948 resultados para Central bank independence
Resumo:
Balkanisation is a way to describe the breakdown of cross-border banking, as nervous lenders retreat in particular from the more troubled parts of the Eurozone or at least try to isolate operations within national boundaries. It is increasing at the Bank level, however the senior policy makers consider this a negative trend – Mario Draghi, president of the European Central Bank, has talked of the need to “repair this financial fragmentation” and Mark Carney, head of global regulatory body the Financial Stability Board, [and now Governor of the Bank of England] has warned that deglobalising finance will hurt growth and jobs by “reducing financial capacity and systemic resilience”. In this article I would like to examine the impact of banking balkanisation on international trade and provide some initial thoughts about remedies for excessive risk in a banking non-balkanising world.
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The purpose of this work is to verify the stability of the relationship between real activity and interest rate spread. The test is based on Chen (1988) and Osorio and Galea (2006). The analysis is applied to Chile and the United States, from 1980 to 1999. In general, in both cases the relationship was statistically significant in early 80s, but a break point is found in both countries during that decades, suggesting that the relationship depends on the monetary rule follow by the Central Bank.
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This paper explores the role of monetary policy in the context of a less developed economy. Monetary transmission mechanisms in less developed economies can be quite different from an industrialized economy, as unlike industrialized countries, these economies are characterized by the small size of organized financial markets, limited substitutability between money and other assets and weak fiscal and monetary institutions. We utilize the Structural VAR approach to analyze the monetary transmission process and impacts of monetary policy on different macro variables in Bangladesh. Monetary policy shocks are identified using non-recursive contemporaneous restrictions, which are based on the Central Bank's reaction function and the structure of the economy. We found strong evidence for the interest rate channel of monetary policy in Bangladesh. Our findings indicate that monetary policy shocks are important sources of fluctuations in the rate of interest, output and prices. Expansionary monetary policies are found to be harmful for achieving price stability in Bangladesh, as they not only increase the prices permanently, but also make the price level more volatile. We also found the evidence of a long lasting effect of monetary policy on output, which suggests that contractionary policy measures may create sustained recession in Bangladesh.
Resumo:
Purpose – This paper aims to examine the tendencies of sustainability reporting by major commercial banks in Bangladesh in comparison with global sustainability reporting indicators outlined in the GRI framework together with banks' predilection toward reporting 16 GRI financial service sector (FSS) specific performance indicators.
Design/methodology/approach – Based on the GRI G3 guidelines, the paper investigated banks' reporting in five broad areas of sustainability, such as environment, labour practices and decent works, product responsibility, human rights and society. The 2008/2009 annual reports of 12 major commercial banks listed on Dhaka stock exchange were analysed and coded using a content-based technique.
Findings – The results show that information on society is addressed most extensively with regard to extent of reporting. This is followed by the disclosures prepared on decent works and labour practices and environmental issues. Furthermore, the disclosures of product responsibility information and the information for human rights are rather scarce in banks' reporting; on the subject of FSS-specific disclosures, only seven items out of 16 are disclosed by all sample banks.
Research limitations/implications – The findings of the study indicate that Bangladeshi commercial banks' social disclosures could develop in this style to become more holistic and over time (in association with the country's central bank involvement) to resemble a type of structured reporting to the point where they are properly labelled per se.
Originality/value – The study contributes to the social disclosure literature, in particular in a developing countries banking sector context, seeing as it disseminates evidence of the standing on social disclosures practices at the level of GRI with developing countries' banks data.
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Central bank communication has become a more and more important instrument for the monetary authorization to intervene its exchange rate. This paper investigates the impact of both verbal and actual intervention on the exchange rate of China's currency, which has become the second-used currency in international trade settlement. The empirical evidence indicates that the central bank communication can influence the exchange rate, but the efficient is quite weak. Moreover, the effect of verbal intervention on the exchange rate of the RMB is weaker than that of actual intervention. One possible explanation is that most of the statements made by the governor of central bank on the RMB exchange rate are neutral in China. Overall, this study identifies the difference between the actual and verbal intervention in exchange rate in China, the largest emerging economy in the world.
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This dissertation shows that brazilian monetary policy had two main objectives in the last fty years: before 1994 the main goal was to - nance the public de cit and since 1994 to control the in ation rate. This dissertation also explains the main aspects of the monetary policy instru- ments and procedures of the Central Bank. In particular, it describes how day-to-day monetary policy was implemented in di¤erent environments. We estimate the La¤er Curve for Brazil and we identify the interest rate stochastic processes at di¤erent periods.
Resumo:
Nos últimos tempos, mensurar o Risco Operacional (RO) tornou-se o grande desafio para instituições financeiras no mundo todo, principalmente com a implementação das regras de alocação de capital regulatório do Novo Acordo de Capital da Basiléia (NACB). No Brasil, ao final de 2004, o Banco Central (BACEN) estabeleceu um cronograma de metas e disponibilizou uma equipe responsável pela adaptação e implementação dessas regras no sistema financeiro nacional. A Federação de Bancos Brasileiros (FEBRABAN) também divulgou recente pesquisa de gestão de RO envolvendo vários bancos. Todo esse processo trouxe uma vasta e crescente pesquisa e atividades voltadas para a modelagem de RO no Brasil. Em nosso trabalho, medimos o impacto geral nos banco brasileiros, motivado pelas novas regras de alocação de capital de RO envolvendo os modelos mais básicos do NACB. Também introduzimos um modelo avançado de mensuração de risco, chamado Loss Data Distribution (LDA), que alguns especialistas, provenientes do Risco de Mercado, convencionaram chamar de Value-at-Risk Operacional (VaR Operacional.). Ao final desse trabalho apresentamos um caso prático baseado na implementação do LDA ou VaR
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O projeto de lei do Senado de Nº 317 de 2003, que estabelece a autonomia operacional do Banco Central do Brasil, é um grande passo em direção a uma modernização institucional do país. Sendo essa autonomia aprovada, uma questão crucial que se segue é como será o desenho institucional do Banco Central do Brasil. Quais áreas estarão ligadas ao BACEN e quais áreas estarão fora? Quem determinará a meta? Quem serão os membros do COPOM? Essas são apenas algumas questões que surgem quando se fala em autonomia do canco central. Existem diversos exemplos de bancos centrais autônomos no mundo e esse estudo irá analisar como esses cancos centrais operam, para que futuramente se possa tentar desenhar um arranjo institucional que se adapte as necessidades brasileiras.
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We study the interplay between the central bank transparency, its credibility, and the ination target level. Based on a model developed in the spirit of the global games literature, we argue that whenever a weak central bank adopts a high degree of transparency and a low target level, a bad and self conrmed type of equilibrium may arise. In this case, an over-the-target ination becomes more likely. The central bank is considered weak when favorable state of nature is required for the target to be achieved. On the other hand, if a weak central bank opts for less ambitious goals, namely lower degree of transparency and higher target level, it may avoid condence crises and ensure a unique equilibrium for the expected ination. Moreover, even after ruling out the possibility of condence crises, less ambitious goals may be desirable in order to attain higher credibility and hence a better coordination of expectations. Conversely, a low target level and a high central bank transparency are desirable whenever the economy has strong fundamentals and the target can be fullled in many states of nature.
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In this paper we look at various alternatives for monetary regimes: dollarization, monetary union and local currency. We use an extension of the debt crisis model of Cole and Kehoe ([3], [4] and [5]), although we do not necessarily follow their sunspot interpretation. Our focus is to appraise the welfare of a country which is heavily dependent on international capital due to low savings, for example, and might suffer a speculative attack on its external public debt. We study the conditions under which countries will be better off adopting each one of the regimes described above. If it belongs to a monetary union or to a local currency regime, a default may be avoided by an ination tax on debt denominated in common or local currency, respectively. Under the former regime, the decision to inate depends on each member country's political inuence over the union's central bank, while, in the latter one, the country has full autonomy to decide about its monetary policy. The possibility that the government inuences the central bank to create ination tax for political reasons adversely affects the expected welfare of both regimes. Under dollarization, ination is ruled out and the country that is subject to an external debt crisis has no other option than to default. Accordingly, one of our main results is that shared ination control strengthens currencies and a common-currency regime is superior in terms of expected welfare to the local-currency one and to dollarization if external shocks that member countries suffer are strongly correlated to each other. On the other hand, dollarization is dominant if the room for political ination under the alternative regime is high. Finally, local currency is dominant if external shocks are uncorrelated and the room for political pressure is mild. We nish by comparing Brazil's and Argentina's recent experiences which resemble the dollarization and the local currency regimes, and appraising the incentives that member countries would have to unify their currencies in the following common markets: Southern Common Market, Andean Community of Nations and Central American Common Market.
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Is private money feasible and desirable? In its absence, is there a central bank policy that partially or fully substitutes for private money? In this paper, some recent modeling ideas about how to address these questioned are reviewed and applied. The main ideas are that people cannot commit to future actions and that their histories are to some extent unknown - are not common knowledge. Under the additional assumption that the private monies issued by diferent people are distinct, a strong recognizability assumption, it is shown that there is a role for private money.
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A tese pretende conhecer de forma profunda a metodologia de ataques especulativos sobre dívidas, desenvolvida por Cole e Kehoe (1996), e tem três objetivos principais: (i) aplicá-la a outros países, além do México, que é feito na versão original; (ii) entender a opção de um país dolarizar, em relação à alternativa de manter sua moeda local, quando a economia depende da entrada de capitais financeiros internacionais; e (iii) estudar a união monetária como uma terceira alternativa de regime monetário, em comparação com a dolarização e o regime de moeda local. O modelo de crises da dívida de Cole-Kehoe é aplicado às economias da Coréia, da Rússia e do Brasil. Modifica-se este modelo para incluir dívida denominada em moeda local, que é totalmente adquirida pelos consumidores nacionais e que dá ao governo a possibilidade de obter receitas por meio da cobrança de um imposto inflacionário sobre estes ativos. As receitas obtidas desta forma podem ser utilizadas para pagar os banqueiros internacionais e evitar uma crise da dívida externa, que ocorreria, em caso contrário. Considera-se também, neste caso, que o banco central possa estar sujeito a pressões de seu governo para gerar estas receitas. Analogamente, para representar um país pertencente a uma união monetária, inclui-se dívida denominada em moeda comum e um governo central no modelo original. A política monetária da união está subordinada à decisão conjunta de todos os países membros. Supõe-se também que o banco central da união possa sofrer pressões políticas de alguns governos nacionais sem disciplina fiscal e dispostos a obter receitas de imposto inflacionário sobre a dívida. Na dolarização, a política monetária está submetida a do banco central do país âncora e, portanto, não há possibilidade de o governo gerar receitas extraordinárias sobre a dívida, a menos que haja forte simetria dos choques que atingem a economia dolarizada e o país âncora. Considerando estas peculiaridades dos três regimes monetários, os níveis de bem-estar são caracterizados e avaliados numericamente para o Brasil. Além disso, obtém-se a política ótima do governo para a dívida em dólar, segundo os três regimes.
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Com a implementação do Acordo de Basiléia II no Brasil, os grandes conglomerados bancários poderão utilizar o chamado modelo IRB (Internal Ratings Based) para cômputo da parcela de risco de crédito da exigência de capital. O objetivo deste trabalho é mensurar a diferença entre o capital mínimo exigido (e, conseqüentemente, do Índice de Basiléia) calculado pela abordagem IRB em relação à regulamentação atual. Para isso, foram estimadas probabilidades de inadimplência (PD) utilizando matrizes de transição construídas a partir dos dados da Central de Risco de Crédito (SCR) do Banco Central do Brasil. Os resultados indicam aumento da exigência de capital, ao contrário do ocorrido nos países do G-10
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Neste trabalho, analisamos a metodologia de cálculo do capital exigido aos bancos brasileiros pelo Banco Central do Brasil, segundo as regras de Basiléia II. O objetivo foi comparar capital regulamentar com capital econômico, medido por modelos de Value at Risk (VaR). Apresentamos exemplos de aplicação destes conceitos em carteiras normalmente negociadas por bancos brasileiros, mostrando a relação entre capital regulamentar e econômico para diversos mercados e estratégias. Tendo em vista as análises realizadas, realçamos os pontos de maior divergência entre os dois tipos de capital. Concluímos enfatizando a importância da revisão de alguns aspectos das regras de Basiléia II no sentido de promover maior convergência entre capital econômico e regulamentar.
Resumo:
O objetivo deste trabalho é discutir a aplicação da legislação de defesa da concorrência no setor bancário em relação a cinco aspectos: 1. experiência internacional de interação entre as autoridades de defesa da concorrência e de regulação bancária; 2. aplicabilidade da Lei 8884/94 ao setor bancário tendo em vista a legislação específica do segmento; 3. adequação de tal aplicação tendo em vista as peculiaridades do setor, em particular as questões relativas ao risco sistêmico existente em determinadas conjunturas; 4. providências necessárias para conferir segurança jurídica aos atos realizados desde a edição da Lei 8884/94, bem como ao phasing in de regulação concorrencial do setor; 5. eventuais adaptações que seriam necessárias para aplicação da Lei 8884/94 ao setor. O estudo apresenta argumentos econômicos e jurídicos para um sistema de competências complementares entre o Banco Central e o CADE, além de sugerir mecanismos operacionais para sua implementação prática.