186 resultados para Broke,
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In this study, the filtration process and the biomass characteristics in a laboratory-scale submerged membrane bioreactor (MBR) equipped with a hollow fiber (HF) microfiltration membrane were studied at different solid retention times (SRT). The MBR was fed by synthetic wastewater and the organic loading rate (OLR) was 0.5, 0.2, 0.1, and 0.08 kg COD kg VSS−1 d−1 for 10, 30, 60, and 90 days of SRT, respectively. The hydraulic retention time was 8.4 h and the permeate flux was 6 L m−2 h−1(LMH). Data analysis confirmed that at all the studied SRTs, the HF-MBR operated very good obtaining of high quality permeates. Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD) removal efficiencies were higher than 95%. The best filtration performance was reached at SRT of 30 d. On the other hand, the respirometric analysis showed that biomass was more active and there was more biomass production at low SRTs. The concentration of soluble extracellular polymeric substances (EPS) decreased with increasing SRT. A decrease of soluble EPS caused a decrease of membrane fouling rate, decreasing the frequency of chemical cleanings. The floc size decreased with SRT increasing. At high SRTs, there was more friction among particles due to the increase of the cellular density and the flocs broke decreasing their size.
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Introduction. In the speech given to both Houses of Parliament on 11 October 2013 during the first parliamentary session, King Mohammed VI said that the “Moroccan democratic model” was “a precursor in the region as well as on the continental level.”1 Similarly, with the purpose of stressing the “democratic exceptionalism”2 of the country, the new government, led by Abdeilah Benkirane, emphasised that Morocco represents a “third way” compared to countries such as Tunisia, Libya or Egypt since it “…has not embarked on a limited process of reform from the top, driven and controlled by the King. Nor has it experienced a revolution brought a angry citizens rising up against the regime. Rather, it has chosen an alternate path based on a genuine partnership between the King and the PJD (Parti de la justice et du développement) that promises to bring about more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.”4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a “democratic model” or a “third way.” After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, “in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model […] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.”5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: “King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society […] France fully supports this exemplary process.” Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.”4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a “democratic model” or a “third way.” After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, “in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model […] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.”5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: “King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society […] France fully supports this exemplary process.” Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took place in Morocco was considered an extremely positive step taken by the country, as well as a means to strengthen the cooperation between the EU and Morocco. Indeed, according to the High Representative Catherine Ashton, this reform “constitute[s] a significant response to the legitimate aspirations of the Moroccan people and [is] consistent with Morocco’s Advanced Status with the EU.”7 When it comes to the media, it is worth noting that following the ratification of the 2011 Constitution, The New York Times headlined: “All Hail the (Democratic) King.” Even sections of the academic literature have commended the constitutional reform carried out by the Moroccan Sovereign.9 In this paper I argue against the aforementioned idea, according to which Morocco should be considered a model in the region, and in particular I show that the constitution-making process, the 2011 Constitution and its subsequent implementation have more flaws than merits. Accordingly, this paper proceeds in five steps. First of all, I examine the reaction of the regime to the upheavals that broke out in the country after 20 February 2011. Secondly, I analyse the process of constitution showing its main strengths and weaknesses, and comparing it with other constituent processes that took place in the region following the Arab uprisings. In the third section, I highlight the most significant elements of continuity and discontinuity with the previous 1996 Constitution. The fourth section deals with the process of implementation: specifically process is proceeding quite slowly and that in some cases ordinary legislation is in contrast with the new Constitution and international human rights treaties. Moreover, I discuss the role that the judiciary and the Constitutional Court can play in the implementation and interpretation of the Constitution. Finally, I draw some concluding remarks.
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Belarus holds a special position in Russian policy due to its geopolitical, military and transit significance. Russia's influence and position in the entire Eastern European region largely depend on how strong Russian influence in Belarus is. The process of Russian-Belarusian integration began in 1994, when Alyaksandr Lukashenka came to power in Minsk. At the time, Russia's policy towards Belarus was based on twomain assumptions. Firstly, the Kremlin supported Lukashenka's authoritarian regime. This allowed Russia to keep Belarus within its orbit of political influence and prevent other states from getting involved, since an undemocratic Belarus could not count on closer contacts with the West. Secondly, Russia heavily subsidised Belarus with cheap energy resources (way below the market price) and allowed the duty-free access of Belarusian goods to its market. Thus Belarus became a kind of 'sponsored authoritarianism' with a specific economic model, owing its existence to Russia's economic and political support. At the same time, Moscow's key objective in its policy towards Belarus was to make Minsk accept the Russian conditions concerning integration, which would in fact lead to Belarus' incorporation by the Russian Federation. However, Belarus managed to maintain its sovereignty, while Alyaksandr Lukashenka bandied the term 'integration' about in order to maintain the preferential model of his state's relations with Russia. Russia's intention to alter the nature of these bilateral relations became evident when Vladimir Putin took power in 2000. However, Moscow faced Minsk's refusal to accept the Russian integration plan (which, among other measures, provided for the takeover of Belarusian economic assets by Russian companies). This forced Russia to use its main tool against Minsk: the supplies of cheap gas and oil that had been sustaining Belarus' archaic economy. The most serious crisis in Russian-Belarusian relations broke out at the beginning of 2007, following Moscow's decision to raise the energy resource prices. This decision marked the beginning of the application of market principles to settlements between Moscow and Minsk. The key question this study is meant to answer concerns the consequences of the aforementioned decision by Russia for future Russian-Belarusian relations. Are they at a turning point? What are Russia's policy objectives? What results can come from the process of moving mutual relations onto an economic footing? What policy will replace Russia's 'sponsoring of Belarusian authoritarianism', which it has been implementing since 1994? Finally, what further measures will Russia undertake towards Belarus? The current study consists of five chapters. The first chapter offers a brief presentation of Belarus' significance and position in Russian policy. The second analyses the development of Russian-Belarusian political relations, first of all the establishment of the Union State, Belarus' position in Russian domestic policy and Russia's influence on Belarusian policy. The third chapter presents bilateral economic relations, primarily energy issues. The fourth chapter describes the state and perspectives of military cooperation between the two states. The fifth chapter presents conclusions, where the author attempts to define the essence of the ongoing re-evaluation in Russian-Belarusian relations and to project their future model.
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1. Even though Chechnya remains the most unstable republic in the Russian North Caucasus, the open armed conflict known as the Second Chechen War, which broke out in the autumn of 1999, is gradually dying down. 2. Several years ago, the conflict in Chechnya could have been characterised as a war between Chechen separatists and the government of the Russian Federation. However, the nature of the conflict has changed significantly over the last four or five years. 3. Even though the intensity of fighting in Chechnya has abated in recent years, the conflict has spilt over to the other Caucasus republics such as Ingushetia, Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria. As a result, this is presently not so much a Chechen conflict as a regional clash between the authorities and the Caucasian (including Chechen) Islamists. 4. The Chechen militants are weaker now, and the conflict has changed from a struggle for national liberation into a fight for the Islamic cause; but this does not mean that Russia has ultimately solved the problem of Chechen separatism.
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More than one year since the first pro-Russian moves in the Donbas, separatists have taken control of parts of the Donbas and Luhansk oblasts but are still unable to form truly functioning administrative structures. The exercise of power by the central administration of the so-called ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ (DPR) and ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ (LPR) is restricted to resolving problems as they arise, while administration proper is the prerogative of the local authorities reporting to them which had been performing this function before the conflict broke out. The way the situation is developing and the fact that access to information is restricted make it difficult to determine the structure of the separatist government in more detail, precisely how it is organised, and what the internal hierarchy is like. The overriding goal of the governments of the DPR and the LPR is to maintain and develop their military potential. In effect, the lives of the so-called republics are subordinate to military goals. The Donbas separatism is a conglomerate of different groups of interests, with Russia at the fulcrum. Its representatives set the main tactical and strategic goals and thus have a decisive influence on the development of the situation in the region. Individual separatist groupings come into conflict, and some oligarchs linked to the former Party of Regions circles have also been making attempts to maintain their influence. The struggle between individual groups of interest is intensifying as the situation on the war front becomes calmer. Since the situation has temporarily stabilised after the seizure of Debaltseve, the central governments of the DPR and the LPR have made attempts to expand their influence, combating armed criminals who are outside their control and that of Russia. The civilian population is taking the brunt of the devastation caused by the war and the increasing militarisation of the region. Despite the fact that the intensity of the fighting on the war front is falling, worsening humanitarian problems are causing refugees to continue their flight from the territories controlled by the separatists. 2 million people have fled the conflict zone since the beginning of the war: 1.3 million of them have found shelter in other regions of Ukraine, and more than 700,000 have left for Russia. The region has also sustained great economic losses – most mines have been either destroyed or closed, many industrial plants have restricted or completely discontinued their production, and many firms have been taken over by force. In effect, the region has seen an economic downturn.
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Substantial retreat or disintegration of numerous ice shelves have been observed on the Antarctic Peninsula. The ice shelf in the Prince Gustav Channel retreated gradually since the late 1980's and broke-up in 1995. Tributary glaciers reacted with speed-up, surface lowering and increased ice discharge, consequently contributing to sea level rise. We present a detailed long-term study (1993-2014) on the dynamic response of Sjögren Inlet glaciers to the disintegration of Prince Gustav Ice Shelf. We analyzed various remote sensing datasets to observe the reactions of the glaciers to the loss of the buttressing ice shelf. A strong increase in ice surface velocities was observed with maximum flow speeds reaching 2.82±0.48 m/d in 2007 and 1.50±0.32 m/d in 2004 at Sjögren and Boydell glaciers respectively. Subsequently, the flow velocities decelerated, however in late 2014, we still measured about two times the values of our first measurements in 1996. The tributary glaciers retreated 61.7±3.1 km² behind the former grounding line of the ice shelf. In regions below 1000 m a.s.l., a mean surface lowering of -68±10 m (-3.1 m/a) was observed in the period 1993-2014. The lowering rate decreased to -2.2 m/a in recent years. Based on the surface lowering rates, geodetic mass balances of the glaciers were derived for different time steps. High mass loss rate of -1.21±0.36 Gt/a was found in the earliest period (1993-2001). Due to the dynamic adjustments of the glaciers to the new boundary conditions the ice mass loss reduced to -0.59±0.11 Gt/a in the period 2012-2014, resulting in an average mass loss rate of -0.89±0.16 Gt/a (1993-2014). Including the retreat of the ice front and grounding line, a total mass change of -38.5±7.7 Gt and a contribution to sea level rise of 0.061±0.013 mm were computed. Analysis of the ice flux revealed that available bedrock elevation estimates at Sjögren Inlet are too shallow and are the major uncertainty in ice flux computations. This temporally dense time series analysis of Sjögren Inlet glaciers shows that the adjustments of tributary glaciers to ice shelf disintegration are still going on and provides detailed information of the changes in glacier dynamics.
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v.3. Heavens glory, seeke it, &c., 1628. The famous history of Gvy erle of Warwicke, 1682. Miscellaneous poems. Notes, by Sidney J.H. Herrtage. Glossary, by Sidney J.H. Herrtage.
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[Dufek's TD was U-M's only score in loss that broke 23 game winning streak.]
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A chronicle of one of the wars between the Chilians and Araucanians, which broke out in 1598.
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The heart of old Hickory.--Fiddling his way to fame.--A wonderful experience meeting.--Who broke up de meet'n?--Rags.--Ole Logan's courtship.--The heart of the woods.--Christmas eve at the corner grocery.
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Thesis (Master's)--University of Washington, 2016-08
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Thesis (Master's)--University of Washington, 2016-06
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Samples of the cyanobacterium Microcystis aeruginosa from a small pond were used in laboratory experiments with a grid-stirred tank to quantify the effect of turbulent mixing on colony size. Turbulent dissipation in the tank was varied from 10(-9) m(2) s(-3) to 10(-4) m(2) s(-3), covering the range of turbulence intensities experienced by M. aeruginosa colonies in the field and exceeding the maximum dissipation by two orders of magnitude. Large colonies broke up into smaller colonies during the experiments; the mass fraction of colonies with diameter less than 200 mum increased over time. Colony disaggregation was observed to increase with turbulent dissipation. The maximum stable colony diameter across all experiments was in the range 220-420 mum. The overall change in size distribution during the experiments was relatively small, and the colony size distribution remained very broad throughout the experiments. Since colony size affects migration velocity, susceptibility to grazing and surface area to volume ratios, more work is needed to determine how to best represent this broad size distribution when modelling M. aeruginosa populations.
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A series of trials to increase understanding of the summer dormancy trait in Dactylis glomerata was conducted. Autumn-sown reproductive and younger, spring-sown plants of 2 drought-resistant cultivars, contrasting for summer dormancy, were established and then tested in summer 2002 under long drought, drought + midsummer storm, or full irrigation. The autumn-sown reproductive plants of cv. Kasbah were summer dormant under all moisture regimes and exhibited the characteristic traits including growth cessation, rapid herbage senescence, and dehydration of surviving organs (-6.7MPa). Cultivar Kasbah used 8% less soil water over the summer and also began to rehydrate its leaf bases from conserved soil water before the drought broke. The non-dormant cv. Medly grew for 10 days longer under drought and whenever moisture was applied; Medly also responded to the storm with a decline in dehydrin expression in leaf bases, whereas no decline occurred in Kasbah, presumably because it remained dormant and therefore much drier. The irrigated, younger, spring-sown swards of cv. Kasbah had restrained growth and produced only about 25% of the herbage of cv. Medly. Drought reduced activity and growth of young plants of both cultivars, but whereas Medly regrew in response to the storm, cv. Kasbah did not, indicating that dormancy, although only partially expressed after spring sowing, was reinforced by summer drought. A longer drought in 2003 caused a 22% loss of the basal cover in cv. Medly, whereas Kasbah fully maintained its sward and therefore produced a higher post-drought autumn yield. This work confirms summer dormancy as a powerful trait for improving persistence over long, dry summers.
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A região do Grande ABC é caracterizada por ser local que retrata, de forma singular, os conflitos, as mudanças e o impacto da globalização no País e no mundo. Diferentes setores, articulados, construíram o Planejamento Regional para a região, que se deparava com a flexibilização, o desemprego estrutural e a diminuição nos postos de trabalho das grandes montadoras, de indústrias de autopeças, entre outras, e descobriu caminhos de enfrentamento para o processo que avassalou o Brasil e o mundo. Isso exigiu a profissionalização de quem ocupava a função de Secretário, para atender ao perfil das multinacionais. A partir daí, o Secretariado Executivo vem se consolidando como uma profissão de caráter inteligente e intelectual, considerado como analítico-simbólico. O Secretário rompeu com seu antigo perfil, enfrentando a concorrência de profissionais de outras áreas, e desempenha hoje um papel de assessoria adjunta, gerenciando processos e facilitando tomadas de decisão. É um profissional de formação intelectual diferenciada, com competências técnicas, comportamentais e estratégicas. Assim, esta pesquisa teve como objetivo analisar o processo de construção da identidade do ser profissional Secretário na região do Grande ABC; levantar os espaços ocupados por esse profissional, através de mapeamento dos postos que ocupa, e construir uma linha do tempo dessa profissão na região. Para atender aos objetivos, foi utilizada pesquisa documental, a construção de uma linha do tempo e a história oral temática, procedendo-se à coleta e à análise dos dados de sete profissionais Secretários atuantes na região do Grande ABC. O diálogo interdisciplinar entre teoria e os discursos evidenciou que ainda existe um estereótipo cultural quanto à profissão nas organizações, mas há um respeito, ainda que velado, dos superiores e colegas, conquistado por sua persistência e profissionalização. Os resultados demonstram que a identidade do ser profissional Secretário é construída em suas experiências vividas no passado e no presente, o que lhe proporciona um esboço de valores individuais e profissionais que são revistos nas diversas organizações em que atuam ou atuaram e dentro do contexto regional estudado, gerando variações em suas identidades.(AU)