Mate choice evolution, dominance effects, and the maintenance of genetic variation.

Female mate choice influences the maintenance of genetic variation by altering the mating success of males with different genotypes. The evolution of preferences themselves, on the other hand, depends on genetic variation present in the population. Few models have tracked this feedback between a choice gene and its effects on genetic variation, in particular when genes that determine offspring viability and attractiveness have dominance effects. Here we build a population genetic model that allows comparing the evolution of various choice rules in a single framework. We first consider preferences for good genes and show that focused preferences for homozygotes evolve more easily than broad preferences, which allow heterozygous males high mating success too. This occurs despite better maintenance of genetic diversity in the latter scenario, and we discuss why empirical findings of superior mating success of heterozygous males consequently do not immediately lead to a better understanding of the lek paradox. Our results thus suggest that the mechanisms that help maintain genetic diversity also have a flipside of making female choice an inaccurate means of producing the desired kind of offspring. We then consider preferences for heterozygosity per se, and show that these evolve only under very special conditions. Choice for compatible genotypes can evolve but its selective advantage diminishes quickly due to frequency-dependent selection. Finally, we show that our model reproduces earlier results on selfing, when the female choice strategy produces assortative mating. Overall, our model indicates that various forms of heterozygote-favouring (or variable) female choice pose a problem for the theory of sexual ornamentation based on indirect benefits, rather than a solution.

Good genes drive female choice for mating partners in the lek-breeding European treefrog.

Investigating the mechanisms underlying female mate choice is important for sexual-selection theory, but also for population-genetic studies, because distinctive breeding strategies affect differently the dynamics of gene diversity within populations. Using field-monitoring, genetic-assignment, and laboratory-rearing methods, we investigated chorus attendance, mating success and offspring fitness in a population of lek-breeding tree-frogs (Hyla arborea) to test whether female choice is driven by good genes or complementary genes. Chorus attendance explained approximately 50% of the variance in male mating success, but did not correlate with offspring fitness. By contrast, offspring body mass and growth rate correlated with male attractiveness, measured as the number of matings obtained per night of calling. Genetic similarity between mating partners did not depart from random, and did not affect offspring fitness. We conclude that females are able to choose good partners under natural settings and obtain benefits from the good genes, rather than compatible genes, their offspring inherit. This heritability of fitness is likely to reduce effective population sizes below values previously estimated.

Information overload, choice deferral, and moderating role of need for cognition: Empirical evidence

ABSTRACT Choice deferral due to information overload is an undesirable result of competitive environments. The neoclassical maximization models predict that choice avoidance will not increase as more information is offered to consumers. The theories developed in the consumer behavior field predict that some properties of the environment may lead to behavioral effects and an increase in choice avoidance due to information overload. Based on stimuli generated experimentally and tested among 1,000 consumers, this empirical research provides evidence for the presence of behavioral effects due to information overload and reveals the different effects of increasing the number of options or the number of attributes. This study also finds that the need for cognition moderates these behavioral effects, and it proposes psychological processes that may trigger the effects observed.

Behavioral aspects of investment fund's markets: are good managers lucky or skilled?

It is generally accepted that financial markets are efficient in the long run a lthough there may be some deviations in the short run. It is also accepted that a good portfolio manager is the one who beats the market persistently along time, this type of manager could not exist if markets were perfectly efficient According to this in a pure efficient market we should find that managers know that they can not beat the market so they would undertake only pure passive management strategies. Assuming a certain degree of inefficiency in the short run, a market may show some managers who tr y to beat the market by undertaking active strategies. From Fama’s efficient markets theory we can state that these active managers may beat the market occasionally although they will not be able to enhance significantly their performance in the long run. On the other hand, in an inefficient market it would be expected to find a higher level of activity related with the higher probability of beating the market. In this paper we follow two objectives: first, we set a basis to analyse the level of efficiency in an asset invest- ment funds market by measuring performance, strategies activity and it’s persistence for a certain group of funds during the period of study. Second, we analyse individual performance persistence in order to determine the existence of skilled managers. The CAPM model is taken as theoretical background and the use of the Sharpe’s ratio as a suitable performance measure in a limited information environment leads to a group performance measurement proposal. The empiri- cal study takes quarterly data from 1999-2007 period, for the whole population of the Spanish asset investment funds market, provided by the CNMV (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores). This period of study has been chosen to ensure a wide enough range of efficient market observation so it would allow us to set a proper basis to compare with the following period. As a result we develop a model that allows us to measure efficiency in a given asset mutual funds market, based on the level of strategy’s activity undertaken by managers. We also observe persistence in individual performance for a certain group of funds

Occupational choice and development

The rise in world trade since 1970 has been accompanied by a rise in the geographic span of control of management and, hence, also a rise in the e ective international mobility of labor services. We study the e ect of such a globalization of the world's labor markets. The world's welfare gains depend positively on the skill-heterogeneity of the world's labor force. We nd that when peoplecan choose between wage work and managerial work, the worldwide labor market raises output by more in the rich and the poor countries, and by less in the middle-income countries. This is because the middle-income countries experience the smallest change in the factor-price ratio, and where the option to choose between wage work and managerial work has the least value in the integratedeconomy. Our theory also establishes that after economic integration, the high skill countries see a disproportionate increase in managerial occupations. Using aggregate data on GDP, openness and occupations from 115 countries, we find evidence for these patterns of occupational choice.

Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice

Two main school choice mechanisms have attracted the attention in the literature: Boston and deferred acceptance (DA). The question arises on the ex-ante welfareimplications when the game is played by participants that vary in terms of their strategicsophistication. Abdulkadiroglu, Che and Yasuda (2011) have shown that the chances ofnaive participants getting into a good school are higher under the Boston mechanism thanunder DA, and some naive participants are actually better off. In this note we show thatthese results can be extended to show that, under the veil of ignorance, i.e. students not yetknowing their utility values, all naive students may prefer to adopt the Boston mechanism.

Choice by sequential procedures

We propose a rule of decision-making, the sequential procedure guided byroutes, and show that three influential boundedly rational choice models can be equivalentlyunderstood as special cases of this rule. In addition, the sequential procedure guidedby routes is instrumental in showing that the three models are intimately related. We showthat choice with a status-quo bias is a refinement of rationalizability by game trees, which, inturn, is also a refinement of sequential rationalizability. Thus, we provide a sharp taxonomyof these choice models, and show that they all can be understood as choice by sequentialprocedures.

Choice of partners in multiple two-person prisoner's dilemma games: An experimental study

We examine the effect of unilateral and mutual partner selection in the context of prisoner's dilemmas experimentally. Subjects play simultaneously several finitely repeated two-person prisoner's dilemma games. We find that unilateral choice is the best system. It leads to low defection and fewer singles than with mutual choice. Furthermore, with the unilateral choice setup we are able to show that intendingdefectors are more likely to try to avoid a match than intending cooperators. We compare our results of multiple games with single game PD-experiments and find no difference in aggregate behavior. Hence the multiple game technique is robust and might therefore be an important tool in the future for testing the use of mixed strategies.

A dynamic choice model of hybrid behavior in the attribute-space

This paper presents a dynamic choice model in the attributespace considering rational consumers that discount the future. In lightof the evidence of several state-dependence patterns, the model isfurther extended by considering a utility function that allows for thedifferent types of behavior described in the literature: pure inertia,pure variety seeking and hybrid. The model presents a stationaryconsumption pattern that can be inertial, where the consumer only buysone product, or a variety-seeking one, where the consumer buys severalproducts simultane-ously. Under the inverted-U marginal utilityassumption, the consumer behaves inertial among the existing brands forseveral periods, and eventually, once the stationary levels areapproached, the consumer turns to a variety-seeking behavior. An empiricalanalysis is run using a scanner database for fabric softener andsignificant evidence of hybrid behavior for most attributes is found,which supports the functional form considered in the theory.

Credit cycles in theory and experiment

We test in the laboratory the potential of evolutionary dynamics as predictor of actual behavior. To this end, we propose an asymmetricgame -which we interpret as a borrowerlender relation-, study itsevolutionary dynamics in a random matching set-up, and tests itspredictions. The model provides conditions for the existence ofcredit markets and credit cycles. The theoretical predictions seemto be good approximations of the experimental results.

Take-the-best and other simple strategies: Why and when they work 'well' in binary choice

The effectiveness of decision rules depends on characteristics of bothrules and environments. A theoretical analysis of environments specifiesthe relative predictive accuracies of the lexicographic rule 'take-the-best'(TTB) and other simple strategies for binary choice. We identify threefactors: how the environment weights variables; characteristics of choicesets; and error. For cases involving from three to five binary cues, TTBis effective across many environments. However, hybrids of equal weights(EW) and TTB models are more effective as environments become morecompensatory. In the presence of error, TTB and similar models do not predictmuch better than a naïve model that exploits dominance. We emphasizepsychological implications and the need for more complete theories of theenvironment that include the role of error.

Satisfaction in choice as a function of the number of alternatives: When "goods satiate" but "bads escalate"

Whereas people are typically thought to be better off with more choices, studiesshow that they often prefer to choose from small as opposed to large sets of alternatives.We propose that satisfaction from choice is an inverted U-shaped function of thenumber of alternatives. This proposition is derived theoretically by considering thebenefits and costs of different numbers of alternatives and is supported by fourexperimental studies. We also manipulate the perceptual costs of information processingand demonstrate how this affects the resulting satisfaction function. We furtherindicate that satisfaction when choosing from a given set is diminished if people aremade aware of the existence of other choice sets. The role of individual differences insatisfaction from choice is documented by noting effects due to gender and culture. Weconclude by emphasizing the need to have an explicit rationale for knowing how muchchoice is enough.

Salience and consumer choice

We present a theory of context-dependent choice in which a consumer's attention is drawnto salient attributes of goods, such as quality or price. An attribute is salient for a good when itstands out among the good's attributes, relative to that attribute's average level in the choice set (orgenerally, the evoked set). Consumers attach disproportionately high weight to salient attributesand their choices are tilted toward goods with higher quality/price ratios. The model accounts fora variety of disparate evidence, including decoy effects, context-dependent willingness to pay, andlarge shifts in demand in response to price shocks.

Rational reasoning or adaptive behavior? Evidence from two-person beauty contest games

Many experiments have shown that human subjects do not necessarily behave in line with game theoretic assumptions and solution concepts. The reasons for this non-conformity are multiple. In this paper we study the argument whether a deviation from game theory is because subjects are rational, but doubt that others are rational as well, compared to the argument that subjects, in general, are boundedly rational themselves. To distinguish these two hypotheses, we study behavior in repeated 2-person and many-person Beauty-Contest-Games which are strategically different from one another. We analyze four different treatments and observe that convergence toward equilibrium is driven by learning through the information about the other player s choice and adaptation rather than self-initiated rational reasoning.