Realistic Multi-Agent Simulation of Competitive Electricity Markets

The dynamism and ongoing changes that the electricity markets sector is constantly suffering, enhanced by the huge increase in competitiveness, create the need of using simulation platforms to support operators, regulators, and the involved players in understanding and dealing with this complex environment. This paper presents an enhanced electricity market simulator, based on multi-agent technology, which provides an advanced simulation framework for the study of real electricity markets operation, and the interactions between the involved players. MASCEM (Multi-Agent Simulator of Competitive Electricity Markets) uses real data for the creation of realistic simulation scenarios, which allow the study of the impacts and implications that electricity markets transformations bring to different countries. Also, the development of an upper-ontology to support the communication between participating agents, provides the means for the integration of this simulator with other frameworks, such as MAN-REM (Multi-Agent Negotiation and Risk Management in Electricity Markets). A case study using the enhanced simulation platform that results from the integration of several systems and different tools is presented, with a scenario based on real data, simulating the MIBEL electricity market environment, and comparing the simulation performance with the real electricity market results.

Data Mining Approach to support the Generation of Realistic Scenarios for Multi-Agent simulation of Electricity Markets

This paper presents the Realistic Scenarios Generator (RealScen), a tool that processes data from real electricity markets to generate realistic scenarios that enable the modeling of electricity market players’ characteristics and strategic behavior. The proposed tool provides significant advantages to the decision making process in an electricity market environment, especially when coupled with a multi-agent electricity markets simulator. The generation of realistic scenarios is performed using mechanisms for intelligent data analysis, which are based on artificial intelligence and data mining algorithms. These techniques allow the study of realistic scenarios, adapted to the existing markets, and improve the representation of market entities as software agents, enabling a detailed modeling of their profiles and strategies. This work contributes significantly to the understanding of the interactions between the entities acting in electricity markets by increasing the capability and realism of market simulations.

Herramienta funcional para desarrollo y manejo de un modelo de gestión de inventarios

Esta tesis surge como una oportunidad de crear una herramienta de mejora en las empresas, para controlar los inventarios de la manera más adecuada. Debido a los desórdenes de los precios en el mercado, las promociones no planeadas, y la confrontación de pronósticos optimistas Vs. Pronósticos conservadores, se presenta un gran volumen de devoluciones, repercutiendo en el deterioro de la cartera y afectando directamente las metas estratégicas de las empresas. Tras esta clara oportunidad de mejora, se toma la decisión de evaluar el modelo de pronóstico que arroje los valores más acertados para la planeación de la demanda. Por otro lado, se analizo el mejor modelo de inventarios con sus respectivos indicadores de control. Dando como resultado una herramienta parametrizada en Excel, que arroja datos de pronósticos de ventas más acertados y optimiza la gestión de los inventarios. Esta herramienta contiene un modelo de gestión de inventarios de revisión continua, lo cual brinda información más acertada de la demanda que enfrenta la compañía, las ventas que puede generar, y los procesos que necesita planear para respaldar su actividad.

‘Nudging’ energy users: regulatory measures to address the risk of aggregate peak demand in European electricity markets

For decades regulators in the energy sector have focused on facilitating the maximisation of energy supply in order to meet demand through liberalisation and removal of market barriers. The debate on climate change has emphasised a new type of risk in the balance between energy demand and supply: excessively high energy demand brings about significantly negative environmental and economic impacts. This is because if a vast number of users is consuming electricity at the same time, energy suppliers have to activate dirty old power plants with higher greenhouse gas emissions and higher system costs. The creation of a Europe-wide electricity market requires a systematic investigation into the risk of aggregate peak demand. This paper draws on the e-Living Time-Use Survey database to assess the risk of aggregate peak residential electricity demand for European energy markets. Findings highlight in which countries and for what activities the risk of aggregate peak demand is greater. The discussion highlights which approaches energy regulators have started considering to convince users about the risks of consuming too much energy during peak times. These include ‘nudging’ approaches such as the roll-out of smart meters, incentives for shifting the timing of energy consumption, differentiated time-of-use tariffs, regulatory financial incentives and consumption data sharing at the community level.

CASCADE: An Agent Based Framework For Modeling The Dynamics Of Smart Electricity Systems

The Complex Adaptive Systems, Cognitive Agents and Distributed Energy (CASCADE) project is developing a framework based on Agent Based Modelling (ABM). The CASCADE Framework can be used both to gain policy and industry relevant insights into the smart grid concept itself and as a platform to design and test distributed ICT solutions for smart grid based business entities. ABM is used to capture the behaviors of diff erent social, economic and technical actors, which may be defi ned at various levels of abstraction. It is applied to understanding their interactions and can be adapted to include learning processes and emergent patterns. CASCADE models ‘prosumer’ agents (i.e., producers and/or consumers of energy) and ‘aggregator’ agents (e.g., traders of energy in both wholesale and retail markets) at various scales, from large generators and Energy Service Companies down to individual people and devices. The CASCADE Framework is formed of three main subdivisions that link models of electricity supply and demand, the electricity market and power fl ow. It can also model the variability of renewable energy generation caused by the weather, which is an important issue for grid balancing and the profi tability of energy suppliers. The development of CASCADE has already yielded some interesting early fi ndings, demonstrating that it is possible for a mediating agent (aggregator) to achieve stable demandfl attening across groups of domestic households fi tted with smart energy control and communication devices, where direct wholesale price signals had previously been found to produce characteristic complex system instability. In another example, it has demonstrated how large changes in supply mix can be caused even by small changes in demand profi le. Ongoing and planned refi nements to the Framework will support investigation of demand response at various scales, the integration of the power sector with transport and heat sectors, novel technology adoption and diffusion work, evolution of new smart grid business models, and complex power grid engineering and market interactions.

Market coupling in the power markets

The thesis analyses the European Unions’ effort to create an integrated pan-European electricity market based on “market coupling” as the proposed allocation mechanism for interconnector transfer capacity. Thus, the thesis’ main focus is if market coupling leads to a price convergence in interlinked markets and how it affects the behavior of electricity price data. The applied research methods are a qualitative, structured literature review and a quantitative analysis of electricity price data. The quantitative analysis relies on descriptive statistics of absolute price differentials and on a Cointegration analysis according to Engle & Granger (1987)’s two step approach. Main findings are that implicit auction mechanisms such as market coupling are more efficient than explicit auctions. Especially the method of price coupling leads to a price convergence in involved markets, to social welfare gains and reduces market power of producers, as shown on the example of the TLC market coupling. The market coupling initiative between Germany and Denmark, on the other hand, is evaluated as less successful and illustrates the complexity and difficulties of implementing market coupling initiatives. The cointegration analysis shows that the time series were already before the coupling date cointegrated, but the statistical significance increased. The thesis suggests that market coupling leads to a price convergence of involved markets and thus functions as method to create a single, integrated European electricity market.

Why designate market makers? affirmative obligations and market quality

We study why most financiaI markets designate one or more agents who precommit to provide more liquidity than they would endogenously choose, and identify two reasons that such affirmative obligations can improve welfare. The first relies on the insight that the informational component of the competi tive bid-ask spread represents a transfer across traders, not a social cost to completing trades. As such, this trading cost dissuades efficient trading, while a restriction on spread widths encourages efficient trading. Secondly, a restriction on spread widths encourages traders to become informed, which speeds the rate at which market prices move toward true asset values in the wake of information events. We consider the setting where competition ensures that affirmative obligations impose net trading losses on designated market makers that must be compensated by side payments, as observed on the Euronext limit order market, and also the setting where the designated market maker is allowed some advantages relative to limit order traders so that profits can be eamed during tranquil periods to offset losses incurred when affirmative obligations are binding, as observed on the NYSE.

A Bilevel Approach to Transmission Expansion Planning Within a Market Environment

We present a bilevel model for transmission expansion planning within a market environment, where producers and consumers trade freely electric energy through a pool. The target of the transmission planner, modeled through the upper-level problem, is to minimize network investment cost while facilitating energy trading. This upper-level problem is constrained by a collection of lower-level market clearing problems representing pool trading, and whose individual objective functions correspond to social welfare. Using the duality theory the proposed bilevel model is recast as a mixed-integer linear programming problem, which is solvable using branch-and-cut solvers. Detailed results from an illustrative example and a case study are presented and discussed. Finally, some relevant conclusions are drawn.

Public-private partnerships in renewable energy in Latin America and the Caribbean

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Market-driven security-constrained transmission network expansion planning

This paper presents a Bi-level Programming (BP) approach to solve the Transmission Network Expansion Planning (TNEP) problem. The proposed model is envisaged under a market environment and considers security constraints. The upper-level of the BP problem corresponds to the transmission planner which procures the minimization of the total investment and load shedding cost. This upper-level problem is constrained by a single lower-level optimization problem which models a market clearing mechanism that includes security constraints. Results on the Garver's 6-bus and IEEE 24-bus RTS test systems are presented and discussed. Finally, some conclusions are drawn. © 2011 IEEE.

Istmo Centroamericano: la regulación de la distribución de energía eléctrica en los países con empresas privadas. Los casos de El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua y Panamá

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Istmo Centroamericano: estadísticas del subsector eléctrico (datos actualizados a 2001)

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Committed to reform? Pragmatic antitrust enforcement in electricity markets

This thesis is a collection of essays about the instrumental use of commitment decisions to facilitate the completion of the European internal electricity market. European policy can shape markets in many ways, two most evident being regulation and competition enforcement. The interplay between these two instruments attracts a lot of scholarly attention. One of the major concerns in the competition vs. regulation debate is the instrumental use of competition rules. It has been observed that competition enforcement is triggered not only as a response to an anticompetitive harm occurring in the market, but that it sometimes becomes a powerful tool in the European Commission’s hands to pursue regulatory goals. This thesis looks for examples of such instrumentalisation in the context of electricity markets and finds that the Commission is very pragmatic in using all the possible instruments it has at hand to push forward its project of creating the internal electricity market. This includes regulation, competition enforcement and all sorts of political pressure. To the extent that commitment decisions accelerate sector-specific regulation and overcome political deadlocks, they contribute to the Commission’s energy policy goals. However, instrumentalisation of competition rules comes at a certain cost to competition policy, energy policy and, most importantly, to electricity markets themselves. Markets might be negatively affected either indirectly, by application of sector-specific regulation or competition policy building on previous commitment decisions, or directly, through the implementation of inadequate commitments in individual cases. Concluding, commitment decisions generally contributed to achieving the policy objectives of the internal electricity market, but their use for that purpose does not come without cost. Given that this cost is ultimately borne by the internal electricity market, the Commission should take a more balanced approach to the instrumental use of commitment decisions so that it does not do more harm than good.

Quantifying and modeling financial market fluctuations

Die Entstehung eines Marktpreises für einen Vermögenswert kann als Superposition der einzelnen Aktionen der Marktteilnehmer aufgefasst werden, die damit kumulativ Angebot und Nachfrage erzeugen. Dies ist in der statistischen Physik mit der Entstehung makroskopischer Eigenschaften vergleichbar, die von mikroskopischen Wechselwirkungen zwischen den beteiligten Systemkomponenten hervorgerufen werden. Die Verteilung der Preisänderungen an Finanzmärkten unterscheidet sich deutlich von einer Gaußverteilung. Dies führt zu empirischen Besonderheiten des Preisprozesses, zu denen neben dem Skalierungsverhalten nicht-triviale Korrelationsfunktionen und zeitlich gehäufte Volatilität zählen. In der vorliegenden Arbeit liegt der Fokus auf der Analyse von Finanzmarktzeitreihen und den darin enthaltenen Korrelationen. Es wird ein neues Verfahren zur Quantifizierung von Muster-basierten komplexen Korrelationen einer Zeitreihe entwickelt. Mit dieser Methodik werden signifikante Anzeichen dafür gefunden, dass sich typische Verhaltensmuster von Finanzmarktteilnehmern auf kurzen Zeitskalen manifestieren, dass also die Reaktion auf einen gegebenen Preisverlauf nicht rein zufällig ist, sondern vielmehr ähnliche Preisverläufe auch ähnliche Reaktionen hervorrufen. Ausgehend von der Untersuchung der komplexen Korrelationen in Finanzmarktzeitreihen wird die Frage behandelt, welche Eigenschaften sich beim Wechsel von einem positiven Trend zu einem negativen Trend verändern. Eine empirische Quantifizierung mittels Reskalierung liefert das Resultat, dass unabhängig von der betrachteten Zeitskala neue Preisextrema mit einem Anstieg des Transaktionsvolumens und einer Reduktion der Zeitintervalle zwischen Transaktionen einhergehen. Diese Abhängigkeiten weisen Charakteristika auf, die man auch in anderen komplexen Systemen in der Natur und speziell in physikalischen Systemen vorfindet. Über 9 Größenordnungen in der Zeit sind diese Eigenschaften auch unabhängig vom analysierten Markt - Trends, die nur für Sekunden bestehen, zeigen die gleiche Charakteristik wie Trends auf Zeitskalen von Monaten. Dies eröffnet die Möglichkeit, mehr über Finanzmarktblasen und deren Zusammenbrüche zu lernen, da Trends auf kleinen Zeitskalen viel häufiger auftreten. Zusätzlich wird eine Monte Carlo-basierte Simulation des Finanzmarktes analysiert und erweitert, um die empirischen Eigenschaften zu reproduzieren und Einblicke in deren Ursachen zu erhalten, die zum einen in der Finanzmarktmikrostruktur und andererseits in der Risikoaversion der Handelsteilnehmer zu suchen sind. Für die rechenzeitintensiven Verfahren kann mittels Parallelisierung auf einer Graphikkartenarchitektur eine deutliche Rechenzeitreduktion erreicht werden. Um das weite Spektrum an Einsatzbereichen von Graphikkarten zu aufzuzeigen, wird auch ein Standardmodell der statistischen Physik - das Ising-Modell - auf die Graphikkarte mit signifikanten Laufzeitvorteilen portiert. Teilresultate der Arbeit sind publiziert in [PGPS07, PPS08, Pre11, PVPS09b, PVPS09a, PS09, PS10a, SBF+10, BVP10, Pre10, PS10b, PSS10, SBF+11, PB10].

Designing Electricity Auctions in the Presence of Transmission Constraints

This paper analyzes the effect that different designs in the access to fnancial transmission rights has on spot electricity auctions. In particular, I characterize the equilibrium in the spot electricity market when financial transmission rights are assigned to the grid operator and when financial transmission rights are assigned to the firm that submits the lowest bid in the spot electricity auction. When financial transmission rights are assigned to the grid operator, my model, in contrast with the models available in the literature, works out the equilibrium for any transmission capacity. Moreover, I have found that an increase in transmission capacity not only increases competition between markets but also within a single market. When financial transmission rights are assigned to the firm that submits the lowest bid in the spot electricity auction, firms compete not only for electricity demand, but also for transmission rights and the arbitrage profits derived from its hold. I have found that introduce competition for transmission rights reduces competition in spot electricity auctions.