Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets

Two-stage game models of information acquisition in stochastic oligopoliesrequire the unrealistic assumption that firms observe the precision ofinformation chosen by their competitors before determining quantities. Thispaper analyzes secret information acquisition as a one-stage game. Relativeto the two-stage game firms are shown to acquire less information. Policyimplications based on the two-stage game yield, therefore, too high taxes ortoo low subsidies for research activities. For the case of heterogeneousduopoly it is shown that comparative statics results partly depend on theobservability assumption.

On the role of non-equilibrium focal points as coordination devices

Considering a pure coordination game with a large number of equivalentequilibria, we argue, first, that a focal point that is itself not a Nash equilibriumand is Pareto dominated by all Nash equilibria, may attract the players'choices. Second, we argue that such a non-equilibrium focal point may act asan equilibrium selection device that the players use to coordinate on a closelyrelated small subset of Nash equilibria. We present theoretical as well asexperimental support for these two new roles of focal points as coordinationdevices.

Evaluating the impact of public subsidies on a firm's performance: a quasi-experimental approach

Many regional governments in developed countries design programs to improve the competitiveness of local firms. In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of public programs whose aim is to enhance the performance of firms located in Catalonia (Spain). We compare the performance of publicly subsidised companies (treated) with that of similar, but unsubsidised companies (non-treated). We use the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) methodology to construct a control group which, with respect to its observable characteristics, is as similar as possible to the treated group, and that allows us to identify firms which retain the same propensity to receive public subsidies. Once a valid comparison group has been established, we compare the respective performance of each firm. As a result, we find that recipient firms, on average, change their business practices, improve their performance, and increase their value added as a direct result of public subsidy programs.

Max-convex decompositions for cooperative TU games

We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of convex games. This max-convex decomposition can be refined by using convex games with non-negative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above results we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all cooperative TU games. Finally, we characterize zero-monotonic games using a strong max-convex decomposition

Evaluating the impact of public subsidies on a firm's performance: a quasi-experimental approach

Many regional governments in developed countries design programs to improve the competitiveness of local firms. In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of public programs whose aim is to enhance the performance of firms located in Catalonia (Spain). We compare the performance of publicly subsidised companies (treated) with that of similar, but unsubsidised companies (non-treated). We use the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) methodology to construct a control group which, with respect to its observable characteristics, is as similar as possible to the treated group, and that allows us to identify firms which retain the same propensity to receive public subsidies. Once a valid comparison group has been established, we compare the respective performance of each firm. As a result, we find that recipient firms, on average, change their business practices, improve their performance, and increase their value added as a direct result of public subsidy programs.

Max-convex decompositions for cooperative TU games

We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of convex games. This max-convex decomposition can be refined by using convex games with non-negative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above results we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all cooperative TU games. Finally, we characterize zero-monotonic games using a strong max-convex decomposition

Experimental Cournot oligopoly and inequity aversion

This paper explores the role of inequity aversion as an explanation for observed behavior in experimental Cournot oligopolies. We show that inequity aversion can change the nature of the strategic interaction: quantities are strategic substitutes for sufficiently asymmetric output levels but strategic complements otherwise. We find that inequity aversion can explain why: (i) some experiments result in higher than Cournot-Nash production levels while others result in lower, (ii) collusion often occurs with only two players whereas with three or more players market outcomes are very close to Cournot-Nash, and (iii) players often achieve equal profits in asymmetric Cournot oligopoly.

On the structure of cooperative and competitive solutions for a generalized assignment game

We study cooperative and competitive solutions for a many- to-many generalization of Shapley and Shubik (1972)'s assignment game. We consider the Core, three other notions of group stability and two al- ternative definitions of competitive equilibrium. We show that (i) each group stable set is closely related with the Core of certain games defined using a proper notion of blocking and (ii) each group stable set contains the set of payoff vectors associated to the two definitions of competitive equilibrium. We also show that all six solutions maintain a strictly nested structure. Moreover, each solution can be identified with a set of ma- trices of (discriminated) prices which indicate how gains from trade are distributed among buyers and sellers. In all cases such matrices arise as solutions of a system of linear inequalities. Hence, all six solutions have the same properties from a structural and computational point of view.

Application of the center manifold theory to the study of slewing flexible Non-ideal structures with nonlinear curvature: a case study

In this paper is Analyzed the local dynamical behavior of a slewing flexible structure considering nonlinear curvature. The dynamics of the original (nonlinear) governing equations of motion are reduced to the center manifold in the neighborhood of an equilibrium solution with the purpose of locally study the stability of the system. In this critical point, a Hopf bifurcation occurs. In this region, one can find values for the control parameter (structural damping coefficient) where the system is unstable and values where the system stability is assured (periodic motion). This local analysis of the system reduced to the center manifold assures the stable / unstable behavior of the original system around a known solution.

Non-parametric stability analyses of dough properties in wheat

AbstractLiterature has unveiled that a paper has not been published yet on using non-parametric stability statistics (NPSSs) for evaluating genotypic stability in dough properties of wheat. Accordingly, the effects of genotype (G), environment (E) and GE interaction (GEI) on alveograph parameters, i.e. dough baking strength (W) and its tenacity (P)/extensibility (L), of 18 wheat (T. aestivum L.) genotypes were studied under irrigated field conditions in an 8-year trial (2006-2014) in central Turkey. Furthermore, genotypic stability for W and P/L was determined using 8 NPSSs viz. RM-Rank mean, RSD-Rank’s standard deviation, RS-Rank Sum, TOP-Ranking, Si(1), Si(2), Si(3) and Si(6) rank statistics. The ANOVA revealed that W and P/L were primarily controlled by E, although G and GEI also had significant effects. Among the 8 NPSSs, only RM, RS and TOP statistics were suitable for detecting the genotypes with high stable and bread making quality (e.g. G1 and G17). In conclusion, using RM, RS and TOP statistics is advisable to select for dough quality in wheat under multi-environment trials (METs).

Stability studies of intravenous cyclosporine preparations stored in non-PVC containers

Dans cette étude, la stabilité de préparations intraveineuses de cyclosporine (0.2 et 2.5 mg/mL dans NaCl 0.9% ou dextrose 5%) entreposées dans des seringues de polypropylène, des sacs de polypropylène-polyoléfine et des sacs de vinyle acétate d’éthylène a été évaluée. Une méthode HPLC indicatrice de la stabilité à base de méthanol a été développée et validée suite a des études de dégradation forcée. Les solutions évaluées ont été préparées de façon aseptique, puis entreposées à 25°C. La stabilité chimique a été évaluée par HPLC et la stabilité physique a été évaluée par inspection visuelle et aussi par diffusion dynamique de la lumière (DLS). Tous les échantillons sont demeurés stables chimiquement et physiquement dans des sacs de polypropylène-polyoléfine (>98% de cyclosporine récupérée après 14 jours). Lorsqu’entreposés dans des seringues de polypropylène, des contaminants ont été extraits des composantes de la seringue. Toutefois, aucune contamination n’a été observée après 10 min de contact entre la préparation de cyclosporine non-diluée et ces mêmes seringues. Les préparations de 2.5 mg/mL entreposées dans des sacs de vinyle acétate d’éthylène sont demeurés stables chimiquement et physiquement (>98% de cyclosporine récupérée après 14 jours). Toutefois, une adsorption significative a été observée avec les échantillons 0.2 mg/mL entreposés dans des sacs de vinyle acétate d’éthylène (<90% de cyclosporine récupéré après 14 jours). Une étude cinétique a démontré une bonne corrélation linéaire entre la quantité adsorbée et la racine carrée du temps de contact (r2 > 0.97). Un nouveou modèle de diffusion a été établi. En conclusion, les sacs de polypropylène-polyoléfine sont le meilleur choix; les seringues de polypropylène présentent un risque de contamination, mais sont acceptables pour un transfert rapide. Les sacs de vinyle acétate d’éthylène ne peuvent être recommandés à cause d’un problème d’adsorption.

Essays on numerically efficient inference in nonlinear and non-Gaussian state space models, and commodity market analysis.

The first two articles build procedures to simulate vector of univariate states and estimate parameters in nonlinear and non Gaussian state space models. We propose state space speci fications that offer more flexibility in modeling dynamic relationship with latent variables. Our procedures are extension of the HESSIAN method of McCausland[2012]. Thus, they use approximation of the posterior density of the vector of states that allow to : simulate directly from the state vector posterior distribution, to simulate the states vector in one bloc and jointly with the vector of parameters, and to not allow data augmentation. These properties allow to build posterior simulators with very high relative numerical efficiency. Generic, they open a new path in nonlinear and non Gaussian state space analysis with limited contribution of the modeler. The third article is an essay in commodity market analysis. Private firms coexist with farmers' cooperatives in commodity markets in subsaharan african countries. The private firms have the biggest market share while some theoretical models predict they disappearance once confronted to farmers cooperatives. Elsewhere, some empirical studies and observations link cooperative incidence in a region with interpersonal trust, and thus to farmers trust toward cooperatives. We propose a model that sustain these empirical facts. A model where the cooperative reputation is a leading factor determining the market equilibrium of a price competition between a cooperative and a private firm

On the Effects of Mergers on Equilibrium Outcomes in a Common Property Renewable Asset Oligopoly

This paper examines a dynamic game of exploitation of a common pool of some renewable asset by agents that sell the result of their exploitation on an oligopolistic market. A Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game is used to analyze the effects of a merger of a subset of the agents. We study the impact of the merger on the equilibrium production strategies, on the steady states, and on the profitability of the merger for its members. We show that there exists an interval of the asset's stock such that any merger is profitable if the stock at the time the merger is formed falls within that interval. That includes mergers that are known to be unprofitable in the corresponding static equilibrium framework.

First-principles electronic theory of non-collinear magnetic order in transition-metal nanowires

The structural, electronic and magnetic properties of one-dimensional 3d transition-metal (TM) monoatomic chains having linear, zigzag and ladder geometries are investigated in the frame-work of first-principles density-functional theory. The stability of long-range magnetic order along the nanowires is determined by computing the corresponding frozen-magnon dispersion relations as a function of the 'spin-wave' vector q. First, we show that the ground-state magnetic orders of V, Mn and Fe linear chains at the equilibrium interatomic distances are non-collinear (NC) spin-density waves (SDWs) with characteristic equilibrium wave vectors q that depend on the composition and interatomic distance. The electronic and magnetic properties of these novel spin-spiral structures are discussed from a local perspective by analyzing the spin-polarized electronic densities of states, the local magnetic moments and the spin-density distributions for representative values q. Second, we investigate the stability of NC spin arrangements in Fe zigzag chains and ladders. We find that the non-collinear SDWs are remarkably stable in the biatomic chains (square ladder), whereas ferromagnetic order (q =0) dominates in zigzag chains (triangular ladders). The different magnetic structures are interpreted in terms of the corresponding effective exchange interactions J(ij) between the local magnetic moments μ(i) and μ(j) at atoms i and j. The effective couplings are derived by fitting a classical Heisenberg model to the ab initio magnon dispersion relations. In addition they are analyzed in the framework of general magnetic phase diagrams having arbitrary first, second, and third nearest-neighbor (NN) interactions J(ij). The effect of external electric fields (EFs) on the stability of NC magnetic order has been quantified for representative monoatomic free-standing and deposited chains. We find that an external EF, which is applied perpendicular to the chains, favors non-collinear order in V chains, whereas it stabilizes the ferromagnetic (FM) order in Fe chains. Moreover, our calculations reveal a change in the magnetic order of V chains deposited on the Cu(110) surface in the presence of external EFs. In this case the NC spiral order, which was unstable in the absence of EF, becomes the most favorable one when perpendicular fields of the order of 0.1 V/Å are applied. As a final application of the theory we study the magnetic interactions within monoatomic TM chains deposited on graphene sheets. One observes that even weak chain substrate hybridizations can modify the magnetic order. Mn and Fe chains show incommensurable NC spin configurations. Remarkably, V chains show a transition from a spiral magnetic order in the freestanding geometry to FM order when they are deposited on a graphene sheet. Some TM-terminated zigzag graphene-nanoribbons, for example V and Fe terminated nanoribbons, also show NC spin configurations. Finally, the magnetic anisotropy energies (MAEs) of TM chains on graphene are investigated. It is shown that Co and Fe chains exhibit significant MAEs and orbital magnetic moments with in-plane easy magnetization axis. The remarkable changes in the magnetic properties of chains on graphene are correlated to charge transfers from the TMs to NN carbon atoms. Goals and limitations of this study and the resulting perspectives of future investigations are discussed.

Mixed oligopoly in education

This paper studies oligopolistic competition in education markets when schools can be private and public and when the quality of education depends on ìpeer groupî e§ects. In the Örst stage of our game schools set their quality and in the second stage they Öx their tuition fees. We examine how the (subgame perfect Nash) equilibrium allocation (qualities, tuition fees and welfare) is a§ected by the presence of public schools and by their relative position in the quality range. When there are no peer group e§ects, e¢ ciency is achieved when (at least) all but one school are public. In particular in the two school case, the impact of a public school is spectacular as we go from a setting of extreme di§erentiation to an e¢ cient allocation. However, in the three school case, a single public school will lower welfare compared to the private equilibrium. We then introduce a peer group e§ect which, for any given school is determined by its student with the highest ability. These PGE do have a signiÖcant impact on the results. The mixed equilibrium is now never e¢ cient. However, welfare continues to be improved if all but one school are public. Overall, the presence of PGE reduces the e§ectiveness of public schools as regulatory tool in an otherwise private education sector.