Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Bank Credit Card Information, Fall 2003

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Bank Credit Card Information

Credit rationing and crowding out during the Industrial Revolution: Evidence from Hoare's Bank, 1702-1862

Crowding-out during the British Industrial Revolution has long been one of the leadingexplanations for slow growth during the Industrial Revolution, but little empirical evidence exists to support it. We argue that examinations of interest rates are fundamentally misguided, and that the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century private loan market balanced through quantity rationing. Using a unique set of observations on lending volume at a London goldsmith bank, Hoare s, we document the impact of wartime financing on private credit markets. We conclude that there is considerable evidence that government borrowing, especially during wartime, crowded out private credit.

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Guard Your Bank Accounts!, June 2005

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Guard Your Bank Accounts!

Financial liberalization, bank crises and growth: Assessing the links

This paper studies the effects of financial liberalization and banking crises on growth. It shows that financial liberalization spurs on average economic growth. Banking crises are harmful for growth, but to a lesser extent in countries with open financial systems and good institutions. The positive effect of financial liberalization is robust to different definitions. While the removal of capital account restrictions is effective by increasing financial depth, equity market liberalization affects growth directly. The empirical analysis is performed through GMM dynamic panel data estimations on a panel of 90 countries observed in the period 1975-1999.

Systemic risk, interbank relations and liquidity provision by the Central Bank

We model systemic risk in an interbank market. Banks face liquidityneeds as consumers are uncertain about where they need to consume. Interbank credit lines allow to cope with these liquidity shocks while reducing the cost of maintaining reserves. However, the interbank market exposes the system to a coordination failure(gridlock equilibrium) even if all banks are solvent. When one bankis insolvent, the stability of the banking system is affected in various ways depending on the patterns of payments across locations. We investigate the ability of the banking industry to withstand the insolvency of one bank and whether the closure ofone bank generates a chain reaction on the rest of the system. Weanalyze the coordinating role of the Central Bank in preventing payments systemic repercussions and we examine the justification ofthe Too-big-to-fail-policy.

Bank versus venture capital

Why do some start-up firms raise funds from banks andothers from venture capitalists? To answer this question,I develop a model of start-up financing when intellectualproperty rights are not well protected. The upside of VCfinancing is that the VC understands the business betterthan a bank. The downside, however, is that the VC maysteal the idea and use it himself. The results of themodel are consistent with empirical regularities onstart-up financing. The model implies that thecharacteristics of the firms financing from venturecapitalists are low-collateral, high-growth and high-profitability. The model also suggests that thetighter protection of intellectual property rightscontributes to the recent dramatic growth of the USventure capital industry.

Banking as an emerging technology: Hoare's Bank, 1702-1742

London s financial market underwent dramatic change after 1700. More limitedthan Paris or Amsterdam in the seventeenth century, London became the leadingfinancial centre in Europe in the eighteenth century. There is an extensive andgrowing literature on the causes of this change, but comparatively little on thechange itself. This article provides detailed information on the operation of theLondon financial market around 1700 by describing the operations of a nascentLondon bank.

Private borrowing during the financial revolution: Hoare’s Bank and its customers, 1702-1724

The financial revolution improved the British government s ability to borrow, andthus its ability to wage war. North andWeingast argued that it also permitted privateparties to borrow more cheaply and widely.We test these inferences with evidencefrom a London bank.We confirm that private bank credit was cheap in the earlyeighteenth century, but we argue that it was not available widely. Importantly, thegovernment reduced the usury rate in 1714, sharply reducing the circle of privateclients that could be served profitably.

Post crisis challenges to bank regulation

The current crisis has swept aside not only the whole of the US investment banking industry butalso the consensual perception of banking risks, contagion and their implication for bankingregulation. As everyone agrees now, risks where mispriced, they accumulated in neuralgic pointsof the financial system, and where amplified by procyclical regulation as well as by the instabilityand fragility of financial institutions.The use of ratings as carved in stone and lack of adequate procedure to swiftly deal withsystemic institutions bankruptcy (whether too-big-to-fail, too complex to fail or too-many to fail).The current paper will not deal with the description and analysis of the crisis, already covered inother contributions to this issue will address the critical choice regulatory authorities will face. Inthe future regulation has to change, but it is not clear that it will change in the right direction. Thismay occur if regulatory authorities, possibly influenced by public opinion and political pressure,adopt an incorrect view of financial crisis prevention and management. Indeed, there are twoapproaches to post-crisis regulation. One is the rare event approach, whereby financial crises willoccur infrequently, but are inescapable.

Bank liquidity, interbank markets and monetary policy

A major lesson of the recent financial crisis is that the interbank lending marketis crucial for banks facing large uncertainty regarding their liquidity needs. Thispaper studies the efficiency of the interbank lending market in allocating funds. Weconsider two different types of liquidity shocks leading to different implications foroptimal policy by the central bank. We show that, when confronted with a distributional liquidity-shock crisis that causes a large disparity in the liquidity held amongbanks, the central bank should lower the interbank rate. This view implies that thetraditional tenet prescribing the separation between prudential regulation and monetary policy should be abandoned. In addition, we show that, during an aggregateliquidity crisis, central banks should manage the aggregate volume of liquidity. Twodifferent instruments, interest rates and liquidity injection, are therefore required tocope with the two different types of liquidity shocks. Finally, we show that failureto cut interest rates during a crisis erodes financial stability by increasing the riskof bank runs.

Definition of tolerable soil erosion values

Although the criteria for defining erosion tolerance are well established, the limits generally used are not consistent with natural, economical and technological conditions. Rates greater than soil formation can be accepted only until a minimum of soil depth is reached, provided that they are not associated with environmental hazard or productivity losses. A sequence of equations is presented to calculate erosion tolerance rates through time. The selection of equation parameters permits the definition of erosion tolerance rates in agreement with environmental, social and technical needs. The soil depth change that is related to irreversible soil degradation can be calculated. The definition of soil erosion tolerance according to these equations can be used as a guideline for sustainable land use planning and is compatible with expert systems.

Sedimentos marinos superficiales en la bahía del Callao, Perú. 1997

Durante El Niño 1997, se estudiaron los sedimentos marinos superficiales de la bahía del Callao (11°50’S a 12°06’S), en 68 estaciones de muestreo situadas al interior de la bahía, incluyendo Ventanilla. Se situaron 35 estaciones complementarias entre las desembocaduras de los ríos Rímac y Chillón donde se concentran las descargas de desechos industriales, urbanos y de actividad portuaria. Se realizaron tres transectos, frente a: playa Ventanilla, al colector Comas y a Chucuito-La Punta. Frente a la playa Márquez se encuentra textura areno arcillosa y hacia el norte predomina el fango; frente a Oquendo las texturas son fango y arena arcillosa. Sedimentos de grano fino, con textura limo arcillosa y arcillo limosa existen en el fondo marino de zonas más profundas y alejadas de la costa; pero también están cerca de la costa, al sur y suroeste de la zona de operaciones portuarias, frente a Chucuito y La Punta. Texturas de arena se registraron al norte del río Chillón (La Pampilla y Ventanilla), en los alrededores del banco Camotal y frente a La Punta. En las áreas más profundas y abrigadas de la bahía, los sedimentos con granulometría muy fina presentan valores negativos de asimetría, característicos de ambientes de sedimentación. En sectores donde existen sedimentos de grano más grueso ocurren procesos de transporte (tipo y forma de ondulaciones) y erosión, apreciables en imágenes del fondo, y en el análisis de parámetros estadísticos. Los altos contenidos de materia orgánica se encuentran asociados a sedimentos de grano fino en ambientes de sedimentación principalmente, está condicionado por la tasa de aporte y origen (antrópico, marino o continental) y por las condiciones de escaso oxígeno que favorecen su preservación. Los más bajos contenidos orgánicos frente a la zona costera de Ventanilla, están asociadas a sedimentos con predominancia de fracciones de arena y origen terrígeno y mayor oxigenación.

Is bank debt special for the transmission of monetary policy? Evidence from the stock market

We combine existing balance sheet and stock market data with two new datasets to studywhether, how much, and why bank lending to firms matters for the transmission of monetarypolicy. The first new dataset enables us to quantify the bank dependence of firms precisely,as the ratio of bank debt to total assets. We show that a two standard deviation increase inthe bank dependence of a firm makes its stock price about 25% more responsive to monetarypolicy shocks. We explore the channels through which this effect occurs, and find that thestock prices of bank-dependent firms that borrow from financially weaker banks display astronger sensitivity to monetary policy shocks. This finding is consistent with the banklending channel, a theory according to which the strength of bank balance sheets mattersfor monetary policy transmission. We construct a new database of hedging activities andshow that the stock prices of bank-dependent firms that hedge against interest rate riskdisplay a lower sensitivity to monetary policy shocks. This finding is consistent with aninterest rate pass-through channel that operates via the direct transmission of policy ratesto lending rates associated with the widespread use of floating-rates in bank loans and creditline agreements.