex-ante. We analyze the interest for the tax authority of committing, ex-ante, to a settlement strategy. We show that to commit to the use of settlements is ex-ante optimal when the tax authority receives signals that provide statistical information about the taxpayers' true tax liability. The more informative the signal, the larger the additional expected evenue raised by the tax authority when using settlement as a policy tool.

The Proposals for a European tax on CO2 and their implications for intercountry distribution

This paper analyzes the advantages and implications of the implementation of a European tax on carbon dioxide emissions as an own resource of the European Union. In contrast to a harmonized tax, which would only have distributive effects within each member state, a tax collected at European scale would also have important distributive effects among different countries. These effects would also depend on the use of tax revenues. The paper investigates the distributive effects among the member states of three tax models: a pure CO2