Broadband: What do consumers want? Examining willingness-to-pay

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Cape Verde’s foreign policy: an economic perspective

The virtuous cycle between development success and foreign policy in Cape Verde reflects a positive interaction between globalization and governance. Development success under globalization entails positive market perceptions regarding the orientation and predictability of policies as well as the accompanying institutional arrangements, thereby making foreign policy salient beyond the comparator group, or “aspirational”. Even if there is no universally applicable development model, an aspirational foreign policy can be built on positive rankings with respect to comparator groups. In Macedo and Pereira (2010), macrolevel policy and institutional combinations underpinning trade diversification and income convergence in West and Southern Africa are used to establish development success for Cape Verde and Mozambique respectively. Here, the narrative of long-term development helps identify the following drivers: moving towards a market economy; opening up to regional and global trade; increasing economic and political freedom; pursuing macroeconomic stability and financial reputation; ensuring policy continuity (especially in trade and industrial sectors) and focusing on human development (especially poverty reduction and education). Looking at GDP per capita and indicators of financial reputation and good governance of sub-regional peers is not sufficient to conclude that Cape Verde’s convergence will be sustained. Nevertheless, the positive interaction between trade and financial globalization, on the one hand, and democracy and good governance, on the other, have positive implications for the effectiveness of foreign policy across the region as well as in the Portuguese-speaking community.

Regional growth in Europe: The role of European and national policies

We conduct a systematic study of the impact of European Union (EU) regional policies on regional economic growth that controls for national policies and geographic characteristics. Special care is taken in distinguishing between the impact of EU policies and of national policies on economic growth. Our empirical study tries to answer two different questions. First, is there convergence across EU regions, and if so, do regions converge to a common European steady-state or to a national one? Second, how do European and national policies affect regional growth? We find evidence of regional convergence at the national level but not at the European level. In addition we find that trade openness at the national level is associated with regional convergence while European regional policies contribute, though weakly, to regional convergence. Our results suggest that policies that foster market integration – and convergence to a common steady-state - such as the promotion of labour and capital movements across countries and common regulatory policies are as important for European-wide regional convergence as regional structural funds.

R&D spillovers in an endogenous growth model with physical capital, human capital and varieties

There is a family of models with Physical, Human capital and R&D for which convergence properties have been discussed (Arnold, 2000a; Gómez, 2005). However, spillovers in R&D have been ignored in this context. We introduce spillovers in this model and derive its steady-state and stability properties. This new feature implies that the model is characterized by a system of four differential equations. A unique Balanced Growth Path along with a two dimensional stable manifold are obtained under simple and reasonable conditions. Transition is oscillatory toward the steady-state for plausible values of parameters.

Analysis of the progress of lifelong learning strategies of Portuguese Economics and Management Schools

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Three essays on economics of predictability of stock returns

A PhD Dissertation, presented as part of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the NOVA - School of Business and Economics

Essays in environmental and happiness economics

A PhD Dissertation, presented as part of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the NOVA - School of Business and Economics

Four essays in behavioral economics

A PhD Dissertation, presented as part of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the NOVA - School of Business and Economics

Transitional dynamics of an endogenous growth model with an erosion effect

The convergence features of an Endogenous Growth model with Physical capital, Human Capital and R&D have been studied. We add an erosion effect (supported by empirical evidence) to this model, and fully characterize its convergence properties. The dynamics is described by a fourth-order system of differential equations. We show that the model converges along a one-dimensional stable manifold and that its equilibrium is saddle-path stable. We also argue that one of the implications of considering this “erosion effect” is the increase in the adherence of the model to data.

Higher education branding: Nova School of Business and Economics and Bocconi University

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The economics of Vieira da Silva

This paper investigates the time valuation and the age valuation profile of art-works created by the Portuguese female painter Maria Helena Vieira da Silva. It uses data from records from her paintings auction sales between 1986 and 2014, taken from Artprice.com. The study explores three aspects regarding her artistic career: (1) estimation of Age-valuation profile, defining her creativity pattern and the age at which she produced her most valuable paintings; (2) estimation of time valuation profile, through a creation of an individual hedonic price index for Vieira da Silva; (3) internationalization phenomenon of the artist, investigating whether selling prices are primarily set in euros or in US dollar. The results suggest that Vieira da Silva peaked quite early in her career; her paintings prices are not very sensible to economic cycles and tends to slightly increase afterlife; the empirical results are not suggestive on which currency is the best predictor of her paintings’ price.

Potential M&A between TIM Brazil and Oi S.A: The irreversible force of Telecommunications convergence

The intrinsic forces of market aiming for telecom industry convergence has arrived to Brazil. This case presents real characters, a sequence of events and other public information that has been impacting two corporations studied in this case. TIM Brazil and Oi S.A, two top players in the Brazilian telecom industry mobile and fixed segment respectively. While a merge between the two of them looks perfect and simple in an operational perspective due to its vertical complementarity, bring to them opportunities to win over a bundle offer (multi service package) that will consolidate their market predominance. Macroeconomic and internal corporate contrasts between these companies’ environment might signal that an impulsive could have a high price to pay in the future.

Essays in health economics: Volume-Outcome Effect, upcoding behaviour and the evaluation of a short-term intervention program

Evidence in the literature suggests a negative relationship between volume of medical procedures and mortality rates in the health care sector. In general, high-volume hospitals appear to achieve lower mortality rates, although considerable variation exists. However, most studies focus on US hospitals, which face different incentives than hospitals in a National Health Service (NHS). In order to add to the literature, this study aims to understand what happens in a NHS. Results reveal a statistically significant correlation between volume of procedures and better outcomes for the following medical procedures: cerebral infarction, respiratory infections, circulatory disorders with AMI, bowel procedures, cirrhosis, and hip and femur procedures. The effect is explained with the practice-makes-perfect hypothesis through static effects of scale with little evidence of learning-by-doing. The centralization of those medical procedures is recommended given that this policy would save a considerable number of lives (reduction of 12% in deaths for cerebral infarction).

The new economy: Essays in network economics and two-sided markets

Following the Introduction, which surveys existing literature on the technology advances and regulation in telecommunications and on two-sided markets, we address specific issues on the industries of the New Economy, featured by the existence of network effects. We seek to explore how each one of these industries work, identify potential market failures and find new solutions at the economic regulation level promoting social welfare. In Chapter 1 we analyze a regulatory issue on access prices and investments in the telecommunications market. The existing literature on access prices and investment has pointed out that networks underinvest under a regime of mandatory access provision with a fixed access price per end-user. We propose a new access pricing rule, the indexation approach, i.e., the access price, per end-user, that network i pays to network j is function of the investment levels set by both networks. We show that the indexation can enhance economic efficiency beyond what is achieved with a fixed access price. In particular, access price indexation can simultaneously induce lower retail prices and higher investment and social welfare as compared to a fixed access pricing or a regulatory holidays regime. Furthermore, we provide sufficient conditions under which the indexation can implement the socially optimal investment or the Ramsey solution, which would be impossible to obtain under fixed access pricing. Our results contradict the notion that investment efficiency must be sacrificed for gains in pricing efficiency. In Chapter 2 we investigate the effect of regulations that limit advertising airtime on advertising quality and on social welfare. We show, first, that advertising time regulation may reduce the average quality of advertising broadcast on TV networks. Second, an advertising cap may reduce media platforms and firms' profits, while the net effect on viewers (subscribers) welfare is ambiguous because the ad quality reduction resulting from a regulatory cap o¤sets the subscribers direct gain from watching fewer ads. We find that if subscribers are sufficiently sensitive to ad quality, i.e., the ad quality reduction outweighs the direct effect of the cap, a cap may reduce social welfare. The welfare results suggest that a regulatory authority that is trying to increase welfare via regulation of the volume of advertising on TV might necessitate to also regulate advertising quality or, if regulating quality proves impractical, take the effect of advertising quality into consideration. 3 In Chapter 3 we investigate the rules that govern Electronic Payment Networks (EPNs). In EPNs the No-Surcharge Rule (NSR) requires that merchants charge at most the same amount for a payment card transaction as for cash. In this chapter, we analyze a three- party model (consumers, merchants, and a proprietary EPN) with endogenous transaction volumes and heterogenous merchants' transactional benefits of accepting cards to assess the welfare impacts of the NSR. We show that, if merchants are local monopolists and the network externalities from merchants to cardholders are sufficiently strong, with the exception of the EPN, all agents will be worse o¤ with the NSR, and therefore the NSR is socially undesirable. The positive role of the NSR in terms of improvement of retail price efficiency for cardholders is also highlighted.

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).