Umstrukturierung von kollektiven Kapitalanlagen

The issuance of the Swiss Federal Act on Collective Investment Schemes (CISA) in the year 2007 and the revision thereof in 2013 expanded the possibilities for restructuring of collective investment schemes and simplified the procedures. For instance, in article 95 the CISA contains a provision that deals in a non-conclusive way with the restructuring of open-ended collective investment schemes. As a novelty regulation, this provision allows for mergers not only of contractual funds but also of investment companies with variable capital (SICAV). Additionally, the transformation of an open-ended collective investment into another CISA legal form was also included into the catalogue of possible restructuring processes. Further, a SICAV still maintains the possibility for asset transfer according to article 69 ff. of the Federal Act on Merger, Demerger, Transformation and Transfer of Assets (MerA). However, not all open questions have been clarified. As long as the CISA does not contain restructuring provisions, as is the case with closed-ended collective investment schemes, generally the MerA and/or the Swiss Code of Obligations (CO) apply. The interplay of diverse, partly overlapping legislative bases leads to the emergence of unwanted gaps. Moreover, the partial revision of the CISA was not completely implemented at the ordinance level. Among others, the following issues have not been conclusively or clearly regulated: the permitted combinations of mergers, the merger procedure of the SICAV, the permitted restructurings, the transformation procedure as well as the application scope of the asset transfer for collective investment schemes according to the relevant merger regulations. Although these questions will be clarified in the following article through a systematic and teleological analysis of the relevant regulations, it is to be hoped that the gaps will be closed within the next CISA revision in order to guarantee comprehensive legal certainty.

Knowledge transfer in software-maintenance offshore outsourcing

Software-maintenance offshore outsourcing (SMOO) projects have been plagued by tedious knowledge transfer during the service transition to the vendor. Vendor engineers risk being over-strained by the high amounts of novel information, resulting in extra costs that may erode the business case behind offshoring. Although stakeholders may desire to avoid these extra costs by implementing appropriate knowledge transfer practices, little is known on how effective knowledge transfer can be designed and managed in light of the high cognitive loads in SMOO transitions. The dissertation at hand addresses this research gap by presenting and integrating four studies. The studies draw on cognitive load theory, attributional theory, and control theory and they apply qualitative, quantitative, and simulation methods to qualitative data from eight in-depth longitudinal cases. The results suggest that the choice of appropriate learning tasks may be more central to knowledge transfer than the amount of information shared with vendor engineers. Moreover, because vendor staff may not be able to and not dare to effectively self-manage learn-ing tasks during early transition, client-driven controls may be initially required and subsequently faded out. Collectively, the results call for people-based rather than codification-based knowledge management strategies in at least moderately specific and complex software environments.

Transformative deliberative moments among ex-combattants in Colombia

This dissertation presents the concept of Deliberative Transformative Moment and the instrument to identify it, in a further attempt to bridge the gap between deliberation theory and practice. A transformative moment in the deliberative process occurs when the level of deliberation is either lifted from low to high or drops from high to low. In order to identify such a moment, one has to look at the context and dynamics of the group discussion. This broadening of the unit of analysis is a big difference from other existing instruments to measure the level of deliberation, such as the Deliberative Quality Index –DQI, which focuses primarily on the individual speech acts. Consistent with the theoretical framework of consociational and deliberation approaches, the observed discussions took place among two deeply divided groups, Colombian ex-combatants from both the extreme left and the extreme right. Moving beyond a pure Habermasian perspective, this study finds that besides pure rational arguments, there are some contexts in which personal stories, jokes and self-interests, acting as justification of arguments, have either a positive or a negative impact on deliberative transformative moments. Although this research has a strongly qualitative orientation, reliability tests scored high, giving it strength as a reliable and valid research method that shedding some light on the sort of speech acts that enhance deliberation and those that detract from it.

Three essays on prices and selection

Competitive Market Segmentation Abstract In a two-firm model where each firm sells a high-quality and a low-quality version of a product, customers differ with respect to their brand preferences and their attitudes towards quality. We show that the standard result of quality-independent markups crucially depends on the assumption that the customers' valuation of quality is identical across firms. Once we relax this assumption, competition across qualities leads to second-degree price discrimination. We find that markups on low-quality products are higher if consuming a low-quality product involves a firm-specific disutility. Likewise, markups on high-quality products are higher if consuming a high-quality product creates a firm-specific surplus. Selection upon Wage Posting Abstract We discuss a model of a job market where firms announce salaries. Thereupon, they decide through the evaluation of a productivity test whether to hire applicants. Candidates for a job are locked in once they have applied at a given employer. Hence, such a market exhibits a specific form of the bargain-then-ripoff principle. With a single firm, the outcome is efficient. Under competition, what might be called "positive selection" leads to market failure. Thus our model provides a rationale for very small employment probabilities in some sectors. Exclusivity Clauses: Enhancing Competition, Raising Prices Abstract In a setting where retailers and suppliers compete for each other by offering binding contracts, exclusivity clauses serve as a competitive device. As a result of these clauses, firms addressed by contracts only accept the most favorable deal. Thus the contract-issuing parties have to squeeze their final customers and transfer the surplus within the vertical supply chain. We elaborate to what extent the resulting allocation depends on the sequence of play and discuss the implications of a ban on exclusivity clauses.

Essays on behavioral aspects of the design and disclosure of compensation contracts

This thesis consists of four essays on the design and disclosure of compensation contracts. Essays 1, 2 and 3 focus on behavioral aspects of mandatory compensation disclosure rules and of contract negotiations in agency relationships. The three experimental studies develop psychology- based theory and present results that deviate from standard economic predictions. Furthermore, the results of Essay 1 and 2 also have implications for firms’ discretion in how to communicate their top management’s incentives to the capital market. Essay 4 analyzes the role of fairness perceptions for the evaluation of executive compensation. For this purpose, two surveys targeting representative eligible voters as well as investment professionals were conducted. Essay 1 investigates the role of the detailed ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’, which is part of the Security and Exchange Commission’s 2006 regulation, on investors’ evaluations of executive performance. Compensation disclosure complying with this regulation clarifies the relationship between realized reported compensation and the underlying performance measures and their target achievement levels. The experimental findings suggest that the salient presentation of executives’ incentives inherent in the ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’ makes investors’ performance evaluations less outcome dependent. Therefore, investors’ judgment and investment decisions might be less affected by noisy environmental factors that drive financial performance. The results also suggest that fairness perceptions of compensation contracts are essential for investors’ performance evaluations in that more transparent disclosure increases the perceived fairness of compensation and the performance evaluation of managers who are not responsible for a bad financial performance. These results have important practical implications as firms might choose to communicate their top management’s incentive compensation more transparently in order to benefit from less volatile expectations about their future performance. Similar to the first experiment, the experiment described in Essay 2 addresses the question of more transparent compensation disclosure. However, other than the first experiment, the second experiment does not analyze the effect of a more salient presentation of contract information but the informational effect of contract information itself. For this purpose, the experiment tests two conditions in which the assessment of the compensation contracts’ incentive compatibility, which determines executive effort, is either possible or not. On the one hand, the results suggest that the quality of investors’ expectations about executive effort is improved, but on the other hand investors might over-adjust their prior expectations about executive effort if being confronted with an unexpected financial performance and under-adjust if the financial performance confirms their prior expectations. Therefore, in the experiment, more transparent compensation disclosure does not lead to more correct overall judgments of executive effort and to even lower processing quality of outcome information. These results add to the literature on disclosure which predominantly advocates more transparency. The findings of the experiment however, identify decreased information processing quality as a relevant disclosure cost category. Firms might therefore carefully evaluate the additional costs and benefits of more transparent compensation disclosure. Together with the results from the experiment in Essay 1, the two experiments on compensation disclosure imply that firms should rather focus on their discretion how to present their compensation disclosure to benefit from investors’ improved fairness perceptions and their spill-over on performance evaluation. Essay 3 studies the behavioral effects of contextual factors in recruitment processes that do not affect the employer’s or the applicant’s bargaining power from a standard economic perspective. In particular, the experiment studies two common characteristics of recruitment processes: Pre-contractual competition among job applicants and job applicants’ non-binding effort announcements as they might be made during job interviews. Despite the standard economic irrelevance of these factors, the experiment develops theory regarding the behavioral effects on employees’ subsequent effort provision and the employers’ contract design choices. The experimental findings largely support the predictions. More specifically, the results suggest that firms can benefit from increased effort and, therefore, may generate higher profits. Further, firms may seize a larger share of the employment relationship’s profit by highlighting the competitive aspects of the recruitment process and by requiring applicants to make announcements about their future effort. Finally, Essay 4 studies the role of fairness perceptions for the public evaluation of executive compensation. Although economic criteria for the design of incentive compensation generally do not make restrictive recommendations with regard to the amount of compensation, fairness perceptions might be relevant from the perspective of firms and standard setters. This is because behavioral theory has identified fairness as an important determinant of individuals’ judgment and decisions. However, although fairness concerns about executive compensation are often stated in the popular media and even in the literature, evidence on the meaning of fairness in the context of executive compensation is scarce and ambiguous. In order to inform practitioners and standard setters whether fairness concerns are exclusive to non-professionals or relevant for investment professionals as well, the two surveys presented in Essay 4 aim to find commonalities in the opinions of representative eligible voters and investments professionals. The results suggest that fairness is an important criterion for both groups. Especially, exposure to risk in the form of the variable compensation share is an important criterion shared by both groups. The higher the assumed variable share, the higher is the compensation amount to be perceived as fair. However, to a large extent, opinions on executive compensation depend on personality characteristics, and to some extent, investment professionals’ perceptions deviate systematically from those of non-professionals. The findings imply that firms might benefit from emphasizing the riskiness of their managers’ variable pay components and, therefore, the findings are also in line with those of Essay 1.

The Use of New Technology and Occupational Mobility: An Event History Analysis of the Swiss Labor Market

The investigation of the consequences of new technologies has a long standing tradition within economics. Particularly, labor economists are wondering how the introduction of new technologies, e.g. Personal Computers, have shaped labor markets. Former research has concentrated on the question of whether on-the-job use of PCs creates a wage bonus for employees. In this paper, we investigate whether the use of PCs increases employees’ probability of an upward shift in their employment status and whether it reduces the risk of involuntary labor market exits. We do so by applying event history analysis to the Swiss Labor Market Survey, a random sample of 3028 respondents, and by analyzing a Panel sub-sample of 650 respondents conducted recently in Switzerland. Our results show that on-the-job use of PCs was beneficial for employees in the past by increasing their probability of an upward shift by approximately 50%. The analysis also suggests that PC use reduces the risk and duration of unemployment. However, these latter results fail to reach statistical significance.