Response of residential electricity demand to price: The effect of measurement error

In this paper we present an empirical analysis of the residential demand for electricity using annual aggregate data at the state level for 48 US states from 1995 to 2007. Earlier literature has examined residential energy consumption at the state level using annual or monthly data, focusing on the variation in price elasticities of demand across states or regions, but has failed to recognize or address two major issues. The first is that, when fitting dynamic panel models, the lagged consumption term in the right-hand side of the demand equation is endogenous. This has resulted in potentially inconsistent estimates of the long-run price elasticity of demand. The second is that energy price is likely mismeasured.

Trading Activity in Options and Stock Around Price-Sensitive News Announcements

This study investigates the trading activity in options and stock markets around informed events with extreme daily stock price movements. We find that informed agents are more likely to trade options prior to negative news and stocks ahead of positive news. We also show that optioned stocks overreact to the arrival of negative news, but react efficiently to positive news. However, the overreaction patterns are unique to the subsample of stocks with the lowest pre-event abnormal option/stock volume ratio (O/S). This finding suggests that the incremental benefit of option listing is related to the level of option trading activity, over and beyond the presence of an options market on the firm's stock. Finally, we find that the pre-event abnormal O/S is a better predictor of stock price patterns following a negative shock than is the pre-event O/S, implying that the former may contain more information about the future value of stocks than the latter.

Price Discrimination in Quantity Setting Oligopoly

We analyze a two-stage quantity setting oligopolistic price discrimination game. In the first stage firms choose capacities and in the second stage they simultaneously choose the share that they assign to each segment. At the equilibrium the firms focus more on the high-valuation customers. When the capacities in the first stage are endogenous, the deadweight loss does not vanish with the level of price discrimination, as it does in one-stage games and monopoly. Moreover, the quantity-weighted average price increases with the level of price discrimination as opposed to established results in the literature for one-stage games.