919 resultados para FRAUDE ELECTORAL - COLOMBIA
Resumo:
3 hojas.
Resumo:
32 hojas : Cuadros.
Resumo:
3 hojas : ilustraciones.
Resumo:
48 hojas.
Resumo:
15 hojas.
Resumo:
18 hojas : ilustraciones.
Resumo:
29 hojas : ilustraciones.
Resumo:
2 hojas.
Resumo:
Compendio de fotografías que ilustran actividades de promoción social para el desarrollo de la artesanía, suscripción de convenios interinstitucionales, eventos feriales, visitas a municipios artesanales tradicionales, entrega de condecoraciones y reconocimientos a las destrezas de los artesanos, inauguración de ferias artesanales que en colaboración con funcionarios de la entidad fueron llevados a cabo por parte de los exgerentes de Artesanías de Colombia: Federico Echeberría Olarte (1968-1972), Graciela Samper de Bermúdez (1972-1984), María Cristina Palau de Angulo (1985-1990), Cecilia Duque Dique (01990-2005) y Paola Andrea Munñoz Jurado (2005-2009). (Herrera Rubio, Neve Enrique)
Resumo:
28 hojas ; ilustraciones, fotografías.
Resumo:
9 hojas : ilustraciones, fotografías
Resumo:
7 hojas : ilustraciones, fotografías
Resumo:
13 hojas : ilustraciones, fotografías
Resumo:
40 hojas : ilustraciones fotografías.
Resumo:
Protocorporatist West European countries in which economic interests were collectively organized adopted PR in the first quarter of the twentieth century, whereas liberal countries in which economic interests were not collectively organized did not. Political parties, as Marcus Kreuzer points out, choose electoral systems. So how do economic interests translate into party political incentives to adopt electoral reform? We argue that parties in protocorporatist countries were representative of and closely linked to economic interests. As electoral competition in single member districts increased sharply up to World War I, great difficulties resulted for the representative parties whose leaders were seen as interest committed. They could not credibly compete for votes outside their interest without leadership changes or reductions in interest influence. Proportional representation offered an obvious solution, allowing parties to target their own voters and their organized interest to continue effective influence in the legislature. In each respect, the opposite was true of liberal countries. Data on party preferences strongly confirm this model. (Kreuzer's historical criticisms are largely incorrect, as shown in detail in the online supplementary Appendix.). © 2010 American Political Science Association.