Evidence on the incentive optimality of share contracts

Ever since Adam Smith, economists have argued that share contracts do not provide proper incentives. This paper uses tenancy data from India to assess the existence of missing incentives in this classical example of moral hazard. Sharecroppers are found to be less productive than owners, but as productive as fixed-rent tenants. Also, the productivity gap between owners and both types of tenants is driven by sample-selection issues. An endogenous selection rule matches tenancy contracts with less-skilled farmers and lower-quality lands. Due to complementarity, such a matching affects tenants’ input choices. Controlling for that, the contract form has no effect on the expected output. Next, I explicitly model farmer’s optimal decisions to test the existence of non-contractible inputs being misused. No evidence of missing incentives is found.

Workplace diversity and incentive contracts : theory and evidence

This paper presents a simple theory of the provision of incentives in firms in which the principal optimally chooses both compensation contracts and the composition of the work force. Assuming that individuals display group loyalty, a less diverse (more homogeneous) work force will be more cooperative. Simple comparative statics provide some testable implications relating risk, diversity and incentive pay. I also analyze the case in which workers’ characteristics cannot be readily observed ex ante. The theory then predicts that firms are more likely to prevent workers from interacting with each other when workers are expected to have similar characteristics. This shows a surprising effect of diversity in the workplace: more diverse firms will promote more interactions between workers of different types, i.e. they will be less segregated. I test the main predictions of the model using a cross-sectional sample of corporate boards. I use the proportion of women on boards as a measure of diversity. There are three main empirical findings: (1) a significant negative correlation between firm risk and diversity, (2) a significant positive relationship between performance-based compensation and diversity and (3) a significant positive correlation between the number of board meetings (a measure of interactions among directors) and diversity. The evidence is broadly consistent with the implications of the theory.

Optimal provision of implicit and explicit incentives in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of the fiow of funds as an implicit incetive provided by investors to portfolio managers in a two-period relationship. We show that the fiow of funds is a powerful incentive in an asset management contract. We build a binomial moral hazard model to explain the main trade-ofIs in the relationship between fiow, fees and performance. The main assumption is that efIort depend" on the combination of implicit and explicit incentives while the probability distrioutioll function of returns depends on efIort. In the case of full commitment, the investor's relevant trade-ofI is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce efIort in the first período The more concerned the investor is with today's payoff. the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the following periods. That is. in the second period, the investor penalizes observed low returns by withdrawing resources from non-performing portfolio managers. Besides, he pays performance fee when the observed excess return is positive. When commitment is not a plausible hypothesis, we consider that the investor also learns some symmetríc and imperfect information about the ability of the manager to generate positive excess returno In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as efIort choices exerted by the portfolio manager. We show that implicit incentives can explain the fiow-performance relationship and, conversely, endogenous expected return determines incentives provision and define their optimal leveIs. We provide a numerical solution in Matlab that characterize these results.

Legal enforcement, collateral and heterogeneity of project financing contracts

This paper employs mechanism design to study the effects of imperfect legal enforcement on optimal scale of projects, borrowing interest rates and the probability of default. The analysis departs from an environment that combines asymmetric information about cash flows and limited commitment by borrowers. Incentive for repayment comes from the possibility of liquidation of projects by a court, but courts are costly and may fail to liquidate. The value of liquidated assets can be used as collateral: it is transferred to the lender when courts liquidate. Examples reveal that costly use of courts may be optimal, which contrasts with results from most limited commitment models, where punishments are just threats, never applied in optimal arrangements. I show that when voluntary liquidation is allowed, both asymmetric information and uncertainty about courts are necessary conditions for legal punishments ever to be applied. Numerical solutions for several parametric specifications are presented, allowing for heterogeneity on initial wealth and variability of project returns. In all such solutions, wealthier individuals borrow with lower interest rates and run higher scale enterprises, which is consistent with stylized facts. The reliability of courts has a consistently positive effect on the scale of projects. However its effect on interest rates is subtler and depends essentially on the degree of curvature of the production function. Numerical results also show that the possibility of collateral seizing allows comovements of the interest rates and the probability of repayment.

Exclusivity contracts and competition : the case of the Brazilian fuels market

Exclusivity contracts can help stations by providing brand-value that allows them to obtain higher profits, relative to unbranded retailers. However, branded retailers may have a stronger negative effect over its competitors’ profits. It is not clear which one of these two effects dominates (brand-value vs competition effect). Therefore, the impact of exclusivity over the number of participants in the downstream market is not determined. In this paper, I empirically study the effects of exclusivity agreements on competition in the Brazilian gasoline sector. In order to do so, I estimate an entry model of endogenous product-type choices using data of retailers’ locations and contract choices along with data from the 2010 Brazilian Census. I use my estimates to simulate entry decisions under two counterfactual scenarios: i) mandatory exclusivity and ii) no exclusivity.

Health management contracts in Costa Rica from a comparative perspective

Includes bibliography

Economic regulation to supplement bidding for public works contracts

Includes bibliography

Public-private contracts: analysis and formulae for sustainability: development and applications in Mexico

Includes bibliography

RP979-56 Long-Term Installment Land Contracts

The installment land contract is both an instrument of transfer and a method of financing sales of land. If properly drawn, it can have a number of advantages for both the buyer and seller. Both parties should contact their attorneys to be sure that the terms of the contract are clearly stated and understood. This research publication discusses how long-term installment land contracts are used in the agricultural community.

CC96-396 Productcion Flexibility Contracts: Provisions, Implications and the Participation Decision

The Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-127) was signed into law by President Clinton on April 4, 1996. Most provisions of the new law, including the commodity provisions, will be effective for seven years, 1996-2002. Unlike previous farm bills, provisions relating to commodity supports are grouped together under what is known as the Agricultural Market Transition Act (AMTA) program. Producers of seven commodities: corn, sorghum, barley, oats, wheat, rice and cotton must sign Productive Flexibility Contracts (PFCs) to participate in the AMTA. These seven commodities are referred to as "contract commodities." This publication focuses on the PFCs, beginning with an overview of contract provisions. Potential short- and long-run implications of PFCs are then discussed.

Pacta sunt servanda versus the social role of contracts: the case of Brazilian agriculture contracts

This study explores the instability created by contradictory court decisions related with contract breaches. Forward marketing contracts represent an important source of resources to finance Brazilian agriculture, however a large number of contract breaches were observed during a period of marked increase in soy prices. The study analyzed 161 judicial appeal decisions and a survey was carried with 70 farmers. The results show the difference of judges' interpretation and the existence of second order effects. The effects of court decisions were more requirements of guarantees and the reduction in the number of contracts. Those soybean farmers who did not breach their contracts have also been negatively affected by the strategic reactions of trading and processing companies. The concept of "social function of the contract" introduced in Brazilian civil code led to a higher degree of instability in contracts, raising transaction costs and motivating private economic sanctions.

Data and behavioral contracts for web services

The recent trend in Web services is fostering a computing scenario where loosely coupled parties interact in a distributed and dynamic environment. Such interactions are sequences of xml messages and in order to assemble parties – either statically or dynamically – it is important to verify that the “contracts��� of the parties are “compatible”. The Web Service Description Language (wsdl) is a standard used for describing one-way (asynchronous) and request/response (synchronous) interactions. Web Service Conversation Language extends wscl contracts by allowing the description of arbitrary, possibly cyclic sequences of exchanged messages between communicating parties. Unfortunately, neither wsdl nor wscl can effectively define a notion of compatibility, for the very simple reason that they do not provide any formal characterization of their contract languages. We define two contract languages for Web services. The first one is a data contract language and allow us to describe a Web service in terms of messages (xml documents) that can be sent or received. The second one is a behavioral contract language and allow us to give an abstract definition of the Web service conversation protocol. Both these languages are equipped with a sort of “sub-typing” relation and, therefore, they are suitable to be used for querying Web services repositories. In particular a query for a service compatible with a given contract may safely return services with “greater” contract.