Disputes over memory ownership: What memories are disputed?

The ownership of memories is sometimes disputed, particularly by twins. Examination of 77 disputed memories, 71 provided by twins, showed that most of the remembered events are negative and that the disputants appear to be self-serving. They claim for themselves memories for achievements and suffered misfortunes but are more likely to give away memories of personal wrongdoing. The research suggests that some of the memories in which we play a leading role might in fact have been the experiences of others.

Joint ownership and beneficial entitlement: Stack v Dowden.

Explores the issue of the share of beneficial entitlement to the family home where the legal title is jointly owned, but where there has not been an express declaration of a beneficial joint tenancy. Discusses the House of Lords judgment in Stack v Dowden which addressed this point. Explains how the judges moved the focus away from the court imposing its own sense of fairness on the parties or imputing an intention based on the circumstances to one where the concentration will be on the parties' relevant conduct. Outlines three other points of interest referred to in the judgment: (1) whether an indirect financial contribution could support a constructive trust; (2) whether proprietary estoppel and common intention constructive trusts should be assimilated; and (3) whether a mortgage liability is equivalent to a financial contribution.

Beneficial ownership and detriment

Considers the factors which contribute to a court finding that a cohabitee has a beneficial interest in property, in particular the detriment which is required to establish a constructive trust, with reference to the Chancery Division decision in Levi v Levi and previous case law. Outlines the provisions on express or inferred common intention. Considers whether a loan of money from the non-owning to the owning cohabitant, made at a lower level than commercial loans, towards the purchase the property was sufficient detriment to entitle her to proceeds of sale from the property.

The effect of ownership structure, country governance, and financial development on the capital structure of unlisted eastern European firms

This paper investigates the determinants of capital structure for a sample of 20,713 unlisted firms from 11 eastern European countries over the period 1994-2004. We employ usual firm-specific financial variables as well as country-specific variables that describe the degrees of governance structure and financial development of each country. Using regression analysis, our results indicate that firm ownership concentration and country governance structure are insignificant explanatory variables to the degree of leverage of the firms in our sample. On the other hand, indicators of country financial development are robust determinants of capital structure. However, the marginal explanatory power of country-specific variables is small. We conclude that firm-specific characteristics are decisive in capital structure.

Employee reward: alternatives, consequences and contexts

[Book Contents] Introducing Employee Reward Systems; Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks; The Legal, Employment Relations and Market Context; Base Pay Structures and Relationships; Pay Setting, Composition and Progression; Variable Pay Schemes; Benefits; Pensions; Non-Financial Reward; Rewarding Directors and Executives; International Reward Management; Employee Reward within HRM.

Ownership Patterns and Control in Turkish Listed Companies

The purpose of this paper is to document the prevalent ownership concentration, structure and control in the top 100 companies listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. The results are discussed in the context of emerging corporate governance trends in Turkey. Where appropriate, comparisons with other countries are provided. The results of the study indicate that ownership of Turkish companies is highly concentrated, families being the dominant shareholders. The separation of ownership and control among Turkish companies is mainly achieved through pyramidal ownership structures and the presence of big business groups. However, the cash flow and voting rights in Turkish companies are relatively more aligned compared to other family–ownership–dominated insider–system countries.