Law and science: risk assessment and risk management in the WTO agreement on the application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures

Assessing and managing risks relating to the consumption of food stuffs for humans and to the environment has been one of the most complex legal issues in WTO law, ever since the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures was adopted at the end of the Uruguay Round and entered into force in 1995. The problem was expounded in a number of cases. Panels and the Appellate Body adopted different philosophies in interpreting the agreement and the basic concept of risk assessment as defined in Annex A para. 4 of the Agreement. Risk assessment entails fundamental question on law and science. Different interpretations reflect different underlying perceptions of science and its relationship to the law. The present thesis supported by the Swiss National Research Foundation undertakes an in-depth analysis of these underlying perceptions. The author expounds the essence and differences of positivism and relativism in philosophy and natural sciences. He clarifies the relationship of fundamental concepts such as risk, hazards and probability. This investigation is a remarkable effort on the part of lawyer keen to learn more about the fundamentals based upon which the law – often unconsciously – is operated by the legal profession and the trade community. Based upon these insights, he turns to a critical assessment of jurisprudence both of panels and the Appellate Body. Extensively referring and discussing the literature, he deconstructs findings and decisions in light of implied and assumed underlying philosophies and perceptions as to the relationship of law and science, in particular in the field of food standards. Finding that both positivism and relativism does not provide adequate answers, the author turns critical rationalism and applies the methodologies of falsification developed by Karl R. Popper. Critical rationalism allows combining discourse in science and law and helps preparing the ground for a new approach to risk assessment and risk management. Linking the problem to the doctrine of multilevel governance the author develops a theory allocating risk assessment to international for a while leaving the matter of risk management to national and democratically accountable government. While the author throughout the thesis questions the possibility of separating risk assessment and risk management, the thesis offers new avenues which may assist in structuring a complex and difficult problem

Deterrence and Incapacitation: Towards a Unified Theory of Criminal Punishment

Economic models of crime have focused primarily on the goal of deterrence; the goal of incapacitation has received much less attention. This paper adapts the standard deterrence model to incorporate incapacitation. When prison only is used, incapacitation can result in a longer or a shorter optimal prison term compared to the deterrence-only model. It is longer if there is underdeterrence, and shorter if there is overdeterrence. In contrast, when a fine is available and it is not constrained by the offender's wealth, the optimal prison term is zero. Since the fine achieves first-best deterrence, only efficient crimes are committed and hence, there is no gain from incapacitation.

O princípio da ofensividade como complemento necessário à regra da legalidade penal no Estado Democrático de Direito

As ideias políticas e filosóficas que influenciaram a criação da regra da legalidade penal e do princípio da ofensividade têm origem no Iluminismo. Principalmente durante a Idade Média e o Antigo Regime, confundia-se crime com pecado e as pessoas podiam ser punidas por mero capricho do soberano, sem que existisse lei. As arbitrariedades eram gritantes. A finalidade de ambas as teorias surgidas no período da Ilustração, portanto ao pregarem que era necessária a existência de lei prévia para que alguém fosse punido (regra da legalidade) e que o crime pressupunha uma lesão a direito ou bem jurídico de terceiro (princípio da ofensividade) , era a mesma: limitar o poder punitivo. No entanto, a regra da legalidade penal foi muito mais absorvida pelo discurso dogmático-jurídico do que o princípio da ofensividade, sendo oportuno, pois, analisar as razões pelas quais isso ocorreu. Algumas delas serão analisadas neste estudo como, por exemplo, a ausência de previsão explícita desse princípio nas Constituições, a suposta incompatibilidade desse princípio com a separação de poderes e com a própria regra da legalidade penal e a insegurança jurídica que a aplicação de princípios poderia gerar. Além disso, há um fator político de destaque: a consolidação da burguesia exigia a imposição de limites formais ao poder estatal, mas não limites materiais. Outro fator importante foi o advento do positivismo criminológico, no final do século XIX, que, ao confundir crime com doença, retornou ao paradigma do direito penal do autor que havia vigorado na Idade Média. Finalmente, para demonstrar o que impediu a consolidação do princípio da ofensividade especificamente no Brasil, será analisada a influência da doutrina europeia na dogmática nacional.

The Future Direction of Delaware Law (Including a Brief Exegesis on Fee Shifting Bylaws)

Delaware sets the governance standards for most public companies. The ability to attract corporations could not be explained solely by the existence of a favorable statutory regime. Delaware was not invariably the first or the only state to implement management friendly provisions. Given the interpretive gaps in the statute and the critical importance of the common law in the governance process, courts played an outsized role in setting legal standards. The management friendly nature of the Delaware courts contributed significantly to the state’s attraction to public corporations. A current example of a management friendly trend in the case law had seen the recent decisions setting out the board’s authority to adopt bylaws under Section 109 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), particularly those involving the shifting of fees in litigation against the corporation or its directors. The DGCL allows bylaws that address “the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.” The broad parameters are, however, subject to limits. Bylaws cannot be inconsistent with the certificate of incorporation or “the law.” Law includes the common law. The Delaware courts have used the limitations imposed by “the law” to severely restrict the reach of shareholder inspired bylaws. The courts have not used the same principles to impose similar restraints on bylaws adopted by the board of directors. This can be seen with respect to bylaws that restrict or even eliminate the right of shareholders to bring actions against management and the corporation. In ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund the court approved a fee shifting bylaw that had littl relationship to the internal affairs of the corporation. The decision upheld the bylaw as facially valid.The decision ignored a number of obvious legal infirmities. Among other things, the decision did not adequately address the requirement in Section 109(b) that bylaws be consistent with “the law.” The decision obliquely acknowledged that the provisions would “by their nature, deter litigation” but otherwise made no effort to assess the impact of this deterrence on shareholders causes of action. The provision in fact had the practical effect of restricting, if not eliminating, litigation rights granted by the DGCL and the common law. Perhaps most significantly, however, the bylaws significantly limited common law rights of shareholders to bring actions against the corporation and the board. Given the high dismissal rates for these actions, fee shifting bylaws imposed a meaningful risk of liability on plaintiffs. Moreover, because judgments in derivative suits were paid to the corporation, shareholders serving as plaintiffs confronted the risk of liability without any offsetting direct benefit. By preventing suits in this area, the bylaw effectively insulated the behavior of boards from legal challenge. The ATP decision was poorly reasoned and overstepped acceptable boundaries. The management friendly decision threatened the preeminent role of Delaware in the development of corporate law. The decision raised the specter of federal intervention and the potential for meaningful competition from the states. Because the opinion examined the bylaw in the context of non-stock companies, the reasoning may remain applicable only to those entities and never make the leap to for-profit stock corporations. Nonetheless, the analysis reflects a management friendly approach that does not adequately take into account the impact of the provision on the rights of shareholders.

Robotic control systems based on bioinspired multi-agent systems: application of the principles of neuroscience to robotics

Robotics is a field that presents a large number of problems because it depends on a large number of disciplines, devices, technologies and tasks. Its expansion from perfectly controlled industrial environments toward open and dynamic environment presents a many new challenges, such as robots household robots or professional robots. To facilitate the rapid development of robotic systems, low cost, reusability of code, its medium and long term maintainability and robustness are required novel approaches to provide generic models and software systems who develop paradigms capable of solving these problems. For this purpose, in this paper we propose a model based on multi-agent systems inspired by the human nervous system able to transfer the control characteristics of the biological system and able to take advantage of the best properties of distributed software systems.