Agency Fact Sheet, Department of Commerce: Insurance Division, FY2008

This document produced by the Iowa Department of Administrative Services has been developed to provide a multitude of information about executive branch agencies/department on a single sheet of paper. The facts provides general information, contact information, workforce data, leave and benefits information and affirmative action data.

Agency Fact Sheet, Department of Commerce: Insurance Division, FY2009

This document produced by the Iowa Department of Administrative Services has been developed to provide a multitude of information about executive branch agencies/department on a single sheet of paper. The facts provides general information, contact information, workforce data, leave and benefits information and affirmative action data.

Agency Fact Sheet, Department of Commerce: Insurance Division, FY2010

This document produced by the Iowa Department of Administrative Services has been developed to provide a multitude of information about executive branch agencies/department on a single sheet of paper. The facts provides general information, contact information, workforce data, leave and benefits information and affirmative action data.

Agency Fact Sheet, Department of Commerce: Insurance Division, FY2011

This document produced by the Iowa Department of Administrative Services has been developed to provide a multitude of information about executive branch agencies/department on a single sheet of paper. The facts provides general information, contact information, workforce data, leave and benefits information and affirmative action data.

Agency Fact Sheet, Department of Commerce: Insurance Division, FY2002

This document produced by the Iowa Department of Administrative Services has been developed to provide a multitude of information about executive branch agencies/department on a single sheet of paper. The facts provides general information, contact information, workforce data, leave and benefits information and affirmative action data.

Agency Fact Sheet, Department of Commerce: Insurance Division, FY2003

This document produced by the Iowa Department of Administrative Services has been developed to provide a multitude of information about executive branch agencies/department on a single sheet of paper. The facts provides general information, contact information, workforce data, leave and benefits information and affirmative action data.

Agency Fact Sheet, Department of Commerce: Insurance Division, FY2004

This document produced by the Iowa Department of Administrative Services has been developed to provide a multitude of information about executive branch agencies/department on a single sheet of paper. The facts provides general information, contact information, workforce data, leave and benefits information and affirmative action data.

Agency Fact Sheet, Department of Commerce: Insurance Division, FY2005

This document produced by the Iowa Department of Administrative Services has been developed to provide a multitude of information about executive branch agencies/department on a single sheet of paper. The facts provides general information, contact information, workforce data, leave and benefits information and affirmative action data.

Agency Fact Sheet, Department of Commerce: Insurance Division, FY2006

This document produced by the Iowa Department of Administrative Services has been developed to provide a multitude of information about executive branch agencies/department on a single sheet of paper. The facts provides general information, contact information, workforce data, leave and benefits information and affirmative action data.

Self-selection and risk selection on the Swiss health insurance market

Abstract This thesis presents three empirical studies in the field of health insurance in Switzerland. First we investigate the link between health insurance coverage and health care expenditures. We use claims data for over 60 000 adult individuals covered by a major Swiss Health Insurance Fund, followed for four years; the data show a strong positive correlation between coverage and expenditures. Two methods are developed and estimated in order to separate selection effects (due to individual choice of coverage) and incentive effects ("ex post moral hazard"). The first method uses the comparison between inpatient and outpatient expenditures to identify both effects and we conclude that both selection and incentive effects are significantly present in our data. The second method is based on a structural model of joint demand of health care and health insurance and makes the most of the change in the marginal cost of health care to identify selection and incentive effects. We conclude that the correlation between insurance coverage and health care expenditures may be decomposed into the two effects: 75% may be attributed to selection, and 25 % to incentive effects. Moreover, we estimate that a decrease in the coinsurance rate from 100% to 10% increases the marginal demand for health care by about 90% and from 100% to 0% by about 150%. Secondly, having shown that selection and incentive effects exist in the Swiss health insurance market, we present the consequence of this result in the context of risk adjustment. We show that if individuals choose their insurance coverage in function of their health status (selection effect), the optimal compensations should be function of the se- lection and incentive effects. Therefore, a risk adjustment mechanism which ignores these effects, as it is the case presently in Switzerland, will miss his main goal to eliminate incentives for sickness funds to select risks. Using a simplified model, we show that the optimal compensations have to take into account the distribution of risks through the insurance plans in case of self-selection in order to avoid incentives to select risks.Then, we apply our propositions to Swiss data and propose a simple econometric procedure to control for self-selection in the estimation of the risk adjustment formula in order to compute the optimal compensations.

Employment risk, unemployment insurance and search strategies: a disaggregated equilibrium approach with application to the Swiss labour market in the 1990-ies

The Organization of the Thesis The remainder of the thesis comprises five chapters and a conclusion. The next chapter formalizes the envisioned theory into a tractable model. Section 2.2 presents a formal description of the model economy: the individual heterogeneity, the individual objective, the UI setting, the population dynamics and the equilibrium. The welfare and efficiency criteria for qualifying various equilibrium outcomes are proposed in section 2.3. The fourth section shows how the model-generated information can be computed. Chapter 3 transposes the model from chapter 2 in conditions that enable its use in the analysis of individual labor market strategies and their implications for the labor market equilibrium. In section 3.2 the Swiss labor market data sets, stylized facts, and the UI system are presented. The third section outlines and motivates the parameterization method. In section 3.4 the model's replication ability is evaluated and some aspects of the parameter choice are discussed. Numerical solution issues can be found in the appendix. Chapter 4 examines the determinants of search-strategic behavior in the model economy and its implications for the labor market aggregates. In section 4.2, the unemployment duration distribution is examined and related to search strategies. Section 4.3 shows how the search- strategic behavior is influenced by the UI eligibility and section 4.4 how it is determined by individual heterogeneity. The composition effects generated by search strategies in labor market aggregates are examined in section 4.5. The last section evaluates the model's replication of empirical unemployment escape frequencies reported in Sheldon [67]. Chapter 5 applies the model economy to examine the effects on the labor market equilibrium of shocks to the labor market risk structure, to the deep underlying labor market structure and to the UI setting. Section 5.2 examines the effects of the labor market risk structure on the labor market equilibrium and the labor market strategic behavior. The effects of alterations in the labor market deep economic structural parameters, i.e. individual preferences and production technology, are shown in Section 5.3. Finally, the UI setting impacts on the labor market are studied in Section 5.4. This section also evaluates the role of the UI authority monitoring and the differences in the Way changes in the replacement rate and the UI benefit duration affect the labor market. In chapter 6 the model economy is applied in counterfactual experiments to assess several aspects of the Swiss labor market movements in the nineties. Section 6.2 examines the two equilibria characterizing the Swiss labor market in the nineties, the " growth" equilibrium with a "moderate" UI regime and the "recession" equilibrium with a more "generous" UI. Section 6.3 evaluates the isolated effects of the structural shocks, while the isolated effects of the UI reforms are analyzed in section 6.4. Particular dimensions of the UI reforms, the duration, replacement rate and the tax rate effects, are studied in section 6.5, while labor market equilibria without benefits are evaluated in section 6.6. In section 6.7 the structural and institutional interactions that may act as unemployment amplifiers are discussed in view of the obtained results. A welfare analysis based on individual welfare in different structural and UI settings is presented in the eighth section. Finally, the results are related to more favorable unemployment trends after 1997. The conclusion evaluates the features embodied in the model economy with respect to the resulting model dynamics to derive lessons from the model design." The thesis ends by proposing guidelines for future improvements of the model and directions for further research.

Insurance Fraud Alert, 2011

Do not let anyone use your personal information from your car or health insurance policy to file a fraudulent insurance claim of any kind.

Audit report on the Northeast Iowa Schools Insurance Trust for the year ended June 30, 2011

Audit report on the Northeast Iowa Schools Insurance Trust for the year ended June 30, 2011

The aggregate claims distribution of a life insurance portfolio with a pairwise positive dependence structure

The individual life model has always been considered as the one closest to the real situation of the total claims of a life insurance portfolio. It only makes the ¿nearly inevitable assumption¿ of independence of the lifelenghts of insured persons in the portfolio. Many clinical studies, however, have demonstrated positive dependence of paired lives such as husband and wife. In our opinion, it won¿t be unrealistic expecting a considerable number of married couples in any life insurance portfolio (e.g. life insurance contracts formalized at the time of signing a mortatge) and these dependences materially increase the values for the stop-loss premiums associated to the aggregate claims of the portfolio. Since the stop-loss order is the order followed by any risk averse decison maker, the simplifying hypothesis of independence constitute a real financial danger for the company, in the sense that most of their decisions are based on the aggregated claims distribution. In this paper, we will determine approximations for the distribution of the aggregate claims of a life insurance portfolio with some married couples and we will describe how to make safe decisions when we don¿t know exactly the dependence structure between the risks in each couple. Results in this paper are partly based on results in Dhaene and Goovaerts (1997)