Notes: concerning sermons : manuscript, 1728-1730

Notes on sermons delivered by John Webb and Peter Thatcher, Congregational ministers at the New North Church in Boston.

Sermons : manuscript, 1689-1690

Contains sermons, chiefly by "Mr. Gookin," delivered 18 Aug. 1689-23 Feb. 1690, on faith, theft, adultery, obedience, and other topics. Probably by Nathaniel Gookin (1636-1692; Harvard AB 1675).

Sermons : manuscript, 1709-1722

64 sermons on verses from John, Proverbs, Revelations, Matthew, and other books of the Bible, with notation of dates and places delivered in and around Boston.

Sermons : manuscript, [16--]

Sermons concerning passages from Luke, Matthew, Ephesians, Isaiah, and other books.

Sermons : manuscript, [17--]

Sermons chiefly concern the Lord's Prayer.

Sermons : manuscript , 1689

Sermons by Cotton Mather, James Allen, Joshua Moodey, Solomon Stoddard, Samuel Willard, and others, delivered in and around Boston, 19 Sept.-15 Dec. 1689.

Sermons : manuscript, 1717-1719

Autograph manuscript, signed.

Notes: on sermons : manuscript, 1689-1692

Contains a list of ministers and the dates and topics of their sermons. The ministers are from in and around Boston.

How far do the borders of the west extend? Russian/Polish strategic conflicts in the period 1990-2010. OSW Report, 2010-03-18

From a historical perspective, the last two decades can almost be regarded as a 'golden age' of Polish-Russian relations. This is the first time in several centuries that a sovereign Poland and Russia have been able to develop mutual relations without resorting to force; moreover, they have established a bilateral legal basis and put into practice its provisions on "the inviolability of borders, territorial integrity, non-interference with internal affairs and the nations' right to self-determination. This does not change the fact that since 1990 the atmosphere between the two countries has much more often been chilly and tense. Contrary to the widely-held belief, Polish-Russian conflicts do not stem from genetic Russophobia on the part of Poland, or irrational prejudice on the part of Russia. Their substance is real and concerns strategic issues. At the deepest level, though, this is a dispute about how far the borders of the Western world extend, and about the Russian Federation's sphere of influence. However, it is not a clash between two states; moreover, Poland is certainly not the most important actor in this regard, although due to the historical context and its geographic location, it is one of the countries that lies closest to the 'line of contact', and is therefore particularly entangled in the disagreement.

Strategia unii europejskiej dla regionu dunaju. Implikacje dla Polski i Grupy Wyszehradzkiej. Prace OSW 37/2011. = European Union Strategy for the Danube region. Implications for the Polish and the Visegrad Group. OSW Study 37/2011

Strategia dunajska jest drugim po strategii bałtyckiej przykładem rosnącego znaczenia makroregionów w Unii Europejskiej. Na politykę regionalną patrzy się przy tym coraz częściej przez pryzmat realizacji nie tylko spójności wewnętrznej, ale także działań na rzecz lepszego powiązania państwa z otoczeniem zewnętrznym – zarówno unijnym, jak i pozaunijnym. Polska współtworzy strategię bałtycką, ale nie została włączona do ścisłego grona państw przygotowujących strategię dunajską. Wyzwaniem dla Grupy Wyszehradzkiej jest określenie stanowiska w sprawie roli strategii makroregionalnych w budowaniu spójności Europy Środkowej i harmonijnego rozwoju całej UE. Postulat lepszej koordynacji polityk i środków UE w celu wdrażania strategii makroregionalnych należy traktować także jako wezwanie do zacieśnienia współpracy między Polską a jej południowymi sąsiadami, bezpośrednio zaangażowanymi w realizację strategii dunajskiej.

Defying the Treaty: The Influence of the Polish and Lithuanian Council Presidencies on the Development of the Eastern Partnership. EU Diplomacy Paper No. 6, October 2014

Many scholars now argue that the Treaty of Lisbon has removed the role and influence of the rotating Council Presidency in the domain of the European Union’s foreign affairs. This paper will, however, go beyond a superficial, treaty-based analysis of the influence of the post-Lisbon rotating Council Presidency and instead look at two primary, residual, informal Presidential roles, namely agenda-shaping and brokering. It will examine the extent to which these informal roles allowed the Polish and Lithuanian Council Presidencies of July to December 2011 and 2013 respectively to influence the development of the bilateral, multilateral and internal tracks of the Eastern Partnership. The paper will argue that the considerable influence of these rotating Presidencies defied the logic of the Lisbon Treaty, suggesting that the ‘golden age’ of this six-month position, whereby individual Member States pursue foreign policy issues of significant domestic interest at the European level, has not yet passed.