Investment, duration, and exit strategies for corporate and independent venture capital-backed start-ups

We propose a model of investment, duration, and exit strategies for start-ups backed by venture capital (VC) funds that accounts for the high level of uncertainty, the asymmetry of information between insiders and outsiders, and the discount rate. Our analysis predicts that start-ups backed by corporate VC funds remain for a longer period of time before exiting and receive larger investment amounts than those financed by independent VC funds. Although a longer duration leads to a higher likelihood of an exit through an acquisition, a larger investment increases the probability of an IPO exit. These predictions find strong empirical support.

A study of governance practices in corporate foundations

Implementation of social investments through corporate foundations is growing and, therefore, it is important to study their governance aspects better. Governance is conceptualized as a set of control and incentive mechanisms to overcome the so-called agency conflicts, which originate from the separation of property and management in for-profit organizations, a concept also applied to nonprofit institutions. It is argued that corporate foundations have the characteristics both of companies and of civil society organizations, which distinguishes them from both types of organizations. This paper analyses a study in which a set of governance mechanisms, adapted from those identified by a literature review of corporate and nonprofit governance, was selected for study. It is an exploratory descriptive case study, which analyzed data about eight organizations collected through publications and interviews with their CEOs. The data analysis indicates that it is appropriate to distinguish the different organization types and to apply the agency theory. Research results indicate that the selected governance mechanisms may be adapted and used in corporate foundations. However, they are only partially applied in the observed cases, which suggests the need for further studies that might consolidate these practices in such organizations.

Essays in banking and corporate finance

Abstract This paper presents a model of executive compensation in which the executive is risk-averse and has specific knowledge -knowledge about the optimal actions to take that is costly to transfer to the principal. The model generates predictions that are consistent with the available evidence and provides a rationale for a number of unresolved puzzles in executive compensation. Notably, we find that relative performance evaluation is optimal only if the quality of specific knowledge is low. We also show (1) why some common risk components are not filtered out of executives' pay, (2) why performance is more likely to be evaluated relative to aggregate market movements than relative to industry movements, and (3) why executives with higher perceived abilities are given stronger incentives. Finally, we demonstrate that the relation between risk and incentives may be positive or negative, depending on the quality of the executive's specific knowledge.

O Papel das Demonstrações Financeiras na Corporate Governance: O caso da Cabo Verde Telecom

O fenómeno da Corporate Governance tem vindo a ocupar um lugar importante na literatura moderna dada a sua importância no mercado global e competitivo em que vivemos. A partir do final dos anos 80, esta matéria ganhou um grande relevo devido ao aumento da participação activa dos investidores institucionais e pequenos investidores individuais nos mercados de capitais e sua crescente exigência por uma gestão mais rigorosa, transparente e que defende os interesses dos accionistas ou shareholders. Os grandes escândalos financeiros, envolvendo diversas empresas nos EUA e na Europa, que causaram prejuízos incomensuráveis ao mercado, despertaram a atenção do mundo para a relevância das boas práticas de Corporate Governance. O maior destaque para este tema aconteceu em 2002, após a ocorrência os escândalos com as multinacionais Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat, entre outros. Naturalmente, para os países em desenvolvimento, a qualidade da Corporate Governance local é de fundamental importância para o crescimento económico duradouro. Essa visão global e transversal da Corporate Governance veio acentuar a procura de soluções para o alinhamento dos interesses entre gestores e accionistas. A solução para os conflitos de agência e a melhoria dos mecanismos de gestão estão no cerne do debate sobre o tema. Este estudo faz uma análise das teorias da Corporate Governance, a sua evolução e importância e o papel das demonstrações financeiras como um dos elementos que suportam a boa Corporate Governance, aplicada na gestão de uma empresa cabo-verdiana – A CVTelecom. Pretende-se, assim, identificar os benefícios advindos da aplicação das boas práticas de Corporate Governace para a gestão da empresa e para a sociedade como um todo. A escolha da CVTelecom, operadora de telecomunicações, prende-se com dois aspectos fundamentais: i) ser a empresa privada que exerce maior impacto sobre a economia cabo-verdiana, empregando cerca de 1,3% do total dos trabalhadores do sector privado no País; ii) o crescimento da economia cabo-verdiana estar suportado, mais do que nunca, nas TIC, constituindo, por essa razão, num dos principais desafios do País. Concluiu-se que a CVTelecom, embora esteja localizada num país onde ainda não existe uma entidade com a responsabilidade de fazer a avaliação da gestão das empresas no quadro das normas que enformam a Corporate Governance, encontra-se bem encaminhada ao nível da implementação de normas e procedimentos que favoreçam uma boa Corporate Governance.

Generating Brand Equity through Corporate Social Responsibility to Key Stakeholders

In this paper we argue that socially responsible policies have a positive impact on a firm's brand equity in the short-term as well as in the long-term. Moreover, once we distinguish between different stakeholders, we posit that secondary stakeholders such as community are even more important than primary stakeholders (customers, shareholders, workers and suppliers) in generating brand equity. Policies aimed at satisfied community interests act as a mechanism to reinforce trust that gives further credibility to social responsible polices with other stakeholders. The result is a decrease in conflicts among stakeholders and greater stakeholder willingness to provide intangible resources that enhance brand equity. We provide support of our theoretical contentions making use of a panel data composed of 57 firms from 10 countries (the US, Japan, South Korea, France, the UK, Italy, Germany, Finland, Switzerland and the Netherlands) for the period 2002 to 2007. We use detailed information on brand equity obtained from Interbrand and on corporate social responsibility (CSR) provided by the SiRi Global Profile database, as compiled by the Sustainable Investment Research International Company (SiRi).

Three essays in dynamic corporate finance

Summary Throughout my thesis, I elaborate on how real and financing frictions affect corporate decision making under uncertainty, and I explore how firms time their investment and financing decisions given such frictions. While the macroeconomics literature has focused on the impact of real frictions on investment decisions assuming all equity financed firms, the financial economics literature has mainly focused on the study of financing frictions. My thesis therefore assesses the join interaction of real and financing frictions in firms' dynamic investment and financing decisions. My work provides a rationale for the documented poor empirical performance of neoclassical investment models based on the joint effect of real and financing frictions on investment. A major observation relies in how the infrequency of corporate decisions may affect standard empirical tests. My thesis suggests that the book to market sorts commonly used in the empirical asset pricing literature have economic content, as they control for the lumpiness in firms' optimal investment policies. My work also elaborates on the effects of asymmetric information and strategic interaction on firms' investment and financing decisions. I study how firms time their decision to raise public equity when outside investors lack information about their future investment prospects. I derive areal-options model that predicts either cold or hot markets for new stock issues conditional on adverse selection, and I provide a rational approach to study jointly the market timing of corporate decisions and announcement effects in stock returns. My doctoral dissertation therefore contributes to our understanding of how under real and financing frictions may bias standard empirical tests, elaborates on how adverse selection may induce hot and cold markets in new issues' markets, and suggests how the underlying economic behaviour of firms may induce alternative patterns in stock prices.

Credit lines: The other side of corporate liquidity

In this paper we offer the first large sample evidence on the availability and usage ofcredit lines in U.S. public corporations and use it to re-examine the existing findings oncorporate liquidity. We show that the availability of credit lines is widespread and thataverage undrawn credit is of the same order of magnitude as cash holdings. We test thetrade-off theory of liquidity according to which firms target an optimum level of liquidity,computed as the sum of cash and undrawn credit lines. We provide support for the existenceof a liquidity target, but also show that the reasons why firms hold cash and credit linesare very different. While the precautionary motive explains well cash holdings, the optimumlevel of credit lines appears to be driven by the restrictions imposed by the credit line itself,in terms of stated purpose and covenants. In support to these findings, credit line drawdownsare associated with capital expenditures, acquisitions, and working capital.

Free entry does not imply zero profits

Traditional economic wisdom says that free entry in a market will drive profits down to zero. This conclusion is usually drawn under the assumption of perfect information. We assumethat a priori there exists imperfect information about theprofitability of the market, but that potential entrants maylearn the demand curve perfectly at negligible cost byengaging in market research. Even if in equilibrium firmslearn the demand perfectly, profits may be strictly positivebecause of insufficient entry. The mere fact that it will notbecome common knowledge that every entrant has perfectinformation about demand causes this surprising result. Belief means doubt. Knowing means certainty. Introduction to the Kabalah.

Window-dressing in German interwar balance sheets

German accounting rules value assets and liabilities asymmetricallyand thus lead to grossly distorted balance sheets. In the interwardebate on a reform of disclosure regulation, financial expertsconsidered the (undisclosed) tax balance sheet, which had to bedrawn up separately for the corporate tax assessment, as a paradigmfor adequate financial disclosure. However, due to tax secrecy thaywere barred from analyzing tax documents. Using archival evidence,we analyze tax balance sheets from which the reliability of disclosedbalance sheets of the interwar period can be assessed. It emergesthat companies overstated their profits in the middand late 1920s,but grossly understated them in the Nazi economy.

Corporate finance and the monetary transmission mechanism

This paper analyzes the transmission mechanisms of monetarypolicy in a general equilibrium model of securities marketsand banking with asymmetric information. Banks' optimal asset/liability policy is such that in equilibrium capital adequacy constraints are always binding. Asymmetric information about banks' net worth adds a cost to outside equity capital, which limits the extent to which banks can relax their capital constraint. In this context monetarypolicy does not affect bank lending through changes in bank liquidity. Rather, it has the effect of changing theaggregate composition of financing by firms. The model also produces multiple equilibria, one of which displays all the features of a "credit crunch". Thus, monetary policy can also have large effects when it induces a shift from one equilibrium to the other.