Despacho ótimo de potências ativa e reativa de sistema elétricos multi-áreas considerando restrições físicas, econômicas e ambientais =: Envronmentally constrained active-reactive optimal power flow-a compromising strategy for economic-emission dispatch and a multi-area paradigm

Pós-graduação em Engenharia Elétrica - FEIS

U.S. utilities' experiences with the implementation of energy efficiency programs

In the U.S., many electric utility companies are offering demand-side management (DSM) programs to their customers as ways to save money and energy. However, it is challenging to compare these programs between utility companies throughout the U.S. because of the variability of state energy policies. For example, some states in the U.S. have deregulated electricity markets and others do not. In addition, utility companies within a state differ depending on ownership and size. This study examines 12 utilities’ experiences with DSM programs and compares the programs’ annual energy savings results that the selected utilities reported to the Energy Information Administration (EIA). The 2009 EIA data suggests that DSM program effectiveness is not significantly affected by electricity market deregulation or utility ownership. However, DSM programs seem to generally be more effective when administered by utilities located in states with energy savings requirements and DSM program mandates.

Propuestas regulatorias para el diseño de un mercado ibérico a plazo eficiente de la energía = Regulatory proposals for the development of an efficient iberian energy forward market

El mercado ibérico de futuros de energía eléctrica gestionado por OMIP (“Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia, Pólo Português”, con sede en Lisboa), también conocido como el mercado ibérico de derivados de energía, comenzó a funcionar el 3 de julio de 2006. Se analiza la eficiencia de este mercado organizado, por lo que se estudia la precisión con la que sus precios de futuros predicen el precio de contado. En dicho mercado coexisten dos modos de negociación: el mercado continuo (modo por defecto) y la contratación mediante subasta. En la negociación en continuo, las órdenes anónimas de compra y de venta interactúan de manera inmediata e individual con órdenes contrarias, dando lugar a operaciones con un número indeterminado de precios para cada contrato. En la negociación a través de subasta, un precio único de equilibrio maximiza el volumen negociado, liquidándose todas las operaciones a ese precio. Adicionalmente, los miembros negociadores de OMIP pueden liquidar operaciones “Over-The-Counter” (OTC) a través de la cámara de compensación de OMIP (OMIClear). Las cinco mayores empresas españolas de distribución de energía eléctrica tenían la obligación de comprar electricidad hasta julio de 2009 en subastas en OMIP, para cubrir parte de sus suministros regulados. De igual manera, el suministrador de último recurso portugués mantuvo tal obligación hasta julio de 2010. Los precios de equilibrio de esas subastas no han resultado óptimos a efectos retributivos de tales suministros regulados dado que dichos precios tienden a situarse ligeramente sesgados al alza. La prima de riesgo ex-post, definida como la diferencia entre los precios a plazo y de contado en el periodo de entrega, se emplea para medir su eficiencia de precio. El mercado de contado, gestionado por OMIE (“Operador de Mercado Ibérico de la Energía”, conocido tradicionalmente como “OMEL”), tiene su sede en Madrid. Durante los dos primeros años del mercado de futuros, la prima de riesgo media tiende a resultar positiva, al igual que en otros mercados europeos de energía eléctrica y gas natural. En ese periodo, la prima de riesgo ex-post tiende a ser negativa en los mercados de petróleo y carbón. Los mercados de energía tienden a mostrar niveles limitados de eficiencia de mercado. La eficiencia de precio del mercado de futuros aumenta con el desarrollo de otros mecanismos coexistentes dentro del mercado ibérico de electricidad (conocido como “MIBEL”) –es decir, el mercado dominante OTC, las subastas de centrales virtuales de generación conocidas en España como Emisiones Primarias de Energía, y las subastas para cubrir parte de los suministros de último recurso conocidas en España como subastas CESUR– y con una mayor integración de los mercados regionales europeos de energía eléctrica. Se construye un modelo de regresión para analizar la evolución de los volúmenes negociados en el mercado continuo durante sus cuatro primeros años como una función de doce indicadores potenciales de liquidez. Los únicos indicadores significativos son los volúmenes negociados en las subastas obligatorias gestionadas por OMIP, los volúmenes negociados en el mercado OTC y los volúmenes OTC compensados por OMIClear. El número de creadores de mercado, la incorporación de agentes financieros y compañías de generación pertenecientes a grupos integrados con suministradores de último recurso, y los volúmenes OTC compensados por OMIClear muestran una fuerte correlación con los volúmenes negociados en el mercado continuo. La liquidez de OMIP está aún lejos de los niveles alcanzados por los mercados europeos más maduros (localizados en los países nórdicos (Nasdaq OMX Commodities) y Alemania (EEX)). El operador de mercado y su cámara de compensación podrían desarrollar acciones eficientes de marketing para atraer nuevos agentes activos en el mercado de contado (p.ej. industrias consumidoras intensivas de energía, suministradores, pequeños productores, compañías energéticas internacionales y empresas de energías renovables) y agentes financieros, captar volúmenes del opaco OTC, y mejorar el funcionamiento de los productos existentes aún no líquidos. Resultaría de gran utilidad para tales acciones un diálogo activo con todos los agentes (participantes en el mercado, operador de mercado de contado, y autoridades supervisoras). Durante sus primeros cinco años y medio, el mercado continuo presenta un crecimento de liquidez estable. Se mide el desempeño de sus funciones de cobertura mediante la ratio de posición neta obtenida al dividir la posición abierta final de un contrato de derivados mensual entre su volumen acumulado en la cámara de compensación. Los futuros carga base muestran la ratio más baja debido a su buena liquidez. Los futuros carga punta muestran una mayor ratio al producirse su menor liquidez a través de contadas subastas fijadas por regulación portuguesa. Las permutas carga base liquidadas en la cámara de compensación ubicada en Madrid –MEFF Power, activa desde el 21 de marzo de 2011– muestran inicialmente valores altos debido a bajos volúmenes registrados, dado que esta cámara se emplea principalmente para vencimientos pequeños (diario y semanal). Dicha ratio puede ser una poderosa herramienta de supervisión para los reguladores energéticos cuando accedan a todas las transacciones de derivados en virtud del Reglamento Europeo sobre Integridad y Transparencia de los Mercados de Energía (“REMIT”), en vigor desde el 28 de diciembre de 2011. La prima de riesgo ex-post tiende a ser positiva en todos los mecanismos (futuros en OMIP, mercado OTC y subastas CESUR) y disminuye debido a la curvas de aprendizaje y al efecto, desde el año 2011, del precio fijo para la retribución de la generación con carbón autóctono. Se realiza una comparativa con los costes a plazo de generación con gas natural (diferencial “clean spark spread”) obtenido como la diferencia entre el precio del futuro eléctrico y el coste a plazo de generación con ciclo combinado internalizando los costes de emisión de CO2. Los futuros eléctricos tienen una elevada correlación con los precios de gas europeos. Los diferenciales de contratos con vencimiento inmediato tienden a ser positivos. Los mayores diferenciales se dan para los contratos mensuales, seguidos de los trimestrales y anuales. Los generadores eléctricos con gas pueden maximizar beneficios con contratos de menor vencimiento. Los informes de monitorización por el operador de mercado que proporcionan transparencia post-operacional, el acceso a datos OTC por el regulador energético, y la valoración del riesgo regulatorio pueden contribuir a ganancias de eficiencia. Estas recomendaciones son también válidas para un potencial mercado ibérico de futuros de gas, una vez que el hub ibérico de gas –actualmente en fase de diseño, con reuniones mensuales de los agentes desde enero de 2013 en el grupo de trabajo liderado por el regulador energético español– esté operativo. El hub ibérico de gas proporcionará transparencia al atraer más agentes y mejorar la competencia, incrementando su eficiencia, dado que en el mercado OTC actual no se revela precio alguno de gas. ABSTRACT The Iberian Power Futures Market, managed by OMIP (“Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia, Pólo Português”, located in Lisbon), also known as the Iberian Energy Derivatives Market, started operations on 3 July 2006. The market efficiency, regarding how well the future price predicts the spot price, is analysed for this energy derivatives exchange. There are two trading modes coexisting within OMIP: the continuous market (default mode) and the call auction. In the continuous trading, anonymous buy and sell orders interact immediately and individually with opposite side orders, generating trades with an undetermined number of prices for each contract. In the call auction trading, a single price auction maximizes the traded volume, being all trades settled at the same price (equilibrium price). Additionally, OMIP trading members may settle Over-the-Counter (OTC) trades through OMIP clearing house (OMIClear). The five largest Spanish distribution companies have been obliged to purchase in auctions managed by OMIP until July 2009, in order to partly cover their portfolios of end users’ regulated supplies. Likewise, the Portuguese last resort supplier kept that obligation until July 2010. The auction equilibrium prices are not optimal for remuneration purposes of regulated supplies as such prices seem to be slightly upward biased. The ex-post forward risk premium, defined as the difference between the forward and spot prices in the delivery period, is used to measure its price efficiency. The spot market, managed by OMIE (Market Operator of the Iberian Energy Market, Spanish Pool, known traditionally as “OMEL”), is located in Madrid. During the first two years of the futures market, the average forward risk premium tends to be positive, as it occurs with other European power and natural gas markets. In that period, the ex-post forward risk premium tends to be negative in oil and coal markets. Energy markets tend to show limited levels of market efficiency. The price efficiency of the Iberian Power Futures Market improves with the market development of all the coexistent forward contracting mechanisms within the Iberian Electricity Market (known as “MIBEL”) – namely, the dominant OTC market, the Virtual Power Plant Auctions known in Spain as Energy Primary Emissions, and the auctions catering for part of the last resort supplies known in Spain as CESUR auctions – and with further integration of European Regional Electricity Markets. A regression model tracking the evolution of the traded volumes in the continuous market during its first four years is built as a function of twelve potential liquidity drivers. The only significant drivers are the traded volumes in OMIP compulsory auctions, the traded volumes in the OTC market, and the OTC cleared volumes by OMIClear. The amount of market makers, the enrolment of financial members and generation companies belonging to the integrated group of last resort suppliers, and the OTC cleared volume by OMIClear show strong correlation with the traded volumes in the continuous market. OMIP liquidity is still far from the levels reached by the most mature European markets (located in the Nordic countries (Nasdaq OMX Commodities) and Germany (EEX)). The market operator and its clearing house could develop efficient marketing actions to attract new entrants active in the spot market (e.g. energy intensive industries, suppliers, small producers, international energy companies and renewable generation companies) and financial agents as well as volumes from the opaque OTC market, and to improve the performance of existing illiquid products. An active dialogue with all the stakeholders (market participants, spot market operator, and supervisory authorities) will help to implement such actions. During its firs five and a half years, the continuous market shows steady liquidity growth. The hedging performance is measured through a net position ratio obtained from the final open interest of a month derivatives contract divided by its accumulated cleared volume. The base load futures in the Iberian energy derivatives exchange show the lowest ratios due to good liquidity. The peak futures show bigger ratios as their reduced liquidity is produced by auctions fixed by Portuguese regulation. The base load swaps settled in the clearing house located in Spain – MEFF Power, operating since 21 March 2011, with a new denomination (BME Clearing) since 9 September 2013 – show initially large values due to low registered volumes, as this clearing house is mainly used for short maturity (daily and weekly swaps). The net position ratio can be a powerful oversight tool for energy regulators when accessing to all the derivatives transactions as envisaged by European regulation on Energy Market Integrity and Transparency (“REMIT”), in force since 28 December 2011. The ex-post forward risk premium tends to be positive in all existing mechanisms (OMIP futures, OTC market and CESUR auctions) and diminishes due to the learning curve and the effect – since year 2011 – of the fixed price retributing the indigenous coal fired generation. Comparison with the forward generation costs from natural gas (“clean spark spread”) – obtained as the difference between the power futures price and the forward generation cost with a gas fired combined cycle plant taking into account the CO2 emission rates – is also performed. The power futures are strongly correlated with European gas prices. The clean spark spreads built with prompt contracts tend to be positive. The biggest clean spark spreads are for the month contract, followed by the quarter contract and then by the year contract. Therefore, gas fired generation companies can maximize profits trading with contracts of shorter maturity. Market monitoring reports by the market operator providing post-trade transparency, OTC data access by the energy regulator, and assessment of the regulatory risk can contribute to efficiency gains. The same recommendations are also valid for a potential Iberian gas futures market, once an Iberian gas hub – currently in a design phase, with monthly meetings amongst the stakeholders in a Working Group led by the Spanish energy regulatory authority since January 2013 – is operating. The Iberian gas hub would bring transparency attracting more shippers and improving competition and thus its efficiency, as no gas price is currently disclosed in the existing OTC market.

Bulgarian-Russian games in the energy sector: an outcome is getting closer. OSW Commentary No. 61, 2011-10-5

Bulgaria and Russia are entering the final phase of setting the conditions of their co-operation in the energy sector. A new gas contract is being negotiated because the currently applicable agreements will have expired by the end of 2012. The fate of two major energy projects – whose implementation depends on good co-operation between Sofia and Moscow: the Burgas– –Alexandroupolis oil pipeline and the construction of a Bulgarian nuclear power plant in Belene with Russian participation – is currently being decided. Another issue ever-present on the agenda is the future of the South Stream gas pipeline promoted by Russia, which is to run through Bulgarian territory. The outcome of all the aforementioned discussions and negotiations will determine for years the model of Bulgarian-Russian relations and may strongly affect the shape of the oil, gas and electricity markets in South-Eastern Europe.

The rise of capacity mechanisms: are they inevitable in the European Union? Egmont Paper 80, September 2015

These last years, in multiple Member States, the electricity markets have seen the rapid emergence of Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms (CRMs). They are meant to guarantee the stability of the electricity system in a more uncertain context. The reactions of the European Commission were late towards them. It is thus essential to bring some clarity here, otherwise the legal uncertainty could become a new impediment for investment.

The EU power sector needs long-term price signals. CEPS Special Report No. 135/April 2016

By 2030, half of the EU’s electricity demand will be covered by renewables and will need to be accompanied by flexible conventional back-up resources. Due to the high upfront costs inherent to renewables and the progressively lower running times associated with back-up capacity, the cost of capital will have a proportionately greater impact on total costs than today. This report examines how electricity markets can be designed to provide long-term price signals, thereby reducing the cost of capital for these technologies and allowing for a more efficient transition. It finds that current market arrangements are unable to provide long-term price signals. To address this issue, we argue that a system for long-term contracts with a regulated counterparty could be implemented. A centralised system where capacity or energy or a combination of both is contracted, could be introduced for conventional and renewable capacity, based on a regional adequacy assessment and with a competitive bidding system in place to ensure cost-effectiveness. Member states face a number of legislative barriers while implementing these types of systems, however, which could be reduced by merging legislation and setting EU framework rules for the design of these contractual agreements.

Assessment of competition in the Illinois electric industry in 2002.

A report by the Illinois Commerce Commission required by Section 16-120(b) of the Electric Service Customer Choice and Rate Relief Law of 1997 which directs the Commission to monitor and analyze the state of competition in Illinois electricity markets.

Energy systems analysis of transboundary river basins in a nexus approach: the Sava river basin study case

Resource management policies are frequently designed and planned to target specific needs of particular sectors, without taking into account the interests of other sectors who share the same resources. In a climate of resource depletion, population growth, increase in energy demand and climate change awareness, it is of great importance to promote the assessment of intersectoral linkages and, by doing so, understand their effects and implications. This need is further augmented when common use of resources might not be solely relevant at national level, but also when the distribution of resources ranges over different nations. This dissertation focuses on the study of the energy systems of five south eastern European countries, which share the Sava River Basin, using a water-food(agriculture)-energy nexus approach. In the case of the electricity generation sector, the use of water is essential for the integrity of the energy systems, as the electricity production in the riparian countries relies on two major technologies dependent on water resources: hydro and thermal power plants. For example, in 2012, an average of 37% of the electricity production in the SRB countries was generated by hydropower and 61% in thermal power plants. Focusing on the SRB, in terms of existing installed capacities, the basin accommodates close to a tenth of all hydropower capacity while providing water for cooling to 42% of the net capacity of thermal power currently in operation in the basin. This energy-oriented nexus study explores the dependency on the basin’s water resources of the energy systems in the region for the period between 2015 and 2030. To do so, a multi-country electricity model was developed to provide a quantification ground to the analysis, using the open-source software modelling tool OSeMOSYS. Three main areas are subject to analysis: first, the impact of energy efficiency and renewable energy strategies in the electricity generation mix; secondly, the potential impacts of climate change under a moderate climate change projection scenario; and finally, deriving from the latter point, the cumulative impact of an increase in water demand in the agriculture sector, for irrigation. Additionally, electricity trade dynamics are compared across the different scenarios under scrutiny, as an effort to investigate the implications of the aforementioned factors in the electricity markets in the region.

Minimizar o sobrecusto da redução da capacidade de interligação com recurso ao counter-trading

Dissertação para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Engenharia Electrotécnica Ramo de energia

Propuesta metodológica para la renovación de los sistemas y procesos de administración de los mercados eléctricos: el caso colombiano

El mercado eléctrico ha evolucionado en Colombia desde 1995, fortaleciéndose institucionalmente, dinamizando su desarrollo, y enfrentando grandes desafíos. Los sistemas de administración, que soportan el funcionamiento del mercado, han evolucionado a la par, aunque algunos se encuentran aislados entre sí o han sido desarrollados en plataformas diferentes, lo que dificulta la sostenibilidad y el mantenimiento, y reducen la facilidad de incorporar cambios. Al referenciarse con otros mercados en el mundo, se observa gran dinámica en la incorporación de tecnologías en información y comunicaciones, avances regulatorios o requerimientos de clientes. Se requiere una renovación tecnológica que conserve el conocimiento adquirido, y permita incorporar fácilmente las tendencias del mercado. Este artículo presenta los resultados de la propuesta metodológica para la renovación tecnológica enmarcada en el proyecto Colciencias CNBT 833559938649 de investigación tecnológica, Sistema para la administración del mercado de energía eléctrica en Colombia, Fase I.

Metodologia de otimização estocástica para coordenação eólico-fotovoltaica

Esta dissertação incide sobre o tema da coordenação entre sistemas eólicos e fotovoltaicos que participam no mercado de eletricidade. A incerteza da potência eólica e fotovoltaica é uma caraterística predominante nesta coordenação, devendo ser considerada no planeamento ótimo de sistemas eólico-fotovoltaicos. A fim de modelizar a incerteza é apresentada uma metodologia de otimização estocástica baseada em programação linear para maximizar o lucro esperado de uma empresa produtora de energia elétrica que participa no mercado diário. A coordenação entre sistemas eólicos e fotovoltaicos visa mitigar os desequilíbrios de energia, resultantes das ofertas horárias submetidas no mercado diário e, consequentemente, reduzir as penalizações financeiras. Os resultados da coordenação entre um sistema eólico e um sistema fotovoltaico são comparados com os resultados obtidos para a operação não coordenada. Estes resultados permitem concluir que a metodologia desenvolvida aplicada à coordenação apresenta um lucro esperado superior ao lucro obtido para a operação não coordenada; Abstract Stochastic Optimization Methodology for Wind-Photovoltaic Coordination This dissertation focuses on the issue of coordination between wind and photovoltaic systems participating in electricity markets. The uncertainty of wind and photovoltaic power is a main characteristic of these systems, which must be included in the optimal scheduling of the coordination of wind with photovoltaic systems. In order to model the uncertainty is presented a stochastic approach based on linear programming to maximize the profit of a wind photovoltaic power producer which participates in electricity markets. The coordination of wind with photovoltaic systems aims to mitigate the energy deviations, as a result of the participation in day-ahead market and therefore reducing economic penalties. The results obtained by the coordination are compared to results obtained by the separated operation of wind and photovoltaic systems. The results allow concluding that the proposed approach applied to the coordination presents an expected profit higher than the expected profit without coordination.

Análisis comparativo de diferentes esquemas de suficiencia en generación eléctrica: Algunas reflexiones para el mercado eléctrico en Colombia

El Mercado eléctrico colombiano ha venido enfrentando dificultades con la ocurrencia del Fenómeno de El Niño 2015-2016 que evidenciaron fallas en el diseño del mercado. El presente trabajo de grado hace un referenciamiento internacional de diferentes tipos de diseño de mercados eléctricos enfocado principalmente a los mecanismos utilizados para garantizar la suficiencia en capacidad de generación, describe la problemática actual y hace algunas recomendaciones para el mercado colombiano con base en las ventajas, desventajas y adaptabilidad evidenciadas en los mercados analizados de Nord Pool, Alberta, PJM, Chile, Brasil y Panamá.

Cost-free feed-in tariffs for renewable energy deployment in Spain

Feed-in-tariff (FIT) schemes have been widely employed to promote renewable energy deployment. While FITs may be perceived by consumers as an extra cost, renewable energies cause a noticeable price reduction in wholesale electricity markets. We analyse both effects for the case of the Spanish electricity market during 2010. In particular, we examine the level of FITs that makes savings and extra costs to be similar on an hourly basis. Results are obtained for a wide range of renewable generation scenarios. It is found that FITs with null extra costs for consumers are in the range of 50–80 €/MWh. Some of the side-effects of a high penetration of renewable energy in the market are analysed in detail and discussed.