Italy and the EU in historical perspective. ACES Working Papers, August 2009

This paper will deal with relations between Italy and the European Communities in a historical perspective. It will take into consideration both exogenous and endogenous variables. As regards the exogenous, relations with the United States are of particular relevance. As for the endogenous, the focus will be on the way political parties have perceived the process of European integration. Here, one can distinguish three periods: from the origins to the late 1970s; from the late 1970s to the mid 1990s and from the mid 1990s to today. The first period was characterized by the opposition of the left to European and Atlantic integration, on the basis of ideological contraposition; the second witnessed a shared consensus by all political parties on integration - especially European; in the latest period, domestic political divisions at times lead parties to oppose European integration.

Russian nationalists on the Kremlin’s policy in Ukraine. OSW Commentary No. 156|24.12.2014

On the Day of National Unity, celebrated in Russia every 4 November, members of nationalist movements organise a so-called Russian March in Moscow. In 2014 the nationalists took part in three competing marches, which illustrated the divisions present in these circles. The reason for these divisions is a difference of opinions on the policy pursued by Russia towards Ukraine. The pro-Russian, Russia-inspired protests in south-eastern Ukraine organised under the slogan of ‘defending’ the Russians living there (the ‘Russian Spring’) and the annexation of Crimea were received enthusiastically by the nationalists and contributed to a consolidation of these circles around the Kremlin which lasted for several months. In spite of this, opinions on the Russian government’s current policy towards the so-called Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics have been varied. The most radical groups have demanded that military support be offered, and that the ‘confederation’ of these republics, the so-called ‘Novorossiya’, should be officially recognised. They consider the Kremlin’s policy to have been too soft, and see the signing of the peace agreements in Minsk as a betrayal of the interests of the Russians. For the remaining representatives of nationalist circles, who are not so numerous and are less visible in the public sphere, finding a solution for Russia’s domestic problems remains a priority. Some of them oppose the very notion of Russia’s involvement in the conflict. Since the beginning of the ‘Russian Spring’, the Kremlin has fostered active attitudes among the nationalists and solicited their support, hoping to win a valuable ally. This has boosted hopes in these circles that their political position may be strengthened. The involvement in the fighting in Ukraine has led to a radicalisation of attitudes among the nationalists, and demonstrated that this group is ideologically motivated and has considerable potential for mobilisation. Moreover, the ‘Great Russian’ and anti-Western slogans some of them have propagated are reflected in views displayed by average Russians, who have been influenced by the patriotic enthusiasm which followed the annexation of Crimea. Due to all this, from among all the actors active on the opposition side, it is the nationalists – and not the representatives of the liberal and pro-Western opposition – that have the best prospects for access to the political stage in Russia. It cannot be ruled out that a further strengthening of the radical groups might also be boosted by the possible growing social frustration caused by the economic crisis, which additionally increases the risk of political destabilisation.

The New Silk Road: a versatile instrument in China’s policy. OSW Commentary No. 161, February 10 2015

Introduction. The Chinese leader Xi Jinping presented the concept of the New Silk Road – a collection of land and maritime routes – in autumn 2013. Initially, it envisaged the creation of a network of infrastructural connections, mainly transport corridors, between China and its most important economic partner – Europe. The concept grew in importance throughout 2014 to become the key instrument of China’s foreign policy, especially in the areas of public diplomacy and soft power. Towards the end of 2014, the Chinese government announced it would establish a Silk Road Fund worth US$40 billion. The New Silk Road idea is a flexible formula used by China in its dialogue with many other countries. Its inclusive nature helps contribute to diluting the negative impression caused by China’s rapid economic expansion and assertiveness in foreign policy, especially with regard to its neighbours. The process of implementing the New Silk Road concept will allow China to expand its influence within its neighbourhood: in Central and South-Eastern Asia. The New Silk Road will be an alternative point of reference to the US dominance and Russian integration projects in these regions. The concept will legitimise and facilitate the growth of China’s influence in the transit countries on the route to Western Europe, i.e. in the Middle East (Arab countries, Israel and Turkey, the Horn of Africa and Central Europe (the Balkans and the Visegrad Group countries). This concept is also essential for China’s domestic policy. It has become one of Xi Jinping’s main political projects. It will boost the development of China’s central and western provinces. The fact that the concept is open and not fully defined means that it will be a success regardless of the extent to which it will be implemented in practice. Its flexible nature allows China to continue investments already initiated bilaterally and to present them as components of the New Silk Road concept.

Germany’s ‘refugee’ problem. The most important test for Chancellor Merkel and the grand coalition. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 182/11.09.2015 2015-09-11

The rapid increase in the number of immigrants from outside of the EU coming to Germany has become the paramount political issue. According to new estimates, the number of individuals expected arrive in Germany in 2015 and apply for asylum there is 800,000, which is nearly twice as many as estimated in earlier forecasts. Various administrative, financial and social problems related to the influx of migrants are becoming increasingly apparent. The problem of ‘refugees’ (in public debate, the terms ‘immigrants’, ‘refugees’, ‘illegal immigrants’, ‘economic immigrants’ have not been clearly defined and have often been used interchangeably) has been culminating for over a year. Despite this, it was being disregarded by Angela Merkel’s government which was preoccupied with debates on how to rescue Greece. It was only daily reports of cases of refugee centres being set on fire that convinced Chancellor Merkel to speak and to make immigration problem a priority issue (Chefsache). Neither the ruling coalition nor the opposition parties have a consistent idea of how Germany should react to the growing number of refugees. In this matter, divisions run across parties. Various solutions have been proposed, from liberalisation of laws on the right to stay in Germany to combating illegal immigration more effectively, which would be possible if asylum granting procedures were accelerated. The proposed solutions have not been properly thought through, instead they are reactive measures inspired by the results of opinion polls. This is why their assumptions are often contradictory. The situation is similar regarding the actions proposed by Chancellor Merkel which involve faster procedures to expel individuals with no right to stay in Germany and a plan to convince other EU states to accept ‘refugees’. None of these ideas is new – they were already present in the German internal debate.

The man about town : short stories, philosophical reflections, curbstone politicians, the brown eyed girl, some real fish stories, letters from the resorts and the six barefooted boys /

"Reprinted from the Evening leader."

Unified Jewish religious education curriculum : resource guide for the Armed Forces /

Cover title.

The shift of paradigm in the organizations like foundation of the style of ethical leadership

La presente investigación tiene por objeto analizar el cambio de paradigma en las organizaciones como fundamento del liderazgo ético desde una realidad postmoderna a fin de detectar la necesidad de un liderazgo ético en las organizaciones donde los líderes sean formadores de valores a través del modelaje directivo; es un estilo de liderazgo en el que la visión ética, sistémica e integradora son unas de las principales aptitudes que el líder ético ha de poner en la práctica. Se han desarrollado teorías de liderazgo centradas no tanto en los rasgos o comportamientos de los líderes, sino en la relación entre líder y sus seguidores

The shift of paradigm in the organizations like foundation of the style of ethical leadership

La presente investigación tiene por objeto analizar el cambio de paradigma en las organizaciones como fundamento del liderazgo ético desde una realidad postmoderna a fin de detectar la necesidad de un liderazgo ético en las organizaciones donde los líderes sean formadores de valores a través del modelaje directivo; es un estilo de liderazgo en el que la visión ética, sistémica e integradora son unas de las principales aptitudes que el líder ético ha de poner en la práctica. Se han desarrollado teorías de liderazgo centradas no tanto en los rasgos o comportamientos de los líderes, sino en la relación entre líder y sus seguidores

Leader development for transforming organizations: growing leaders for tomorrow

The article reviews the book "Leader development for transforming organizations: growing leaders for tomorrow",edited by David V. Day, Stephen J. Zaccaro and Stanley M. Halpin.

Metaphors in Hugo Chávez's political discourse:conceptualizing nation, revolution and opposition

This book provides the first comprehensive analysis of metaphors used by Hugo Chávez in his efforts to construct and legitimize his Bolivarian Revolution. It focuses on metaphors drawn from three of his most frequent target domains: the nation, his revolution, and the opposition. The author argues that behind an official discourse of inclusion, Chávez's choice of metaphors contributes to the construction of a polarizing discourse of exclusion in which his political opponents are represented as enemies of the nation. Chávez constructs this polarizing discourse of exclusion by combining metaphors that conceptualize: (a) the nation as a person who has been resurrected by his government, as a person ready to fight for his revolution, or as Chávez himself; (b) the revolution as war; and (c) members of the opposition as war combatants or criminals. At the same time, by making explicit references in his discourse about the revolution as the continuation of Simón Bolívar's wars of independence, Chávez contributes to represent opponents as enemies of the nation, given that in the Venezuelan collective imaginary Bolívar is the symbol of the nation's emancipation.

The French Communist Party and the Algerian war : an ideological turning point?

The subject-matter of this thesis is the interaction between the Parti Communiste Français and the National Liberation struggle in Algeria , and the debate that ensued within the Party itself.For a detailed study of the Party ' s line on the war, PCF publications were contrasted with the texts produced by the opposition.Three main axes were identified crystallising discussion within the Party during the Algerian war: The relationship between France and Algeria and the Party ' s attitude to the French nation; The nature of the Algerian nation and its genesis; France's military engagement in Algeria.The dichotomy between the Party's national and internationalist responsibilities is shown to have resolved itself by the fundamental integration of the PCF into the political structure and value system of the French Republic. This study demonstrates the birth of a substantial internal opposition to the PCF during the Algerian war.

Metaphors in Hugo Chávez's political discourse:conceptualizing nation, revolution and opposition

This dissertation examines Hugo Chávez's choice of metaphors in his efforts to construct and legitimize his Bolivarian Revolution. It focuses on metaphors drawn from three of the most frequent target domains present in his discourse: the nation, his revolution, and the opposition. The study argues that behind an official discourse of inclusion, Chávez's choice of metaphors contributes to the construction of a polarizing discourse of exclusion in which his political opponents are represented as enemies of the nation.The study shows that Chávez constructs this polarizing discourse of exclusion by combining metaphors that conceptualize: (a) the nation as a person who has been resurrected by his government, as a person ready to fight for his revolution, or as Chávez himself; (b) the revolution as war; and (c) members of the opposition as war combatants or criminals. At the same time, the study shows that by making explicit references in his discourse about the revolution as the continuation of Bolívar's wars of independence, Chávez contributes to represent opponents as enemies of the nation, given that in the Venezuelan collective imaginary Simón Bolívar is the symbol of the nation's emancipation.This research, which covers a period of nine years (from Chávez's first year in office in 1999 through 2007), is part of the discipline of Political Discourse Analysis (PDA). It is anchored both in the theoretical framework provided by the cognitive linguistic metaphor theory developed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson described in their book Metaphors We Live By, and in Critical Metaphor Analysis (CMA) as defined by Jonathan Charteris-Black in his book Corpus Approaches to Critical Metaphor Analysis.The study provides the first comprehensive analysis of metaphors used by Chávez in his political discourse. It builds upon the findings of previous studies on political discourse analysis in Venezuela by showing that Chávez's discourse not only polarizes the country and represents opponents as detractors of national symbols such as Bolívar or his wars of independence (which have been clearly established in previous studies), but also represents political opponents as enemies of the nation.

Assessing the efficacy of structural merger remedies:choosing between theories of harm?

Previous empirical assessments of the effectiveness of structural merger remedies have focused mainly on the subsequent viability of the divested assets. Here, we take a different approach by examining how competitive are the market structures which result from the divestments. We employ a tightly specified sample of markets in which the European Commission (EC) has imposed structural merger remedies. It has two key features: (i) it includes all mergers in which the EC appears to have seriously considered, simultaneously, the possibility of collective dominance, as well as single dominance; (ii) in a previous paper, for the same sample, we estimated a model which proved very successful in predicting the Commission’s merger decisions, in terms of the market shares of the leading firms. The former allows us to explore the choices between alternative theories of harm, and the latter provides a yardstick for evaluating whether markets are competitive or not – at least in the eyes of the Commission. Running the hypothetical post-remedy market shares through the model, we can predict whether the EC would have judged the markets concerned to be competitive, had they been the result of a merger rather than a remedy. We find that a significant proportion were not competitive in this sense. One explanation is that the EC has simply been inconsistent – using different criteria for assessing remedies from those for assessing the mergers in the first place. However, a more sympathetic – and in our opinion, more likely – explanation is that the Commission is severely constrained by the pre-merger market structures in many markets. We show that, typically, divestment remedies return the market to the same structure as existed before the proposed merger. Indeed, one can argue that any competition authority should never do more than this. Crucially, however, we find that this pre-merger structure is often itself not competitive. We also observe an analogous picture in a number of markets where the Commission chose not to intervene: while the post-merger structure was not competitive, nor was the pre-merger structure. In those cases, however, the Commission preferred the former to the latter. In effect, in both scenarios, the EC was faced with a no-win decision. This immediately raises a follow-up question: why did the EC intervene for some, but not for others – given that in all these cases, some sort of anticompetitive structure would prevail? We show that, in this sample at least, the answer is often tied to the prospective rank of the merged firm post-merger. In particular, in those markets where the merged firm would not be the largest post-merger, we find a reluctance to intervene even where the resulting market structure is likely to be conducive to collective dominance. We explain this by a willingness to tolerate an outcome which may be conducive to tacit collusion if the alternative is the possibility of an enhanced position of single dominance by the market leader. Finally, because the sample is confined to cases brought under the ‘old’ EC Merger Regulation, we go on to consider how, if at all, these conclusions require qualification following the 2004 revisions, which, amongst other things, made interventions for non-coordinated behaviour possible without requiring that the merged firm be a dominant market leader. Our main conclusions here are that the Commission appears to have been less inclined to intervene in general, but particularly for Collective Dominance (or ‘coordinated effects’ as it is now known in Europe as well as the US.) Moreover, perhaps contrary to expectation, where the merged firm is #2, the Commission has to date rarely made a unilateral effects decision and never made a coordinated effects decision.

How brand attribute typicality and consumer commitment moderate the influence of comparative advertising

This study examines how product attribute typicality and brand commitment influence the effects of comparative versus non-comparative ads on brand attitudes. Employing perspectives from the literatures on typicality and commitment, the study examines the effects of commitment to the comparison brand on the effectiveness of comparative versus non-comparative advertising. A between-informants experiment uses data from 466 student informants. It is hypothesized that (a) when the attribute under consideration is typical (atypical), among comparison brand committed informants, a non-comparative ad is more (no more) persuasive than a comparative ad, (b) when the attribute under consideration is typical, among comparison brand non-committed informants, a comparative ad is more persuasive than a non-comparative ad, and (c) when the attribute under consideration is atypical, among comparison brand non-committed informants, a comparative ad is likely to be more persuasive than a non-comparative ad, but the effect will be weaker than in the case of a typical attribute. Hypothesis (a) is supported while (b) has directional support. The results support a three-way interaction between consumer commitment, attribute typicality, and type of advertisement. The findings are relevant to a variety of contexts, such as markets characterized by high levels of market share and commitment for the market leader as well as fragmented markets where market share and commitment levels are low.

Marine Le Pen and the 'New' FN:a change of style or of substance?

The electoral challenge of the far right is an enduringly problematic feature of contemporary French politics. In the first rounds of the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections, the Front National (FN) under new leader Marine Le Pen attracted a combined total of ten million votes, bringing its ultra-nationalist policies to the centre of national political debate. This article examines the FN's impact on these elections and its implications for French politics. Drawing on official FN programmes, detailed election results and a range of opinion polling data, it assesses the strength of support for Le Pen and her party and seeks to explain their electoral appeal. In particular, it subjects to analysis the claim that the new leader has ‘de-demonised’ the FN, transforming it from perennial outsider to normal participant in mainstream French politics; and it reflects on the strategic dilemma posed for the centre-right by this newly invigorated far-right challenge.