390 resultados para Auction
Resumo:
Auction based mechanisms have become popular in industrial procurement settings. These mechanisms minimize the cost of procurement and at the same time achieve desirable properties such as truthful bidding by the suppliers. In this paper, we investigate the design of truthful procurement auctions taking into account an additional important issue namely carbon emissions. In particular, we focus on the following procurement problem: A buyer wishes to source multiple units of a homogeneous item from several competing suppliers who offer volume discount bids and who also provide emission curves that specify the cost of emissions as a function of volume of supply. We assume that emission curves are reported truthfully since that information is easily verifiable through standard sources. First we formulate the volume discount procurement auction problem with emission constraints under the assumption that the suppliers are honest (that is they report production costs truthfully). Next we describe a mechanism design formulation for green procurement with strategic suppliers. Our numerical experimentation shows that emission constraints can significantly alter sourcing decisions and affect the procurement costs dramatically. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first effort in explicitly taking into account carbon emissions in planning procurement auctions.
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We consider the problem of Probably Ap-proximate Correct (PAC) learning of a bi-nary classifier from noisy labeled exam-ples acquired from multiple annotators(each characterized by a respective clas-sification noise rate). First, we consider the complete information scenario, where the learner knows the noise rates of all the annotators. For this scenario, we derive sample complexity bound for the Mini-mum Disagreement Algorithm (MDA) on the number of labeled examples to be ob-tained from each annotator. Next, we consider the incomplete information sce-nario, where each annotator is strategic and holds the respective noise rate as a private information. For this scenario, we design a cost optimal procurement auc-tion mechanism along the lines of Myer-son’s optimal auction design framework in a non-trivial manner. This mechanism satisfies incentive compatibility property,thereby facilitating the learner to elicit true noise rates of all the annotators.
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Resumen: La dificultad con las redes radica en que, al ser de uso colectivo, generan conflictos sobre sus derechos de propiedad y obligaciones de pago. Por eso, existe una controversia sobre el más eficiente modo para su provisión, que se extiende desde el laissez faire hasta la dictadura. En el camino, se puede detener en algún tipo de consenso, basado en el diseño de mecanismos, adecuado para hacer revelar sus preferencias a los participantes. El proceso implica un intercambio de derechos entre los agentes para arribar a la asignación definitiva. Si, mediante una subasta, se obliga a los participantes a realizar ofertas de intercambio de derechos, los costos de transacción se reducen y la fluidez no puede sino ser mayor. Y ante una mayor fluidez en el intercambio, siempre será posible alcanzar una asignación más eficiente de esos derechos de propiedad. Para mostrar la conveniencia de esta alternativa, en este trabajo se presenta un modelo simplificado de diseño de mecanismos en donde se analiza la eficiencia asignativa de la regla propuesta.
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[ES] Los trabajos de investigación sobre comercio electrónico en Internet ocupan gran parte de la investigación de marketing, pero son pocos aún los que se han ocupado de estudiar el sistema de subasta. Ante las peculiares características de una compra online, transmitir confianza al consumidor en este contexto es uno de los retos más importantes y difíciles en comparación con la compra offline. No obstante, es de esperar que las señales generadoras de confianza sean diferentes en la compra online por subasta que en la compra online en otros sitios web.
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This paper analyzes auctions where bidders face nancial constraints that may force them to resell part of the property of the good (or subcontract part of a project) at a resale market. First we show that the ine¢ cient speculative equilibria of second- price auctions (Garratt and Tröger, 2006) generalizes to situations with partial resale where only the high value bidder is nancially constrained. However, when all players face nancial constraints the ine¢ cient speculative equilibria disappear. Therefore, for auctioning big facilities or contracts where all bidders are nancially constrained and there is a resale market, the second price auction remains a simple and appropriate mechanism to achieve an e¢ cient allocation.
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For the first time in its history, the International Symposium on Sea Turtle Biology and Conservation migrated to a site outside of the United States. Thus the Eighteenth edition was hosted by the Mazatlán Research Unit of the Instituto de Ciencias del Mar y Limnología of the Mexican National Autonomous University (UNAM) in Mazatlán, Sinaloa (Mexico) where it was held from 3-7, March, 1998. Above all, our symposium is prominent for its dynamism and enthusiasm in bringing together specialists from the world´s sea turtle populations. In an effort to extend this philosophy, and fully aware of how fast the interest in sea turtles has grown, the organizers paid special attention to bring together as many people as possible. With the tremendous efforts of the Travel Committee and coupled with a special interest by the Latin American region´s devotees, we managed to get 653 participants from 43 countries. The number of presentations increased significantly too, reaching a total of 265 papers, ranging from cutting-edge scientific reports based on highly sophisticated methods, to the experiences and successes of community-based and environmental education programs. A priority given by this symposium was the support and encouragement for the construction of "bridges" across cultural and discipline barriers. We found success in achieving a multinational dialogue among interest groups- scientists, resource managers, decision makers, ngo's, private industry. There was a broad representation of the broad interests that stretch across these sectors, yet everyone was able to listen and offer their own best contribution towards the central theme of the Symposium: the conservation of sea turtles and the diversity of marine and coastal environments in which they develop through their complicated and protracted life cycle. Our multidisciplinary approach is highly important at the present, finding ourselves at a cross roads of significant initiatives in the international arena of environmental law, where the conservation of sea turtles has a key role to play. Many, many people worked hard over the previous 12 months, to make the symposium a success. Our sincerest thanks to all of them: Program committee: Laura Sarti (chair), Ana Barragán, Rod Mast, Heather Kalb, Jim Spotilla, Richard Reina, Sheryan Epperly, Anna Bass, Steve Morreale, Milani Chaloupka, Robert Van Dam, Lew Ehrhart, J. Nichols, David Godfrey, Larry Herbst, René Márquez, Jack Musick, Peter Dutton, Patricia Huerta, Arturo Juárez, Debora Garcia, Carlos Suárez, German Ramírez, Raquel Briseño, Alberto Abreu; Registration and Secretary: Jane Provancha (chair), Lupita Polanco; Informatics: Germán Ramírez, Carlos Suárez; Cover art: Blas Nayar; Designs: Germán Ramírez, Raquel Briseño, Alberto Abreu. Auction: Rod Mast; Workshops and special meetings: Selina Heppell; Student prizes: Anders Rhodin; Resolutions committee: Juan Carlos Cantú; Local organizing committee: Raquel Briseño, Jane Abreu; Posters: Daniel Ríos and Jeffrey Semminoff; Travel committee: Karen Eckert (chair), Marydele Donnelly, Brendan Godley, Annette Broderick, Jack Frazier; Student travel: Francisco Silva and J. Nichols; Vendors: Tom McFarland and J. Nichols; Volunteer coordination: Richard Byles; Latin American Reunión: Angeles Cruz Morelos; Nominations committee: Randall Arauz, Colleen Coogan, Laura Sarti, Donna Shaver, Frank Paladino. Once again, Ed Drane worked his usual magic with the Treasury of the Symposium Significant financial contributions were generously provided by government agencies. SEMARNAP (Mexico´s Ministry of Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries) through its central office, the Mazatlán Regional Fisheries Research Center (CRIP-Mazatlán) and the National Center for Education and Capacity Building for Sustainable Development (CECADESU) contributed to the logistics and covered the costs of auditoria and audiovisual equipment for the Symposium, teachers and their hotels for the Community Development and Environmental Education workshop in the 5th Latin American Sea Turtle Specialists; DIF (Dept of Family Affairs) provided free accomodation and food for the more than 100 participants in the Latin American Reunion. In this Reunion, the British Council-Mexico sponsored the workshop on the Project Cycle. The National Chamber of the Fisheries Industry (CANAINPES) kindly sponsored the Symposium´s coffee breaks. Personnel from the local Navy (Octave Zona Naval) provided invaluable aid in transport and logistics. The Scientific Coordination Office from UNAM (CICUNAM) and the Latin American Biology Network (RELAB) also provided funding. Our most sincere recognition to all of them. In the name of this Symposium´s compilers, I would like to also express our gratitude to Wayne Witzell, Technical Editor for his guidance and insights and to Jack Frazier for his help in translating and correcting the English of contributions from some non-native English speakers. Many thanks to Angel Fiscal and Tere Martin who helped with the typing in the last, last corrections and editions for these Proceedings. To all, from around the world, who generously helped make the 18th Symposium a huge success, shared their experiences and listened to ours, our deepest gratitude! (PDF contains 316 pages)
Proceedings fo the Seventeenth Annual Sea Turtle Symposium, 4-8 March 1997, Orlando, Florida, U.S.A.
Resumo:
The 17th Annual Sea Turtle Symposium was held at the Delta Orlando Resort in Orlando, Florida U.S.A. from March 4-8, 1997. The symposium was hosted by Florida Atlantic University, Mote Marine Laboratory, University of Central Florida, University of Florida, Florida Atlantic University and the Comité Nacional para la Conservación y Protección de las Totugas Marinas. The 17th was the largest symposium to date. A total of 720 participants registered, including sea turtle biologists, students, regulatory personnel, managers, and volunteers representing 38 countries. In addition to the United States, participants represented Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Bonaire, Bermuda, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, England, Guatemala, Greece, Honduras, India, Italy, Japan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mexico, The Netherlands, Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines, Republic of Seychelles, Scotland, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela. In addition to the 79 oral, 2 video, and 120 poster presentations, 3 workshops were offered: Selina Heppell (Duke University Marine Laboratory) provided “Population Modeling,” Mike Walsh and Sam Dover (Sea World-Orlando) conducted “Marine Turtle Veterinary Medicine” and “Conservation on Nesting Beaches” was offered by Blair Witherington and David Arnold (Florida Department of Environmental Protection). On the first evening, P.C.H. Pritchard delivered a thoughtful retrospect on Archie Carr that showed many sides of a complex man who studied and wrote about sea turtles. It was a presentation that none of us will forget. The members considered a number of resolutions at the Thursday business meeting and passed six. Five of these resolutions are presented in the Commentaries and Reviews section of Chelonian Conservation and Biology 2(3):442-444 (1997). The symposium was fortunate to have many fine presentations competing for the Archie Carr Best Student Presentations awards. The best oral presentation award went to Amanda Southwood (University of British Columbia) for “Heart rates and dive behavior of the leatherback sea turtle during the internesting interval.” The two runners-up were Richard Reina (Australian National University) for “Regulation of salt gland activity in Chelonia mydas” and Singo Minamikawa (Kyoto University) for “The influence that artificial specific gravity change gives to diving behavior of loggerhead turtles”. The winner of this year’s best poster competition was Mark Roberts (University of South Florida) for his poster entitled “Global population structure of green sea Turtles (Chelonia mydas) using microsatellite analysis of male mediated gene flow.” The two runners-up were Larisa Avens (University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill) for “Equilibrium responses to rotational displacements by hatchling sea turtles: maintaining a migratory heading in a turbulent ocean” and Annette Broderick (University of Glasgow) for “Female size, not length, is a correlate of reproductive output.” The symposium was very fortunate to receive a matching monetary and subscription gift from Anders J. G. Rhodin of the Chelonian Research Foundation. These enabled us to more adequately reward the fine work of students. The winners of the best paper and best poster awards received $400 plus a subscription to Chelonian Conservation and Biology. Each runner up received $100. The symposium owes a great debt to countless volunteers who helped make the meeting a success. Those volunteers include: Jamie Serino, Alan Bolton, and Karen Bjorndal, along with the UF students provided audio visual help, John Keinath chaired the student awards committee, Mike Salmon chaired the Program Commiteee, Sheryan Epperly and Joanne Braun compiled the Proceedings, Edwin Drane served as treasurer and provided much logistical help, Jane Provancha coordinated volunteers, Thelma Richardson conducted registration, Vicki Wiese coordinated food and beverage services, Jamie Serino and Erik Marin coordinated entertainment, Kenneth Dodd oversaw student travel awards, Traci Guynup, Tina Brown, Jerris Foote, Dan Hamilton, Richie Moretti, and Vicki Wiese served on the time and place committee, Blair Witherington created the trivia quiz, Tom McFarland donated the symposium logo, Deborah Crouse chaired the resolutions committee, Pamela Plotkin chaired the nominations committee, Sally Krebs, Susan Schenk, and Larry Wood conducted the silent auction, and Beverly and Tom McFarland coordinated all 26 vendors. Many individuals from outside the United States were able to attend the 17th Annual Sea Turtle Symposium thanks to the tireless work of Karen Eckert, Marydele Donnelly, and Jack Frazier in soliciting travel assistance for a number of international participants. We are indebted to those donating money to the internationals’ housing fund (Flo Vetter Memorial Fund, Marinelife Center of Juno Beach, Roger Mellgren, and Jane Provancha). We raise much of our money for international travel from the auction; thanks go to auctioneer Bob Shoop, who kept our auction fastpaced and entertaining, and made sure the bidding was high. The Annual Sea Turtle Symposium is unequaled in its emphasis on international participation. Through international participation we all learn a great deal more about the biology of sea turtles and the conservation issues that sea turtles face in distant waters. Additionally, those attending the symposium come away with a tremendous wealth of knowledge, professional contacts, and new friendships. The Annual Sea Turtle Symposium is a meeting in which pretenses are dropped, good science is presented, and friendly, open communication is the rule. The camaraderie that typifies these meetings ultimately translates into understanding and cooperation. These aspects, combined, have gone and will go a long way toward helping to protect marine turtles and toward aiding their recovery on a global scale. (PDF contains 342 pages)
Resumo:
There is a growing amount of experimental evidence that suggests people often deviate from the predictions of game theory. Some scholars attempt to explain the observations by introducing errors into behavioral models. However, most of these modifications are situation dependent and do not generalize. A new theory, called the rational novice model, is introduced as an attempt to provide a general theory that takes account of erroneous behavior. The rational novice model is based on two central principals. The first is that people systematically make inaccurate guesses when they are evaluating their options in a game-like situation. The second is that people treat their decisions similar to a portfolio problem. As a result, non optimal actions in a game theoretic sense may be included in the rational novice strategy profile with positive weights.
The rational novice model can be divided into two parts: the behavioral model and the equilibrium concept. In a theoretical chapter, the mathematics of the behavioral model and the equilibrium concept are introduced. The existence of the equilibrium is established. In addition, the Nash equilibrium is shown to be a special case of the rational novice equilibrium. In another chapter, the rational novice model is applied to a voluntary contribution game. Numerical methods were used to obtain the solution. The model is estimated with data obtained from the Palfrey and Prisbrey experimental study of the voluntary contribution game. It is found that the rational novice model explains the data better than the Nash model. Although a formal statistical test was not used, pseudo R^2 analysis indicates that the rational novice model is better than a Probit model similar to the one used in the Palfrey and Prisbrey study.
The rational novice model is also applied to a first price sealed bid auction. Again, computing techniques were used to obtain a numerical solution. The data obtained from the Chen and Plott study were used to estimate the model. The rational novice model outperforms the CRRAM, the primary Nash model studied in the Chen and Plott study. However, the rational novice model is not the best amongst all models. A sophisticated rule-of-thumb, called the SOPAM, offers the best explanation of the data.
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This dissertation contains three essays on mechanism design. The common goal of these essays is to assist in the solution of different resource allocation problems where asymmetric information creates obstacles to the efficient allocation of resources. In each essay, we present a mechanism that satisfactorily solves the resource allocation problem and study some of its properties. In our first essay, ”Combinatorial Assignment under Dichotomous Preferences”, we present a class of problems akin to time scheduling without a pre-existing time grid, and propose a mechanism that is efficient, strategy-proof and envy-free. Our second essay, ”Monitoring Costs and the Management of Common-Pool Resources”, studies what can happen to an existing mechanism — the individual tradable quotas (ITQ) mechanism, also known as the cap-and-trade mechanism — when quota enforcement is imperfect and costly. Our third essay, ”Vessel Buyback”, coauthored with John O. Ledyard, presents an auction design that can be used to buy back excess capital in overcapitalized industries.
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Government procurement of a new good or service is a process that usually includes basic research, development, and production. Empirical evidences indicate that investments in research and development (R and D) before production are significant in many defense procurements. Thus, optimal procurement policy should not be only to select the most efficient producer, but also to induce the contractors to design the best product and to develop the best technology. It is difficult to apply the current economic theory of optimal procurement and contracting, which has emphasized production, but ignored R and D, to many cases of procurement.
In this thesis, I provide basic models of both R and D and production in the procurement process where a number of firms invest in private R and D and compete for a government contract. R and D is modeled as a stochastic cost-reduction process. The government is considered both as a profit-maximizer and a procurement cost minimizer. In comparison to the literature, the following results derived from my models are significant. First, R and D matters in procurement contracting. When offering the optimal contract the government will be better off if it correctly takes into account costly private R and D investment. Second, competition matters. The optimal contract and the total equilibrium R and D expenditures vary with the number of firms. The government usually does not prefer infinite competition among firms. Instead, it prefers free entry of firms. Third, under a R and D technology with the constant marginal returns-to-scale, it is socially optimal to have only one firm to conduct all of the R and D and production. Fourth, in an independent private values environment with risk-neutral firms, an informed government should select one of four standard auction procedures with an appropriate announced reserve price, acting as if it does not have any private information.
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This publication gives fishery statistics relating to the landings of the Ivorian trawlers in Abidjan in 1983. The data used are the inquiries made by the C.R.O. on the boats and the auction sheets of the fishing harbour. The data processing was executed on the C.R.O. computer.
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This publication gives fishery statistics relating to the landings of the ivorian trawlers in Abidjan in 1982. The data used are the inquiries made by the C.R.O. on the boats and the auction sheets of the fishing harbour. The data processing was executed on the C.R.O. computer.
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This publication gives fishery statistics relating to the landings of the Ivorian trawlers in Abidjan in 1981. The data used are the inquiries made by the C.R.O. on the boats and the auction sheets of the fishing harbour. The data processing was executed on the C.R.O. computer.
Resumo:
This publication gives fishery statistics relating to the landings of the Ivorian trawlers in Abidjan in 1983. The data used are the inquiries made by the C.R.O. on the boats and the auction sheets of the fishing harbour. The data processing was executed on the C.R.O. computer.
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Weight-on-length (W-L) relationships for 2,482 dolphinfish, Coryphaena hippurus, and 1,161 wahoo, Acanthocybium solandri, were examined. Data on fork length, whole (round) weight, and sex were collected for dolphinfish at the Honolulu fish auction from March 1988 through November 1989. Unsexed weight and length data for wahoo were collected at the auction from July 1988 through November 1989. We also used sex specific weight and length data of 171 wahoo collected during 1977–1985 research cruises for analysis. Coefficients of W-L regressions were significantly different between the sexes for dolphinfish. Coefficients did not significantly differ between the sexes for wahoo based on research cruise data. In a general linear model evaluating month as a categorical factor, month was significant for female dolphinfish, male dolphinfish, and wahoo with sexes pooled. W-L and length-on-weight (L-W) relationships were fitted by nonlinear regression for all dolphinfish, female dolphinfish, male dolphinfish, and all wahoo sexes pooled. W-L relationships for monthly samples of female dolphinfish, male dolphinfish, and all wahoo with sexes pooled were also fitted by nonlinear regression. Predicted mean weight at length for wahoo was highest at the beginning of the spawning season in June and lowest after the spawning season in September. Maximum and minimum predicted mean weight at length for both sexes of dolphinfish did not correspond with the peak spawning period (March–May). Plausible migration models in conjunction with reproductive behavior were examined to explain the variability in monthly predicted mean weight at length for dolphinfish.